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Rick Phillips on the PCA (Gabriel Fluhrer)
2 hours ago
Saturday, February 28, 2009
Friday, February 27, 2009
Anti-Intellectualism
I’ve been following a recent online discussion amongst some friends, acquaintances and strangers, which has been swirling around the proper interpretation of Romans 9. Some rather tangential posts were made by one individual presenting arguments in favor of anti-intellectualism (avoiding certain areas of study because they are valueless in that person/group's estimation). Since the arguments presented are somewhat common in certain American non-denominational evangelical denominations, I’d like to take a moment and respond to them here briefly, for the benefit of some friends of mine who have made their way out of a certain anti-intellectual non-denominational denomination (and for the benefit of those who may still be caught in this bankrupted perspective on truth, knowledge and learning, that they might be awakened to a modern reformation of the Christian heart/mind as well). This is to encourage Christians of all backgrounds to engage in the difficult, but rewarding, discipline of theological study. “It has to start somewhere. It has to start sometime. What better place than here? What better time than now?”
I’m going to quote several of the anti-intellectual fellow’s statements in italics, with my responses afterward in regular script again.
I wanted to comment on some of these comments. The pharoses (sic) were very learned and knew the Hebrew down to the letter, but they were very wrong. Jesus chose his disciples for a reason. To say that they were schooled in 3 languages and the scriptures is making an assumption. They may have been but it doesn’t say that. In fact what it does say is:
Acts 4: 13 Now when they saw the boldness of Peter and John, and perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men, they marvelled; and they took knowledge of them, that they had been with Jesus. 14 And beholding the man which was healed standing with them, they could say nothing against it.
unlearned = agrammatos, ag-ram'-mat-os; from G1 (as neg. particle) and G1121; unlettered, i.e. illiterate:--unlearned.
Ignorant = idiotes, id-ee-o'-tace; (by impl.) an ignoramus (comp. "idiot"):--ignorant, rude, unlearned.
All the school that they needed was to spend time with Jesus...
"Man’s heart is desperately wicked. I whole heartedly disagree with putting my trust in anything that man teaches (sic) shares, forms doctrine or rites (sic) in a book. He may be right but he may also be wrong. It is extremely easy to brainwash people into a system of beliefs, and extremely hard to un-brainwash them. It’s been happening for thousands of years. The only thing we can put our trust in is the Bible. I’m not saying that we can’t glean from a book at all. I’m just saying that they can be extremely dangerous. I guess the reasons I find extra biblical reading dangerous is because of their brainwashing ability. Let me give a few examples of how easy it is to get brainwashed. We all think that our minds are strong and resistant to manipulation but it has absolutely nothing to do with mental strength. The human mind has built into it a form of deductive reasoning. We are all wired like this and can’t change it. However we can arm ourselves by understanding our flesh and the wiles of the devil. These brainwashing exercises will hopefully give us an idea of how our minds and the devil operate. You may have heard of some of these through the years.
"#1) A man left home one day jogging. He jogged a little ways and then turned left, then he jogged a little ways and turned left again, and he jogged a little ways and turned left again and jogged toward home. As he was jogging he noticed two masked men waiting for him. Why did he leave home jogging? Who were the masked men?
...
"#3) This is one that Ken Ham used during a creation vs. evolution seminar. His focus was to show how the school system brainwashes the students. First he drew two large parenthesize (sic) like curved line segments like this. ( ) Then he asked two questions. What’s missing? What did this use (sic) to be? Most of the answers he got were “a circle, or two semi circles.” He answered “your (sic) wrong”. He said, you just saw me draw it right in front of you. It didn’t use (sic) to be anything. Nothing is missing. Your answer was wrong because my question was wrong because you never questioned my question. In this example Ken was trying to demonstrate how easy it was to trap ones (sic) thoughts into a box. Once in the box it is almost impossible to get out. All it takes is one manipulative question to get your thinking off in a direction that all other contemplations will only emanate from that same point. Another (sic) words, once manipulated in to a box, it’s almost impossible to think outside of it.
"It’s so easy to be manipulated into a box, and so hard to get out of it once in. That’s why it’s so hard to un-brainwash JW’s , Mormons, etc… They just can’t see things outside of the box. I’m sure by now you’ve figured out the first two examples. If not, let me give you the answers. For the first one a simple word will stop you from chasing a wild goose. That word is “baseball”. The answers to the questions should be clear now. For example #2 I manipulated your thinking in the wrong direction. The questions all seem to make sense right? Do you see which questions are wrong? They seem logical and obvious but none the less they are wrong. They mislead you down an incorrect path. In the same way extra biblical reading can ask logical questions but lead you down the wrong path of thinking thus putting your thinking into a box in which it isn’t easy to get out of. The Pharisees didn’t want to leave their orthodox understanding of the scriptures.
"They sternly stuck to their guns when confronted with challenges to their understanding, which was based on extra biblical reading, namely the Mishna and the Talmud. These books put them into a box that they just couldn’t get out of. Don’t put your trust in extra biblical books or in orthodoxy. Some of them may be correct but can manipulate you into a dangerous box. Trust in the bible (sic) only. You have the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. That’s really all you need. John 16: 13 Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth:
"If we must read other books then we need to arm ourselves with understanding that we are hard-wired with a form of deductive reasoning which causes us to easily be boxed. We must continually tell ourselves that what we are reading has a good chance of being wrong and will only give one side of the story. Take it with a grain of salt. A good Berean would study books dealing with both sides without bias.
In the case of JW’s they view scripture through a preconceived idea, and focus on passages that talk about Christ’s humanity and twist the passages that deal with his deity when and only when they are confronted with them. A good Berean looks at the bible (sic) with no preconceived ideas. He only asks “what does God say about himself”. What, He is fully God and fully man at the same time? I don’t get it. Well, just because you don’t get it doesn’t make it untrue. Simply, this is what God says about himself. The Bible doesn’t explain any further so we shouldn’t go any further either. Some groups pick one side of the argument and go into error. I want to write a book and title it “the error of Calvinism vs. Arminism (sic).” There shouldn’t be a “vs.” at all. That’s like saying Christ’s deity vs. Christ’s humanity. The “vs.” shouldn’t even exist. The bible clearly teaches both. But because people look at extra biblical books and get manipulated into a box, we now have a slew of JW’s running around.
"Again, when looking at extra biblical books, be extremely careful. In the same way, Gods (sic) choice and mans (sic) choice are both in the bible. As I’ve stated other postings before I believe that Mathew 22 the maeeage (sic) supper of the lamb joins both sides perfectly into one. While you don’t have to agree with me on Mathew 22, at least agree on the fact that both sides of the argument are rattled (ZT:?) in the scripture.
"1 Cor 1:10 Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment.
11 For it hath been declared unto me of you, my brethren, by them which are of the house of Chloe, that there are contentions among you.
12 Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ.
13 Is Christ divided? was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized in the name of Paul?
"(Let’s not divide over these things. It’s not fruitful. If we don’t see eye to eye on an issue let’s try to be, as Paul says, perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment, by finding something we can agree on.)
...
(ZT: In response to another’s criticisms.) "I didn’t say that you used extra biblical books but that these books may have shaped your thinking. Proper reading of scripture is also a spiritual exercise. I hope you are not trying to tell me that one needs to be a 3 year Greek student in order to properly understand Gods (sic) word. We would have the Catholic Church all over again. The Pharisees knew the Hebrew and Greek up and down but were dead wrong. I didn’t say that you were brainwashed. Please try to pay attention to what I wrote and please don’t jump to conclusions. All I was doing was warning you guys to keep in mind that anything other than the word of God is dangerous and could manipulate your understanding. It’s so sad that you make such assumptions about me. If you knew me you wouldn’t have said that I am moved by folklore theology and teachers/preachers. If you would have red (sic) what I wrote on this post then you wouldn’t have stated this. Please read all of what I wrote before you make absurd assumptions.
"As far as the Acts 4:13 comment goes, the word perceived doesn’t mean that they were learned. That is an assumption that you shouldn’t make. You have absolutely no proof that they were literate. To make an assumption like that would scare me. I however agree with you that spending 3 years with Jesus is better than any seminary. That’s all anybody needs to do. I couldn’t say they were very well schooled simply because I don’t want to assume something that isn’t stated in the scripture. Did someone tell you that they were schooled? Again, don’t put your trust in anything that man says."
1.) It is a stock argument from anti-intellectuals to make passing reference to the fact that the Pharisees were highly educated. This statement rarely rises above the level of a guilt by association fallacy, (comparing the similarities between two groups in order to create a negative association with one of the groups without making any logical connection between the two) as evidenced above. In Christian circles, associating anything with the Pharisees’ without making a specific, demonstrable link to the discussion at hand is always going to fall into the category of guilt by association.
2.) It’s also a non sequitur (the conclusion of an argument does not follow in any logical way from the premises). The argument is sometimes presented like this: The Pharisees studied extra-biblical theology. The Pharisees were wrong. Therefore, studying extra-biblical theology is wrong (or “dangerous,” as stated above). The conclusion does not follow from the premises, as demonstrated by plugging a counterexample into the same formula: The Pharisees wore clothes. The Pharisees were wrong. Therefore, wearing clothes is wrong. And walking around naked is equally as shameful as this sort of argumentation.
3.) The real problem with the Pharisees was that they were sinful, not that they were educated. Yes, there are certain sins which it appears one must have a Ph.D. in order to commit. But there are also sins which tend to be found more often in the less-educated classes as well. We should be far more concerned about not falling into the sins of the Pharisees (self-righteousness, self-justification, wrath), since they are sins which affect people of every education level. I should think that a biblically-centered theological education would, in general, lead one toward a better understanding of God and application of Scripture, not the opposite (assuming the theological student is regenerate).
4.) The "riddles" presented above are fun and interesting, though the link between extra-biblical reading and brainwashing is hardly established by such examples. It's a red herring (a digression, which is a deliberate attempt to re-direct an argument in a direction which has nothing to do with the issue under discussion).
5.) More substantially, everything the writer quoted above says regarding extra-biblical writings applies to his own words (since they are, in fact, extra-biblical writings). Read these words again, then apply them to those words: “I whole heartedly disagree with putting my trust in anything that man teaches (sic) shares, forms doctrine or rites (sic) in a book. He may be right but he may also be wrong. It is extremely easy to brainwash people into a system of beliefs, and extremely hard to un-brainwash them. It’s been happening for thousands of years. The only thing we can put our trust in is the Bible. I’m not saying that we can’t glean from a book at all. I’m just saying that they can be extremely dangerous. I guess the reasons I find extra biblical reading dangerous is because of their brainwashing ability... In the same way extra biblical reading can ask logical questions but lead you down the wrong path of thinking thus putting your thinking into a box in which it isn’t easy to get out of... Don’t put your trust in extra biblical books or in orthodoxy. Some of them may be correct but can manipulate you into a dangerous box. Trust in the bible (sic) only. You have the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. That’s really all you need... Again, don’t put your trust in anything that man says.”
6.) These statements are ridiculously self-contradictory. How can I trust what the author is telling me while simultaneously not putting my trust in anything that man says? Sometimes all it takes to refute certain ideas is to repeat them.
7.) We are told (in an extra-biblical statement) not to trust extra-biblical statements, since people are easily “brainwashed.” We are then given an extra-biblical example of how brainwashing works, taken from a Ken Ham lecture. But how does the author know that Ken Ham wasn’t brainwashing him? Indeed, it would appear for consistency’s sake that we must believe that the author has been brainwashed by Ken Ham, since Ken Ham is not the Bible. The author also gave us an unintelligible “cut-and-paste” quote from Strong’s Concordance, which is also an extra-biblical writing. The author appears to be completely unaware of the self-contradictions riddled throughout his statements or their unfortunate implications. Doesn't he realize that Strong's Concordance can put him into a mental "box" which is "very difficult to get out of"?
8.) It gets worse. If we are only to trust the Bible, how do I get myself to work safely, since none of the road signs have apostolic authorship? Indeed, if we can only trust the Bible and ought to distrust all extra-biblical statements, I have to wonder how the author of those statements ever learned how to read or write or use the internet. The contradictions are legion.
9.) And it gets still worse. The Bible which he is referring to is, of course, an English TRANSLATION. This is the work of mere men as well, since the original autographs were mostly in Greek and Hebrew. We obviously can’t trust any translations, since they are the work of fallible men, and we are so easily susceptible to brainwashing. Every translation is just a copy of a copy of a copy, each copy being made by some non-inspired fallible copyist. So, since we don’t have the original autographs, and all textual critical and translation work is performed by untrustworthy extra-biblical scholars, according to the author’s standards, we really have no Bible at all.
11.) This sort of anti-intellectualism wipes away any basis for knowledge at all, even from the Scripture for which it so earnestly desires to contend. It is a philosophical solvent which dissolves itself.
12.) “Trust in the bible only. You have the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. That’s really all you need.” What am I to make of this statement, when the Scripture says that I need to submit myself to church leaders? (Hebrews 13:17) If the Bible and the Holy Spirit are all I need, why does the Bible say to submit to my leaders? The content of the teaching of Scripture itself contradicts this man’s view of the role of Scripture in the life of a believer.
13.) “A good Berean looks at the bible with no preconceived ideas.” This is an utter impossibility. It’s a silly hold-over from Cartesian philosophy. It is derived directly from the Enlightenment, not the Scripture. We cannot escape our own presuppositions, we simply need to seek to “take off” the old presuppositions and “put on” biblical presuppositions, through reading and repentance. When the man quoted reads the Bible does he abandon his preconceived ideas of his own existence, God’s existence, the world’s existence, Scripture’s self-authentication, etc.? Such things are not possible, much less praiseworthy.
14.) One more statement has to be dealt with as well. “I want to write a book and title it “the error of Calvinism vs. Arminism (sic).” There shouldn’t be a “vs.” at all. That’s like saying Christ’s deity vs. Christ’s humanity. The “vs.” shouldn’t even exist. The bible clearly teaches both.”
This sort of thinking seems to pervade much of popular evangelicalism today. It belies a certain historical and theological naivete. Rather than meaningfully engaging both sides of the debate and attempting to reconcile the various doctrines in each system with Scripture, many today would rather offer a third option: “it’s both.”
So, since the Fall, is every one of a man’s faculties affected by sin (Calvinism) OR are just some of those faculties affected (Arminianism)? “It’s both.”
Does God choose to save people according to his own, unconditional purposes (Calvinism) OR does He choose to save people because they have (or He foresees that they will have) certain distinctives which meet certain conditions (Arminianism)? “Both.”
Did Christ’s death secure the salvation of those God has chosen (Calvinism) OR did Christ’s death merely make all men save-able (Arminianism)? “Both. Duh.”
Does God effectively regenerate and save only people whom He chooses (Calvinism) OR does God partially regenerate people so that they might choose of their own free will whether to believe or disbelieve (Wesleyan Arminianism)? “Both.”
Is a true Christian’s salvation eternally secure (Calvinism) or conditionally secure (Arminianism)? “Both.”
Does man have a will which is bound in sin (Calvinism) or a free will (Arminianism)? “Both.”
Calvinism and Arminianism are mutually exclusive systems of beliefs. You cannot be both and a desire to say that the Bible teaches both is a desire to abandon any meaningful use of terminology. Either the Calvinists are right or the Arminians are right or neither is right, but they cannot both be right. Let’s bury such muddled thinking and “go on to maturity.” (Hebrews 6:1)
14.) The author which I quoted above has expressed the desire to find "something we agree on" for further discussion. I have a suggestion. Let's agree that speaking self-contradictions is to speak a falsehood (it's a "lie" if it's done intentionally, but I have no illusions about discerning anyone else's intentions in this regard). Let's agree that speaking a falsehood is sinful, albeit potentially an unintended falsehood and, therefore, an unintended sin. Let's agree that when someone is shown to have sinned they ought to repent and seek the forgiveness of those who might conceivably be affected by that sin. The circle of confession need be no larger than the circle of offense. Let's also agree that the author above has sinned in his self-contradictions and ought to repent, confess and believe that Christ has died in order to forgive his sins of anti-intellectual self-contradiction, as well as to set him free from the power it has over him, in order that he might "be transformed by the renewing of his mind." (Romans 12:2). Let's agree that speaking falsehoods through self-contradiction is a sin which we are all easily susceptible to, and forgive this brother. Let's also agree to pray and study so that the Lord might prevent our "foot from sliding in due time." (Deuteronomy 32:35)
I’m going to quote several of the anti-intellectual fellow’s statements in italics, with my responses afterward in regular script again.
I wanted to comment on some of these comments. The pharoses (sic) were very learned and knew the Hebrew down to the letter, but they were very wrong. Jesus chose his disciples for a reason. To say that they were schooled in 3 languages and the scriptures is making an assumption. They may have been but it doesn’t say that. In fact what it does say is:
Acts 4: 13 Now when they saw the boldness of Peter and John, and perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men, they marvelled; and they took knowledge of them, that they had been with Jesus. 14 And beholding the man which was healed standing with them, they could say nothing against it.
unlearned = agrammatos, ag-ram'-mat-os; from G1 (as neg. particle) and G1121; unlettered, i.e. illiterate:--unlearned.
Ignorant = idiotes, id-ee-o'-tace; (by impl.) an ignoramus (comp. "idiot"):--ignorant, rude, unlearned.
All the school that they needed was to spend time with Jesus...
"Man’s heart is desperately wicked. I whole heartedly disagree with putting my trust in anything that man teaches (sic) shares, forms doctrine or rites (sic) in a book. He may be right but he may also be wrong. It is extremely easy to brainwash people into a system of beliefs, and extremely hard to un-brainwash them. It’s been happening for thousands of years. The only thing we can put our trust in is the Bible. I’m not saying that we can’t glean from a book at all. I’m just saying that they can be extremely dangerous. I guess the reasons I find extra biblical reading dangerous is because of their brainwashing ability. Let me give a few examples of how easy it is to get brainwashed. We all think that our minds are strong and resistant to manipulation but it has absolutely nothing to do with mental strength. The human mind has built into it a form of deductive reasoning. We are all wired like this and can’t change it. However we can arm ourselves by understanding our flesh and the wiles of the devil. These brainwashing exercises will hopefully give us an idea of how our minds and the devil operate. You may have heard of some of these through the years.
"#1) A man left home one day jogging. He jogged a little ways and then turned left, then he jogged a little ways and turned left again, and he jogged a little ways and turned left again and jogged toward home. As he was jogging he noticed two masked men waiting for him. Why did he leave home jogging? Who were the masked men?
...
"#3) This is one that Ken Ham used during a creation vs. evolution seminar. His focus was to show how the school system brainwashes the students. First he drew two large parenthesize (sic) like curved line segments like this. ( ) Then he asked two questions. What’s missing? What did this use (sic) to be? Most of the answers he got were “a circle, or two semi circles.” He answered “your (sic) wrong”. He said, you just saw me draw it right in front of you. It didn’t use (sic) to be anything. Nothing is missing. Your answer was wrong because my question was wrong because you never questioned my question. In this example Ken was trying to demonstrate how easy it was to trap ones (sic) thoughts into a box. Once in the box it is almost impossible to get out. All it takes is one manipulative question to get your thinking off in a direction that all other contemplations will only emanate from that same point. Another (sic) words, once manipulated in to a box, it’s almost impossible to think outside of it.
"It’s so easy to be manipulated into a box, and so hard to get out of it once in. That’s why it’s so hard to un-brainwash JW’s , Mormons, etc… They just can’t see things outside of the box. I’m sure by now you’ve figured out the first two examples. If not, let me give you the answers. For the first one a simple word will stop you from chasing a wild goose. That word is “baseball”. The answers to the questions should be clear now. For example #2 I manipulated your thinking in the wrong direction. The questions all seem to make sense right? Do you see which questions are wrong? They seem logical and obvious but none the less they are wrong. They mislead you down an incorrect path. In the same way extra biblical reading can ask logical questions but lead you down the wrong path of thinking thus putting your thinking into a box in which it isn’t easy to get out of. The Pharisees didn’t want to leave their orthodox understanding of the scriptures.
"They sternly stuck to their guns when confronted with challenges to their understanding, which was based on extra biblical reading, namely the Mishna and the Talmud. These books put them into a box that they just couldn’t get out of. Don’t put your trust in extra biblical books or in orthodoxy. Some of them may be correct but can manipulate you into a dangerous box. Trust in the bible (sic) only. You have the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. That’s really all you need. John 16: 13 Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth:
"If we must read other books then we need to arm ourselves with understanding that we are hard-wired with a form of deductive reasoning which causes us to easily be boxed. We must continually tell ourselves that what we are reading has a good chance of being wrong and will only give one side of the story. Take it with a grain of salt. A good Berean would study books dealing with both sides without bias.
In the case of JW’s they view scripture through a preconceived idea, and focus on passages that talk about Christ’s humanity and twist the passages that deal with his deity when and only when they are confronted with them. A good Berean looks at the bible (sic) with no preconceived ideas. He only asks “what does God say about himself”. What, He is fully God and fully man at the same time? I don’t get it. Well, just because you don’t get it doesn’t make it untrue. Simply, this is what God says about himself. The Bible doesn’t explain any further so we shouldn’t go any further either. Some groups pick one side of the argument and go into error. I want to write a book and title it “the error of Calvinism vs. Arminism (sic).” There shouldn’t be a “vs.” at all. That’s like saying Christ’s deity vs. Christ’s humanity. The “vs.” shouldn’t even exist. The bible clearly teaches both. But because people look at extra biblical books and get manipulated into a box, we now have a slew of JW’s running around.
"Again, when looking at extra biblical books, be extremely careful. In the same way, Gods (sic) choice and mans (sic) choice are both in the bible. As I’ve stated other postings before I believe that Mathew 22 the maeeage (sic) supper of the lamb joins both sides perfectly into one. While you don’t have to agree with me on Mathew 22, at least agree on the fact that both sides of the argument are rattled (ZT:?) in the scripture.
"1 Cor 1:10 Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment.
11 For it hath been declared unto me of you, my brethren, by them which are of the house of Chloe, that there are contentions among you.
12 Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ.
13 Is Christ divided? was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized in the name of Paul?
"(Let’s not divide over these things. It’s not fruitful. If we don’t see eye to eye on an issue let’s try to be, as Paul says, perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment, by finding something we can agree on.)
...
(ZT: In response to another’s criticisms.) "I didn’t say that you used extra biblical books but that these books may have shaped your thinking. Proper reading of scripture is also a spiritual exercise. I hope you are not trying to tell me that one needs to be a 3 year Greek student in order to properly understand Gods (sic) word. We would have the Catholic Church all over again. The Pharisees knew the Hebrew and Greek up and down but were dead wrong. I didn’t say that you were brainwashed. Please try to pay attention to what I wrote and please don’t jump to conclusions. All I was doing was warning you guys to keep in mind that anything other than the word of God is dangerous and could manipulate your understanding. It’s so sad that you make such assumptions about me. If you knew me you wouldn’t have said that I am moved by folklore theology and teachers/preachers. If you would have red (sic) what I wrote on this post then you wouldn’t have stated this. Please read all of what I wrote before you make absurd assumptions.
"As far as the Acts 4:13 comment goes, the word perceived doesn’t mean that they were learned. That is an assumption that you shouldn’t make. You have absolutely no proof that they were literate. To make an assumption like that would scare me. I however agree with you that spending 3 years with Jesus is better than any seminary. That’s all anybody needs to do. I couldn’t say they were very well schooled simply because I don’t want to assume something that isn’t stated in the scripture. Did someone tell you that they were schooled? Again, don’t put your trust in anything that man says."
1.) It is a stock argument from anti-intellectuals to make passing reference to the fact that the Pharisees were highly educated. This statement rarely rises above the level of a guilt by association fallacy, (comparing the similarities between two groups in order to create a negative association with one of the groups without making any logical connection between the two) as evidenced above. In Christian circles, associating anything with the Pharisees’ without making a specific, demonstrable link to the discussion at hand is always going to fall into the category of guilt by association.
2.) It’s also a non sequitur (the conclusion of an argument does not follow in any logical way from the premises). The argument is sometimes presented like this: The Pharisees studied extra-biblical theology. The Pharisees were wrong. Therefore, studying extra-biblical theology is wrong (or “dangerous,” as stated above). The conclusion does not follow from the premises, as demonstrated by plugging a counterexample into the same formula: The Pharisees wore clothes. The Pharisees were wrong. Therefore, wearing clothes is wrong. And walking around naked is equally as shameful as this sort of argumentation.
3.) The real problem with the Pharisees was that they were sinful, not that they were educated. Yes, there are certain sins which it appears one must have a Ph.D. in order to commit. But there are also sins which tend to be found more often in the less-educated classes as well. We should be far more concerned about not falling into the sins of the Pharisees (self-righteousness, self-justification, wrath), since they are sins which affect people of every education level. I should think that a biblically-centered theological education would, in general, lead one toward a better understanding of God and application of Scripture, not the opposite (assuming the theological student is regenerate).
4.) The "riddles" presented above are fun and interesting, though the link between extra-biblical reading and brainwashing is hardly established by such examples. It's a red herring (a digression, which is a deliberate attempt to re-direct an argument in a direction which has nothing to do with the issue under discussion).
5.) More substantially, everything the writer quoted above says regarding extra-biblical writings applies to his own words (since they are, in fact, extra-biblical writings). Read these words again, then apply them to those words: “I whole heartedly disagree with putting my trust in anything that man teaches (sic) shares, forms doctrine or rites (sic) in a book. He may be right but he may also be wrong. It is extremely easy to brainwash people into a system of beliefs, and extremely hard to un-brainwash them. It’s been happening for thousands of years. The only thing we can put our trust in is the Bible. I’m not saying that we can’t glean from a book at all. I’m just saying that they can be extremely dangerous. I guess the reasons I find extra biblical reading dangerous is because of their brainwashing ability... In the same way extra biblical reading can ask logical questions but lead you down the wrong path of thinking thus putting your thinking into a box in which it isn’t easy to get out of... Don’t put your trust in extra biblical books or in orthodoxy. Some of them may be correct but can manipulate you into a dangerous box. Trust in the bible (sic) only. You have the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. That’s really all you need... Again, don’t put your trust in anything that man says.”
6.) These statements are ridiculously self-contradictory. How can I trust what the author is telling me while simultaneously not putting my trust in anything that man says? Sometimes all it takes to refute certain ideas is to repeat them.
7.) We are told (in an extra-biblical statement) not to trust extra-biblical statements, since people are easily “brainwashed.” We are then given an extra-biblical example of how brainwashing works, taken from a Ken Ham lecture. But how does the author know that Ken Ham wasn’t brainwashing him? Indeed, it would appear for consistency’s sake that we must believe that the author has been brainwashed by Ken Ham, since Ken Ham is not the Bible. The author also gave us an unintelligible “cut-and-paste” quote from Strong’s Concordance, which is also an extra-biblical writing. The author appears to be completely unaware of the self-contradictions riddled throughout his statements or their unfortunate implications. Doesn't he realize that Strong's Concordance can put him into a mental "box" which is "very difficult to get out of"?
8.) It gets worse. If we are only to trust the Bible, how do I get myself to work safely, since none of the road signs have apostolic authorship? Indeed, if we can only trust the Bible and ought to distrust all extra-biblical statements, I have to wonder how the author of those statements ever learned how to read or write or use the internet. The contradictions are legion.
9.) And it gets still worse. The Bible which he is referring to is, of course, an English TRANSLATION. This is the work of mere men as well, since the original autographs were mostly in Greek and Hebrew. We obviously can’t trust any translations, since they are the work of fallible men, and we are so easily susceptible to brainwashing. Every translation is just a copy of a copy of a copy, each copy being made by some non-inspired fallible copyist. So, since we don’t have the original autographs, and all textual critical and translation work is performed by untrustworthy extra-biblical scholars, according to the author’s standards, we really have no Bible at all.
11.) This sort of anti-intellectualism wipes away any basis for knowledge at all, even from the Scripture for which it so earnestly desires to contend. It is a philosophical solvent which dissolves itself.
12.) “Trust in the bible only. You have the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. That’s really all you need.” What am I to make of this statement, when the Scripture says that I need to submit myself to church leaders? (Hebrews 13:17) If the Bible and the Holy Spirit are all I need, why does the Bible say to submit to my leaders? The content of the teaching of Scripture itself contradicts this man’s view of the role of Scripture in the life of a believer.
13.) “A good Berean looks at the bible with no preconceived ideas.” This is an utter impossibility. It’s a silly hold-over from Cartesian philosophy. It is derived directly from the Enlightenment, not the Scripture. We cannot escape our own presuppositions, we simply need to seek to “take off” the old presuppositions and “put on” biblical presuppositions, through reading and repentance. When the man quoted reads the Bible does he abandon his preconceived ideas of his own existence, God’s existence, the world’s existence, Scripture’s self-authentication, etc.? Such things are not possible, much less praiseworthy.
14.) One more statement has to be dealt with as well. “I want to write a book and title it “the error of Calvinism vs. Arminism (sic).” There shouldn’t be a “vs.” at all. That’s like saying Christ’s deity vs. Christ’s humanity. The “vs.” shouldn’t even exist. The bible clearly teaches both.”
This sort of thinking seems to pervade much of popular evangelicalism today. It belies a certain historical and theological naivete. Rather than meaningfully engaging both sides of the debate and attempting to reconcile the various doctrines in each system with Scripture, many today would rather offer a third option: “it’s both.”
So, since the Fall, is every one of a man’s faculties affected by sin (Calvinism) OR are just some of those faculties affected (Arminianism)? “It’s both.”
Does God choose to save people according to his own, unconditional purposes (Calvinism) OR does He choose to save people because they have (or He foresees that they will have) certain distinctives which meet certain conditions (Arminianism)? “Both.”
Did Christ’s death secure the salvation of those God has chosen (Calvinism) OR did Christ’s death merely make all men save-able (Arminianism)? “Both. Duh.”
Does God effectively regenerate and save only people whom He chooses (Calvinism) OR does God partially regenerate people so that they might choose of their own free will whether to believe or disbelieve (Wesleyan Arminianism)? “Both.”
Is a true Christian’s salvation eternally secure (Calvinism) or conditionally secure (Arminianism)? “Both.”
Does man have a will which is bound in sin (Calvinism) or a free will (Arminianism)? “Both.”
Calvinism and Arminianism are mutually exclusive systems of beliefs. You cannot be both and a desire to say that the Bible teaches both is a desire to abandon any meaningful use of terminology. Either the Calvinists are right or the Arminians are right or neither is right, but they cannot both be right. Let’s bury such muddled thinking and “go on to maturity.” (Hebrews 6:1)
14.) The author which I quoted above has expressed the desire to find "something we agree on" for further discussion. I have a suggestion. Let's agree that speaking self-contradictions is to speak a falsehood (it's a "lie" if it's done intentionally, but I have no illusions about discerning anyone else's intentions in this regard). Let's agree that speaking a falsehood is sinful, albeit potentially an unintended falsehood and, therefore, an unintended sin. Let's agree that when someone is shown to have sinned they ought to repent and seek the forgiveness of those who might conceivably be affected by that sin. The circle of confession need be no larger than the circle of offense. Let's also agree that the author above has sinned in his self-contradictions and ought to repent, confess and believe that Christ has died in order to forgive his sins of anti-intellectual self-contradiction, as well as to set him free from the power it has over him, in order that he might "be transformed by the renewing of his mind." (Romans 12:2). Let's agree that speaking falsehoods through self-contradiction is a sin which we are all easily susceptible to, and forgive this brother. Let's also agree to pray and study so that the Lord might prevent our "foot from sliding in due time." (Deuteronomy 32:35)
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Monday, February 23, 2009
Some Thoughts on Judas Iscariot
A good friend of mine has raised an important question regarding God's disposition toward the elect and reprobate as such. Specifically, "does God love and only love the elect (even before justification, Eph. 2:3) and hate and only hate the reprobate (even before damnation, Ps. 5:5)?" I briefly mentioned this issue in one of my recent posts on 2 Peter 2:1. While I don't want to re-tread what I said there, I would like to expand on a certain point made. That being: if we desire to see God's disposition on a matter most fully revealed, we look to Christ in the Gospels for answers (while recognizing that Christ being the pinnacle of revelation (Hebrews 1:1-4) does not denigrate, but establishes, the value of all prior revelation (Matthew 5:17-19); indeed, the whole of Scripture is the word of God).
So I would like to briefly raise a couple of salient points regarding Christ's relationship with Judas Iscariot. It should be recognized that Judas Iscariot is an archetypical reprobate. Indeed Christ himself says of him, "It would have been better for that man if he had not been born." (Mark 14:21b) Christ is not speaking hyperbolically. He is not over-stating the case for dramatic effect. The only fate worse than complete non-existence is eternal perdition. And while all sins are equally damnable, not all sins are equally heinous. And betraying with a kiss a loving friend who was the only perfectly sinless man, a beautiful teacher, in fact, the miracle-working Son of God ranks highest on the historical list of heinous acts.
So if we desire to see God's disposition toward the reprobate, I submit for your consideration that Christ's relationship with Judas Iscariot would be the most clear place in all of Scripture to find our answers.
Now, as I said before, I don't intend to undertake a full survey of their relationship at this time; I'd merely like to raise a few points on the matter. Feel free to post your own thoughts, questions, responses and counterexamples in the comments box below.
First, consider that during the institution of the Lord's Supper, Christ appears to have no problem telling his disciples as a whole, "This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood. But behold, the hand of him who betrays me is with me on the table. For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" (Luke 22:20b-22)
In effect, paraphrasing Mark and Luke's parallel statements: "The blood of the New Covenant is poured out for you, including the one seated at the table who will betray me, though it would have been better for him if he had never been born." This is the plainest sense of the terms. There is no reason whatsoever to interject that Christ is somehow speaking "in code" here and is secretly (wink, wink) referring to eleven of the twelve disciples in the room. Such ideas are bereft of any basis in this or any other text of Scripture. This is essentially ascribing to Christ a certain amount of deception... which is unthinkable. If your particular system of theology drives you to make such interjections in order to rescue it, I think you ought to consider that abandoning it (or at least altering it) might be the best alternative.
"This cup is poured out for you." Judas is still seated at the table.
Now (pertaining to our original question) if God has only hatred for the reprobate, it ought to show up in how he related to Judas Iscariot. And yet the next verse in Luke's Gospel (v. 23) states:
"And they began to question one another, which of them it could be who was going to do this."
Remarkably,the disciples don't seem to be able to discern which one of them Christ has hated this entire time. He doesn't appear to have given any indication of his eternal hatred for Judas Iscariot. This raises a similar issue to the one raised above, namely, if God has only hatred toward the reprobate, wouldn't it have been dishonest for Christ to hide this righteous hatred?
(Note: It is said that God is patient toward the reprobate, and this is undoubtedly true. But even "patient hatred" should be easily discernable from love and friendship, especially within a close relationship over several years, as the disciples had with Christ.)
John's account of these events only bolsters the idea that Christ's relationship to Judas was indistinct from his relationship to the other disciples (and I don't think anyone believes Christ had anything but love for his disciples, John 15:13). Even after Judas leaves in order to betray Christ, the disciples "thought that, because Judas had the moneybag, Jesus was telling him, 'Buy what we need for the feast,' or that he should give something to the poor." (John 13:29)
It's right there in front of them that Judas is the one who will betray Christ, yet they think he's going to go run some errands. Even at this moment, nobody sees anything out of the ordinary in Christ's friendship with Judas. Indeed, I say friendship, since Christ specifically calls Judas "friend" at the moment of his betrayal in Matthew 26:50.
The evidence adduced here is heavily in favor of rejecting the over-simplified, reductionistic view that God has only hatred for the reprobate. Anything less than recognizing that "Jesus is a friend of sinners," even eternally non-elect sinners, puts one's theology in the uncomfortable place of affirming a certain amount of guile or deception or double-talk on the part of Christ in his interactions with Judas Iscariot. And such quibbling is nothing short of blasphemy.
So I would like to briefly raise a couple of salient points regarding Christ's relationship with Judas Iscariot. It should be recognized that Judas Iscariot is an archetypical reprobate. Indeed Christ himself says of him, "It would have been better for that man if he had not been born." (Mark 14:21b) Christ is not speaking hyperbolically. He is not over-stating the case for dramatic effect. The only fate worse than complete non-existence is eternal perdition. And while all sins are equally damnable, not all sins are equally heinous. And betraying with a kiss a loving friend who was the only perfectly sinless man, a beautiful teacher, in fact, the miracle-working Son of God ranks highest on the historical list of heinous acts.
So if we desire to see God's disposition toward the reprobate, I submit for your consideration that Christ's relationship with Judas Iscariot would be the most clear place in all of Scripture to find our answers.
Now, as I said before, I don't intend to undertake a full survey of their relationship at this time; I'd merely like to raise a few points on the matter. Feel free to post your own thoughts, questions, responses and counterexamples in the comments box below.
First, consider that during the institution of the Lord's Supper, Christ appears to have no problem telling his disciples as a whole, "This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood. But behold, the hand of him who betrays me is with me on the table. For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" (Luke 22:20b-22)
In effect, paraphrasing Mark and Luke's parallel statements: "The blood of the New Covenant is poured out for you, including the one seated at the table who will betray me, though it would have been better for him if he had never been born." This is the plainest sense of the terms. There is no reason whatsoever to interject that Christ is somehow speaking "in code" here and is secretly (wink, wink) referring to eleven of the twelve disciples in the room. Such ideas are bereft of any basis in this or any other text of Scripture. This is essentially ascribing to Christ a certain amount of deception... which is unthinkable. If your particular system of theology drives you to make such interjections in order to rescue it, I think you ought to consider that abandoning it (or at least altering it) might be the best alternative.
"This cup is poured out for you." Judas is still seated at the table.
Now (pertaining to our original question) if God has only hatred for the reprobate, it ought to show up in how he related to Judas Iscariot. And yet the next verse in Luke's Gospel (v. 23) states:
"And they began to question one another, which of them it could be who was going to do this."
Remarkably,the disciples don't seem to be able to discern which one of them Christ has hated this entire time. He doesn't appear to have given any indication of his eternal hatred for Judas Iscariot. This raises a similar issue to the one raised above, namely, if God has only hatred toward the reprobate, wouldn't it have been dishonest for Christ to hide this righteous hatred?
(Note: It is said that God is patient toward the reprobate, and this is undoubtedly true. But even "patient hatred" should be easily discernable from love and friendship, especially within a close relationship over several years, as the disciples had with Christ.)
John's account of these events only bolsters the idea that Christ's relationship to Judas was indistinct from his relationship to the other disciples (and I don't think anyone believes Christ had anything but love for his disciples, John 15:13). Even after Judas leaves in order to betray Christ, the disciples "thought that, because Judas had the moneybag, Jesus was telling him, 'Buy what we need for the feast,' or that he should give something to the poor." (John 13:29)
It's right there in front of them that Judas is the one who will betray Christ, yet they think he's going to go run some errands. Even at this moment, nobody sees anything out of the ordinary in Christ's friendship with Judas. Indeed, I say friendship, since Christ specifically calls Judas "friend" at the moment of his betrayal in Matthew 26:50.
The evidence adduced here is heavily in favor of rejecting the over-simplified, reductionistic view that God has only hatred for the reprobate. Anything less than recognizing that "Jesus is a friend of sinners," even eternally non-elect sinners, puts one's theology in the uncomfortable place of affirming a certain amount of guile or deception or double-talk on the part of Christ in his interactions with Judas Iscariot. And such quibbling is nothing short of blasphemy.
Friday, February 20, 2009
The Atonement Now Redux: "I Love The Smell of Napalm In The Morning"
Here is a list linking back to all of the atonement-related posts on my site to date, for ease of reference and your reading delight.
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 1 - Introduction
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 2 - Historical Theology
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 3 - Systematic Theology
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 4 - Biblical Theology
Multiple Intentions In The Atonement
Another Link On The Atonement
Double Jeopardy
Problem With John Owen's "Triple Choice" Argument
W.G.T. Shedd On Double Jeopardy
Redemption (Not Sovereign Creation) In 2 Peter 2:1, Part 1
Redemption (Not Sovereign Creation) In 2 Peter 2:1, Part 2
Some Afterthoughts On 2 Peter 2:1
And my re-posts of Dominic Bnonn's Tennant's incisive atonement-related posts:
On The Atonement, Introduction
On The Atonement, Part 1: Federal Headship and Forensic Imputation
On The Atonement, Part 2: The Grounds for The Universal Gospel Call
On The Atonement, Part 3: The Objective Grounds for Faith
On The Atonement, Part 4: God's Desires Frustrated?
On The Atonement, Part 5: Universal Salvation or Double Payment
On The Atonement, Part 6: Universal Atonement Fails to Actually Accomplish Redemption For Anyone
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 1 - Introduction
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 2 - Historical Theology
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 3 - Systematic Theology
Responding to ResponsiveReiding 4 - Biblical Theology
Multiple Intentions In The Atonement
Another Link On The Atonement
Double Jeopardy
Problem With John Owen's "Triple Choice" Argument
W.G.T. Shedd On Double Jeopardy
Redemption (Not Sovereign Creation) In 2 Peter 2:1, Part 1
Redemption (Not Sovereign Creation) In 2 Peter 2:1, Part 2
Some Afterthoughts On 2 Peter 2:1
And my re-posts of Dominic Bnonn's Tennant's incisive atonement-related posts:
On The Atonement, Introduction
On The Atonement, Part 1: Federal Headship and Forensic Imputation
On The Atonement, Part 2: The Grounds for The Universal Gospel Call
On The Atonement, Part 3: The Objective Grounds for Faith
On The Atonement, Part 4: God's Desires Frustrated?
On The Atonement, Part 5: Universal Salvation or Double Payment
On The Atonement, Part 6: Universal Atonement Fails to Actually Accomplish Redemption For Anyone
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Some Afterthoughts on 2 Peter 2:1
After responding to Dr. Gary Long's paper on 2 Peter 2:1 and presenting my own conclusion (largely agreeing with Dr. Wayne Grudem's interpretation), I am left with a single issue to resolve:
What if the false teachers referenced in 2 Peter are not, in fact, Jewish? In what sense can it be said that the Lord "bought" them then?
Yes, it is a "what if..." question. But it is really the only loose end remaining in my mind on the issue of this interpretation. If we rule out the most plausible option (Dr. Grudem's interpretation), what is the next most plausible? Is there a framework that could comport with this verse in both Dr. Grudem's formulation and the second most plausible option?
Given what we've surveyed thus far, hypothetical universalism can be ruled out quite readily. The Master actually "bought" these reprobates. Universal salvation is also not an option, given that it contradicts the clear teaching of Scripture regarding the final judgment (cf. Mt. 25, Rev. 20). Pure particularism (i.e. high Calvinism and Hyper-Calvinism) also leaves no room for making sense of the Lord "buying" non-elect Gentile false teachers.
However, if we maintain a biblically-framed dualistic view of the atonement (that there are both universal and particular intentions in the atonement of Christ) we are able to adopt the most plausible interpretation (Dr. Grudem's) and be comfortable recognizing that if that interpretation is not actually accurate, the idea of Christ's death "buying" the reprobate for the purpose of retributive judgment is still not problematic. I would not seek to establish such a doctrine on the basis of this text as such, but would simply point out that such an interpretation, if necessary, could easily comport with a dualistic view of the atonement, and no other.
(Note: The Arminian doctrine of a believer's conditional security and it's accompanying governmental theory of the atonement might also conceivably cohere with such an interpretation of this text. But adopting that framework is not an option, since it is in such clear contradiction with other, more clear passages of Scripture(cf. John 6, 10; Rom. 8). The analogy of faith for establishing such a doctrine on 2 Peter 2:1 is extremely weak, given the strength of the analogy in favor of the doctrine of the perseverance and preservation of the saints.)
So while I am satisfied with accepting Grudem's very plausible interpretation, I recognize that I am not in a doctrinally untenable position even if this interpretation is incorrect.
What if the false teachers referenced in 2 Peter are not, in fact, Jewish? In what sense can it be said that the Lord "bought" them then?
Yes, it is a "what if..." question. But it is really the only loose end remaining in my mind on the issue of this interpretation. If we rule out the most plausible option (Dr. Grudem's interpretation), what is the next most plausible? Is there a framework that could comport with this verse in both Dr. Grudem's formulation and the second most plausible option?
Given what we've surveyed thus far, hypothetical universalism can be ruled out quite readily. The Master actually "bought" these reprobates. Universal salvation is also not an option, given that it contradicts the clear teaching of Scripture regarding the final judgment (cf. Mt. 25, Rev. 20). Pure particularism (i.e. high Calvinism and Hyper-Calvinism) also leaves no room for making sense of the Lord "buying" non-elect Gentile false teachers.
However, if we maintain a biblically-framed dualistic view of the atonement (that there are both universal and particular intentions in the atonement of Christ) we are able to adopt the most plausible interpretation (Dr. Grudem's) and be comfortable recognizing that if that interpretation is not actually accurate, the idea of Christ's death "buying" the reprobate for the purpose of retributive judgment is still not problematic. I would not seek to establish such a doctrine on the basis of this text as such, but would simply point out that such an interpretation, if necessary, could easily comport with a dualistic view of the atonement, and no other.
(Note: The Arminian doctrine of a believer's conditional security and it's accompanying governmental theory of the atonement might also conceivably cohere with such an interpretation of this text. But adopting that framework is not an option, since it is in such clear contradiction with other, more clear passages of Scripture(cf. John 6, 10; Rom. 8). The analogy of faith for establishing such a doctrine on 2 Peter 2:1 is extremely weak, given the strength of the analogy in favor of the doctrine of the perseverance and preservation of the saints.)
So while I am satisfied with accepting Grudem's very plausible interpretation, I recognize that I am not in a doctrinally untenable position even if this interpretation is incorrect.
Redemption (Not Sovereign Creation) In 2 Peter 2:1, Part 2
We have been looking at Dr. Gary Long's chapter "Redemption in 2 Peter 2:1" (which can be found here). Having discussed the first portion of the chapter yesterday, I will complete this critical analysis today, looking at the four interpretive options which Dr. Long adduces for our consideration.
The Spiritual Redemption View
Dr. Long begins by pointing out that most "modified Calvinists" hold to this interpretation. But, "To get away from the hypothetical label, it is often said by those who hold to universal redemption that Christ had to die for the non-elect in order that they might be justly condemned for their sin of unbelief." While no clear support for this position is given, Dr. Long moves right ahead and refutes his own assertion of the 4-pointers' position. He doesn't even present it as an argument to be refuted, but rather as his opponents' way of "escaping" the "hypothetical label." This is hardly an earnest assessment of another's position.
It should also be recognized that the view under consideration is proposing (albeit rather loosely in Dr. Long's re-formulation) that Christ's retribution against the non-elect is based in some measure in the atonement. This directly contradicts Dr. Long's later footnote (#17) in which he states, "The writer has yet to find a modified Calvinist who biblically defends his belief in universal redemption from the standpoint of retribution..." Either Dr. Long has misrepresented his opponents' position regarding the "spiritual redemption view" (which appears likely from the rather sloppy strawman he presents for refutation) or he has not been paying close attention to the modified Calvinist position which he desires to refute (which also appears likely from the rather sloppy strawman he presents for refutation). Either way, his treatment here is tendentious at best.
Also noteworthy is that Dr. Long's string of rhetorical question refutation (i.e. "And what about imputed sin...?, etc.) is aimed obviously at his own strawman. He, in effect, is arguing that his opponents' position is based on the idea that imputation is, in itself, an unjust act. He does this in an effort at showing that this removes the basis for a substitutionary atonement. But where is the demonstration? The argumentation for the reader to consider? None appears to be necessary in refutation, since nothing but an assertion of straw was offered in favor of the position. This hardly demonstrates the weaknesses of the "spiritual redemption view." This is, frankly, just preaching to the particularists' choir.
Dr. Long then offers three further objections to this view, the first two of which he has been "setting up" for the entire paper, and to which I raised a few objections for consideration yesterday. The third blatantly contradicts even his own strawman presentation of his opponents' position. He says, "Third, because of their theological inconsistency, the universal redemptionists do not attempt to explain how II Peter 2:1 can teach that Christ died a substitutionary death for the false teachers, who in verse 12 of the same chapter are described 'as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed' even as they 'were before of old ordained to this condemnation' (Jude 4)." Even in Dr. Long's reductionistic and over-simplified presentation of his opponents' view he has stated an "attempt to explain how II Peter 2:1 can teach that Christ died a substitutionary death for the false teachers": "that Christ had to die for the non-elect in order that they might be justly condemned for their sin of unbelief."
Dr. Long (unsurprisingly) disagrees with his own strawman, but that does not mean that "no attempt at explanation" has been made. He has utterly contradicted himself by simultaneously over-simplifying his opponents' position and over-stating the case against it throughout this section, such that it is unfortunately difficult to glean much of anything useful from this portion of Dr. Long's chapter.
He rounds this section out rather consistently with his treatment thus far, by proposing: "Because of their inconsistency, those who hold to the spiritual redemption view are logically saying, in effect, that: 'The Lord, by imparting a knowledge of the gospel and working a professed acknowledgement of it and subjection unto it, separated and delivered from the world certain ones that professed to be saints outwardly, who in reality were wolves and hypocrites ordained to condemnation. Therefore, Christ shed His blood for the redemption and salvation of all the reprobates and damned persons in the world who have lived or will live.' Does this make any sense? Does the Bible teach this?"
He creates an absurd quotation, foists it upon his opponents' as though it were their own, then asks, "Does this make any sense? Does the Bible teach this?"
By way of reply, I simply ask, "Is this good scholarship?"
The Christian Charity View
I find it rather ironic that Dr. Long, after his rather uncharitable treatment of the "spiritual redemption view," then presents the "Christian charity view" for our consideration. "It's like rain on your wedding day..."
There are places in Scripture which appear to treat false teachers and false professors as though they are actually elect. I agree with Dr. Long that 2 Peter 2:1 does not appear to be one of those places, and that even if it were it would not support a moderate Calvinists' position (of whatever stripe, my own dualistic view included).
Theologically, it makes sense to speak of all professing Christians as members of the New Covenant, though some may prove finally to be false. This is part of the difference between the eternal and temporal categories discussed yesterday, and relates as well to the eschatological perspective on the New Covenant. "For not all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel..." (Rom. 9:6b)
Under this section we see Dr. Long's first mention of 2 Peter 2:1 "alluding" to Deuteronomy 32:5-6. This "allusion" (I'm tempted to say "illusion") comes out of nowhere, and (as we will see when we consider the "sovereign creation view") leads right back to the place from which it came. But first we must consider...
The Temporal Deliverance View
This view carries with it as much theological merit as the "Christian charity view" does. It is, in fact, true that the non-elect are temporally delivered from many of the consequences for their sinful actions. This is especially true with regard to those false teachers and false professors who receive many of the blessings of the New Covenant, as referred to in the early portion of Hebrews 6.
However, this view also appears to find little support in 2 Peter 2:1, though a related theological argument might be presented that if Christ has indeed "bought" these false teachers through his death, then temporal deliverance may be one of the effects of that purchase; that "common grace" is based objectively upon the cross of Christ, just as efficacious grace is. Again, though, this is not taught in 2 Peter 2:1 and a broader biblical survey would have to be performed in order to establish such an argument. Dr. Long has not presented any reason to reject this possibility, but that issue is extremely peripheral to my current intent in writing, so I will make no effort at considering its merits or demerits at this time. Moving on, finally, to...
The Sovereign Creation View
Dr. Long's presentation of the "sovereign creation" interpretation of 2 Peter 2:1 rests heavily on a tripod of argumentation: (1) his argument that despotes refers to "Christ as Lord," abstracted utterly from "Christ as Mediator"; (2) his argument that agorazo does not mean "buy," but merely "acquire" or "obtain"; (3) that 2 Peter 2:1 directly alludes to Deuteronomy 32:5-6.
The first two arguments we have discussed in yesterday's post. (Briefly, two of the objections raised were: (1) that "Christ as Lord" cannot be automatically abstracted from "Christ as Mediator" anymore than the converse would be true; and that (2) agorazo is never used in the NT with reference to persons, rather than commercial products, outside of a redemptive context.)
The linguistic arguments provided by Dr. Long are an effort at "fencing in" the conclusions one draws with respect to 2 Peter 2:1, intended to lead toward the "sovereign creation view." However, the role of Dt. 32 seems to be the "lynchpin" in Dr. Long's interpretation. So what is the basis for his importation of the context of Dt. 32 into 2 Peter 2:1, essentially laying Dt. 32 overtop of 2 Peter 2?
A footnote.
A footnote which asserts (but does not seek to demonstrate), "That Peter is alluding to Deuteronomy 32:6 in II Peter 2:1 may be seen by observing the context of both passages. This is further supported by the fact that Peter alludes to Deuteronomy 32:5 in verse 13. The author of this pamphlet is not the first to say that Peter alludes to Deuteronomy 32:6 in verse 1, for the same observation has been made by both consistent and inconsistent Calvinistic commentators and Bible teachers."
This is hardly a solid foundation for importing Dt. 32 into 2 Peter 2. No reference is made to who exactly these "consistent and inconsistent Calvinistic commentators" might be. To declare something a fact is one thing; to demonstrate its factuality is another altogether. Dr. Long's use of Dt. 32 appears to be a convention imported for the sake of bolstering his argument that "bought" means "created." However, his "lynchpin" in this argument appears to have been made of solid Jell-O. Unless it can be clearly established that the context of Dt. 32 ought to be imported into 2 Peter 2:1 (and Dr. Long has made little effort to establish this) then the whole of the "sovereign creation view," as Dr. Long has presented it, collapses to the ground right next to the strawmen he hacked and burned to death earlier.
Even if it is granted that Dt. 32 is alluded to here, that only pushes the issue back a step, since Dt. 32 is in reference to a Master buying people who owe him their allegiance, much as the Sovereign Lord redeemed all Israel from out of Egypt... though some died in the wilderness. He redeemed the whole nation, yet some still died in the wilderness. If they were not actually redeemed from Egypt, how did they die in the wilderness? But my goal is not to deal too heavily with typology at this point.
(Note: Dt. 32 is also somewhat problematic linguistically, since the LXX uses kataomai rather than agorazo. The link could be much more firmly established with identical terminology, though it is undeniable that the terms are synonymous in many cases.)
Dr. Long closes this portion by stating, "But the writer is not dogmatic in this preference (for the "sovereign creation view"). He is dogmatic, however, in stating that, the spiritual redemption view has no consistent theological or contextual support. And this is the point that this doctrinal study has attempted to establish. The reader will have to judge for himself if this has been accomplished."
Indeed, "judge with right judgment." (John 7:24b)
Correct Interpretation?
So would I posit that any of the above views are correct? Well, as I think I've commented thus far, it is biblically true that Scripture (1) occasionally refers to even the non-elect members of the New Covenant with Christan charity; (2) that the non-elect do receive temporal deliverance (common grace) from the full judgment of sin and even enjoyment of this life despite their sinfulness (apostates especially receiving the benefits of the church); (3) and that God is the Sovereign Creator of all (and, yes, "all" means "all" even to the particular Calvinist here), though there doesn't appear to be a basis for any of them in this particular text. I have also pointed out that Dr. Long's treatment of the "spiritual redemption view" is clearly inadequate to disprove that position, but would I believe it is worth attempting to establish?
I think, first, the correct interpretation of 2 Peter 2:1 involves trembling at the statements of God's words, rather than meddling with them. Seeking to turn "bought" into "created" (or "bought" into "hypothetically bought") in order to make 2 Peter 2:1 fit neatly into a particular theological system is an example of what I'll call "shoehorn exegesis" (eisegesis based upon theological presuppositions).
We've got this "Size-12 foot" of a doctrine (such as a purely limited atonement or a completely hypothetical/universal atonement) and this dainty little "Size-8 text" for a shoe (such as 2 Pet. 2:1), so we get out our theological and linguistic shoehorns and jam that sucker in there. "See, it fits." Then we take the shoe off and toss it in the corner and hope nobody notices it's there or asks us to put it on too often... because that would just be painful. The hypothetical universalist is no less guilty of inserting their theology into this text as well, since there is no conditionalism present at all. The Master bought these reprobate false teachers.
I think that when our systems collide with the clear words of Scripture, then our system is what ought to be adjusted, and not vice versa. The text clearly says that, in some sense, the Lord has bought reprobate false teachers. This is redemptive language. There are immediate linguistic problems in attempting to deal with this text in a non-redemptive way. Dr. Long offers a non-soteriological interpretation, which is correct on one level, in that the non-elect will not finally be saved; but it is problematic on other levels.
A non-soteriological interpretation appears necessary, then, but how do we conceive of a "non-redemptive buying"? This seems immediately contradictory by the definition of the terms. It's like proposing a "non-purchased purchase" or a "non-fat chili cheesedog." Since "buy" and "redeem" are synonymous, what exactly is this non-redemptive sense of "buying" which is proposed? The contrast given by Dr. Long seems to be between buying in a "commercial product" sense and buying in a "saving the soul" sense. But both are still "buying," are they not?
I say all of this to show that this text is, in fact, difficult for all sides of the discussion: the universalist, the particularist, the dualist and whoever else is out there as well. One's theological presuppositions are difficult to escape in this regard, as shown by Dr. Long's tendentious treatment. But I don't desire to be too hard on him for this. As I said, it is particularly difficult to deal with this text without importing many extra-contextual presuppositions into the discussion; and Dr. Long certainly is a highly respectable Bible scholar.
So, I take the text plainly, at face value. Christ has in some sense, bought these false teachers. Genuinely bought, not hypothetically bought. And there are no examples of "buying" referring to Christ's creative work. What does Christ buy in creating something?
Wayne Grudem (taking a cue from the formidable Baptist scholar John Gill) in his Systematic Theology offers what seems to be the most plausible explanation of this verse:
"The OT allusion is probably to Dt. 32:6, where Moses says to the rebellious people who have turned away from God, ‘Is not he your Father who has bought you?’ (author's translation). Peter is drawing an analogy between the past false prophets who arose among the Jews and those who will be false teachers within the churches to which he writes... From the time of the exodus onward, any Jewish person would have considered himself or herself one who was ‘bought’ by God in the exodus and therefore a person of God’s own possession... So the text means not that Christ had redeemed these false prophets, but simply that they were rebellious Jewish people (or church attenders in the same position as rebellious Jews) who were rightly owned by God because they had been bought out of the land of Egypt (or their forefathers had), but they were ungrateful to him. Christ's specific redemptive work on the cross is not in view in this verse."
As I said, I think this is the most plausible view to take regarding 2 Peter 2:1, though it is not without its problems as well. We are unsure of the exact recipients of this letter, whether they are Jews or Gentiles or the more common admixture of the two. If these false teachers are, in fact, Jews, then we have a basis for seeing old covenant-style redemptive buying here (as in the exodus). This makes sense only if the false teachers were Jewish, however. Grudem attempts to gloss over this issue (I think) by saying that it can refer to "church attenders in the same position as rebellious Jews." If they are not Jewish, then we are back in the same conundrum as before, regarding the question of what "bought" refers to here. And since it cannot be established or proven false whether these false teachers were Jewish, I think this remains the most plausible, though still not certain, interpretation of the passage.
So there really is no basis in this text for the "sovereign creation view" or the "spiritual redemption view". I think that a historical redemption from the old covenant is what is most likely in view here. If one is seeking to establish a universal aspect to the atonement, they will have to look elsewhere (and I think certain universal aspects can be established elsewhere, as I argued in my series "Responding to ResponsiveReiding".)
This does raise questions regarding the OT typology of the Exodus in relation to the New Covenant and redemption, but those issues are beyond my current scope in writing.
In the end, we all must make our systems humbly bow the knee to the Scripture in worship of the God who is Lord of all. "That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. 2:10-11)
The Spiritual Redemption View
Dr. Long begins by pointing out that most "modified Calvinists" hold to this interpretation. But, "To get away from the hypothetical label, it is often said by those who hold to universal redemption that Christ had to die for the non-elect in order that they might be justly condemned for their sin of unbelief." While no clear support for this position is given, Dr. Long moves right ahead and refutes his own assertion of the 4-pointers' position. He doesn't even present it as an argument to be refuted, but rather as his opponents' way of "escaping" the "hypothetical label." This is hardly an earnest assessment of another's position.
It should also be recognized that the view under consideration is proposing (albeit rather loosely in Dr. Long's re-formulation) that Christ's retribution against the non-elect is based in some measure in the atonement. This directly contradicts Dr. Long's later footnote (#17) in which he states, "The writer has yet to find a modified Calvinist who biblically defends his belief in universal redemption from the standpoint of retribution..." Either Dr. Long has misrepresented his opponents' position regarding the "spiritual redemption view" (which appears likely from the rather sloppy strawman he presents for refutation) or he has not been paying close attention to the modified Calvinist position which he desires to refute (which also appears likely from the rather sloppy strawman he presents for refutation). Either way, his treatment here is tendentious at best.
Also noteworthy is that Dr. Long's string of rhetorical question refutation (i.e. "And what about imputed sin...?, etc.) is aimed obviously at his own strawman. He, in effect, is arguing that his opponents' position is based on the idea that imputation is, in itself, an unjust act. He does this in an effort at showing that this removes the basis for a substitutionary atonement. But where is the demonstration? The argumentation for the reader to consider? None appears to be necessary in refutation, since nothing but an assertion of straw was offered in favor of the position. This hardly demonstrates the weaknesses of the "spiritual redemption view." This is, frankly, just preaching to the particularists' choir.
Dr. Long then offers three further objections to this view, the first two of which he has been "setting up" for the entire paper, and to which I raised a few objections for consideration yesterday. The third blatantly contradicts even his own strawman presentation of his opponents' position. He says, "Third, because of their theological inconsistency, the universal redemptionists do not attempt to explain how II Peter 2:1 can teach that Christ died a substitutionary death for the false teachers, who in verse 12 of the same chapter are described 'as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed' even as they 'were before of old ordained to this condemnation' (Jude 4)." Even in Dr. Long's reductionistic and over-simplified presentation of his opponents' view he has stated an "attempt to explain how II Peter 2:1 can teach that Christ died a substitutionary death for the false teachers": "that Christ had to die for the non-elect in order that they might be justly condemned for their sin of unbelief."
Dr. Long (unsurprisingly) disagrees with his own strawman, but that does not mean that "no attempt at explanation" has been made. He has utterly contradicted himself by simultaneously over-simplifying his opponents' position and over-stating the case against it throughout this section, such that it is unfortunately difficult to glean much of anything useful from this portion of Dr. Long's chapter.
He rounds this section out rather consistently with his treatment thus far, by proposing: "Because of their inconsistency, those who hold to the spiritual redemption view are logically saying, in effect, that: 'The Lord, by imparting a knowledge of the gospel and working a professed acknowledgement of it and subjection unto it, separated and delivered from the world certain ones that professed to be saints outwardly, who in reality were wolves and hypocrites ordained to condemnation. Therefore, Christ shed His blood for the redemption and salvation of all the reprobates and damned persons in the world who have lived or will live.' Does this make any sense? Does the Bible teach this?"
He creates an absurd quotation, foists it upon his opponents' as though it were their own, then asks, "Does this make any sense? Does the Bible teach this?"
By way of reply, I simply ask, "Is this good scholarship?"
The Christian Charity View
I find it rather ironic that Dr. Long, after his rather uncharitable treatment of the "spiritual redemption view," then presents the "Christian charity view" for our consideration. "It's like rain on your wedding day..."
There are places in Scripture which appear to treat false teachers and false professors as though they are actually elect. I agree with Dr. Long that 2 Peter 2:1 does not appear to be one of those places, and that even if it were it would not support a moderate Calvinists' position (of whatever stripe, my own dualistic view included).
Theologically, it makes sense to speak of all professing Christians as members of the New Covenant, though some may prove finally to be false. This is part of the difference between the eternal and temporal categories discussed yesterday, and relates as well to the eschatological perspective on the New Covenant. "For not all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel..." (Rom. 9:6b)
Under this section we see Dr. Long's first mention of 2 Peter 2:1 "alluding" to Deuteronomy 32:5-6. This "allusion" (I'm tempted to say "illusion") comes out of nowhere, and (as we will see when we consider the "sovereign creation view") leads right back to the place from which it came. But first we must consider...
The Temporal Deliverance View
This view carries with it as much theological merit as the "Christian charity view" does. It is, in fact, true that the non-elect are temporally delivered from many of the consequences for their sinful actions. This is especially true with regard to those false teachers and false professors who receive many of the blessings of the New Covenant, as referred to in the early portion of Hebrews 6.
However, this view also appears to find little support in 2 Peter 2:1, though a related theological argument might be presented that if Christ has indeed "bought" these false teachers through his death, then temporal deliverance may be one of the effects of that purchase; that "common grace" is based objectively upon the cross of Christ, just as efficacious grace is. Again, though, this is not taught in 2 Peter 2:1 and a broader biblical survey would have to be performed in order to establish such an argument. Dr. Long has not presented any reason to reject this possibility, but that issue is extremely peripheral to my current intent in writing, so I will make no effort at considering its merits or demerits at this time. Moving on, finally, to...
The Sovereign Creation View
Dr. Long's presentation of the "sovereign creation" interpretation of 2 Peter 2:1 rests heavily on a tripod of argumentation: (1) his argument that despotes refers to "Christ as Lord," abstracted utterly from "Christ as Mediator"; (2) his argument that agorazo does not mean "buy," but merely "acquire" or "obtain"; (3) that 2 Peter 2:1 directly alludes to Deuteronomy 32:5-6.
The first two arguments we have discussed in yesterday's post. (Briefly, two of the objections raised were: (1) that "Christ as Lord" cannot be automatically abstracted from "Christ as Mediator" anymore than the converse would be true; and that (2) agorazo is never used in the NT with reference to persons, rather than commercial products, outside of a redemptive context.)
The linguistic arguments provided by Dr. Long are an effort at "fencing in" the conclusions one draws with respect to 2 Peter 2:1, intended to lead toward the "sovereign creation view." However, the role of Dt. 32 seems to be the "lynchpin" in Dr. Long's interpretation. So what is the basis for his importation of the context of Dt. 32 into 2 Peter 2:1, essentially laying Dt. 32 overtop of 2 Peter 2?
A footnote.
A footnote which asserts (but does not seek to demonstrate), "That Peter is alluding to Deuteronomy 32:6 in II Peter 2:1 may be seen by observing the context of both passages. This is further supported by the fact that Peter alludes to Deuteronomy 32:5 in verse 13. The author of this pamphlet is not the first to say that Peter alludes to Deuteronomy 32:6 in verse 1, for the same observation has been made by both consistent and inconsistent Calvinistic commentators and Bible teachers."
This is hardly a solid foundation for importing Dt. 32 into 2 Peter 2. No reference is made to who exactly these "consistent and inconsistent Calvinistic commentators" might be. To declare something a fact is one thing; to demonstrate its factuality is another altogether. Dr. Long's use of Dt. 32 appears to be a convention imported for the sake of bolstering his argument that "bought" means "created." However, his "lynchpin" in this argument appears to have been made of solid Jell-O. Unless it can be clearly established that the context of Dt. 32 ought to be imported into 2 Peter 2:1 (and Dr. Long has made little effort to establish this) then the whole of the "sovereign creation view," as Dr. Long has presented it, collapses to the ground right next to the strawmen he hacked and burned to death earlier.
Even if it is granted that Dt. 32 is alluded to here, that only pushes the issue back a step, since Dt. 32 is in reference to a Master buying people who owe him their allegiance, much as the Sovereign Lord redeemed all Israel from out of Egypt... though some died in the wilderness. He redeemed the whole nation, yet some still died in the wilderness. If they were not actually redeemed from Egypt, how did they die in the wilderness? But my goal is not to deal too heavily with typology at this point.
(Note: Dt. 32 is also somewhat problematic linguistically, since the LXX uses kataomai rather than agorazo. The link could be much more firmly established with identical terminology, though it is undeniable that the terms are synonymous in many cases.)
Dr. Long closes this portion by stating, "But the writer is not dogmatic in this preference (for the "sovereign creation view"). He is dogmatic, however, in stating that, the spiritual redemption view has no consistent theological or contextual support. And this is the point that this doctrinal study has attempted to establish. The reader will have to judge for himself if this has been accomplished."
Indeed, "judge with right judgment." (John 7:24b)
Correct Interpretation?
So would I posit that any of the above views are correct? Well, as I think I've commented thus far, it is biblically true that Scripture (1) occasionally refers to even the non-elect members of the New Covenant with Christan charity; (2) that the non-elect do receive temporal deliverance (common grace) from the full judgment of sin and even enjoyment of this life despite their sinfulness (apostates especially receiving the benefits of the church); (3) and that God is the Sovereign Creator of all (and, yes, "all" means "all" even to the particular Calvinist here), though there doesn't appear to be a basis for any of them in this particular text. I have also pointed out that Dr. Long's treatment of the "spiritual redemption view" is clearly inadequate to disprove that position, but would I believe it is worth attempting to establish?
I think, first, the correct interpretation of 2 Peter 2:1 involves trembling at the statements of God's words, rather than meddling with them. Seeking to turn "bought" into "created" (or "bought" into "hypothetically bought") in order to make 2 Peter 2:1 fit neatly into a particular theological system is an example of what I'll call "shoehorn exegesis" (eisegesis based upon theological presuppositions).
We've got this "Size-12 foot" of a doctrine (such as a purely limited atonement or a completely hypothetical/universal atonement) and this dainty little "Size-8 text" for a shoe (such as 2 Pet. 2:1), so we get out our theological and linguistic shoehorns and jam that sucker in there. "See, it fits." Then we take the shoe off and toss it in the corner and hope nobody notices it's there or asks us to put it on too often... because that would just be painful. The hypothetical universalist is no less guilty of inserting their theology into this text as well, since there is no conditionalism present at all. The Master bought these reprobate false teachers.
I think that when our systems collide with the clear words of Scripture, then our system is what ought to be adjusted, and not vice versa. The text clearly says that, in some sense, the Lord has bought reprobate false teachers. This is redemptive language. There are immediate linguistic problems in attempting to deal with this text in a non-redemptive way. Dr. Long offers a non-soteriological interpretation, which is correct on one level, in that the non-elect will not finally be saved; but it is problematic on other levels.
A non-soteriological interpretation appears necessary, then, but how do we conceive of a "non-redemptive buying"? This seems immediately contradictory by the definition of the terms. It's like proposing a "non-purchased purchase" or a "non-fat chili cheesedog." Since "buy" and "redeem" are synonymous, what exactly is this non-redemptive sense of "buying" which is proposed? The contrast given by Dr. Long seems to be between buying in a "commercial product" sense and buying in a "saving the soul" sense. But both are still "buying," are they not?
I say all of this to show that this text is, in fact, difficult for all sides of the discussion: the universalist, the particularist, the dualist and whoever else is out there as well. One's theological presuppositions are difficult to escape in this regard, as shown by Dr. Long's tendentious treatment. But I don't desire to be too hard on him for this. As I said, it is particularly difficult to deal with this text without importing many extra-contextual presuppositions into the discussion; and Dr. Long certainly is a highly respectable Bible scholar.
So, I take the text plainly, at face value. Christ has in some sense, bought these false teachers. Genuinely bought, not hypothetically bought. And there are no examples of "buying" referring to Christ's creative work. What does Christ buy in creating something?
Wayne Grudem (taking a cue from the formidable Baptist scholar John Gill) in his Systematic Theology offers what seems to be the most plausible explanation of this verse:
"The OT allusion is probably to Dt. 32:6, where Moses says to the rebellious people who have turned away from God, ‘Is not he your Father who has bought you?’ (author's translation). Peter is drawing an analogy between the past false prophets who arose among the Jews and those who will be false teachers within the churches to which he writes... From the time of the exodus onward, any Jewish person would have considered himself or herself one who was ‘bought’ by God in the exodus and therefore a person of God’s own possession... So the text means not that Christ had redeemed these false prophets, but simply that they were rebellious Jewish people (or church attenders in the same position as rebellious Jews) who were rightly owned by God because they had been bought out of the land of Egypt (or their forefathers had), but they were ungrateful to him. Christ's specific redemptive work on the cross is not in view in this verse."
As I said, I think this is the most plausible view to take regarding 2 Peter 2:1, though it is not without its problems as well. We are unsure of the exact recipients of this letter, whether they are Jews or Gentiles or the more common admixture of the two. If these false teachers are, in fact, Jews, then we have a basis for seeing old covenant-style redemptive buying here (as in the exodus). This makes sense only if the false teachers were Jewish, however. Grudem attempts to gloss over this issue (I think) by saying that it can refer to "church attenders in the same position as rebellious Jews." If they are not Jewish, then we are back in the same conundrum as before, regarding the question of what "bought" refers to here. And since it cannot be established or proven false whether these false teachers were Jewish, I think this remains the most plausible, though still not certain, interpretation of the passage.
So there really is no basis in this text for the "sovereign creation view" or the "spiritual redemption view". I think that a historical redemption from the old covenant is what is most likely in view here. If one is seeking to establish a universal aspect to the atonement, they will have to look elsewhere (and I think certain universal aspects can be established elsewhere, as I argued in my series "Responding to ResponsiveReiding".)
This does raise questions regarding the OT typology of the Exodus in relation to the New Covenant and redemption, but those issues are beyond my current scope in writing.
In the end, we all must make our systems humbly bow the knee to the Scripture in worship of the God who is Lord of all. "That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. 2:10-11)
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
"Some Pastoral Reflections"
Worth serious contemplation, for both comforters and those in grief: Triablogue: "Some Pastoral Reflections"
Redemption (Not Sovereign Creation) In 2 Peter 2:1, Part 1
This is a response to Dr. Gary Long's chapter "Redemption in 2 Peter 2:1," which can be found here. It should be noted at the outset for the reader's benefit that Gary Long, all things being equal, is a theological giant... and I am not. (He was also an artillery officer. As a combat medic who has done a bit of work with ground-pounders, I have great fondness for the guys with the big guns, like Dr. Long.)
That being said, I will be responding to several problems I see in Dr. Long's treatment of 2 Peter 2:1. My response will assume that my audience has read Dr. Long's article (which I linked to above for that purpose) and will therefore only quote sections which are pertinent to the specific responses made within this post.
Dr. Long's initial survey of the usage of the pivotal Greek term agorazo in the NT is accurate and in accord with the standard reference works on the matter. It should be noted that Dr. Long is largely arguing against the 4-point Calvinism of many contemporary dispensationalists (such as Robert P. Lightner or Lewis Sperry Chafer), with whom I would also have much disagreement regarding many subjects, including their doctrine of the extent of the atonement. I'm not sure of Dr. Long's familiarity with the history of doctrine regarding the extent of the atonement. In much of Dr. Long's criticism of these dispensational 4-point Calvinists I would agree with him, for I am advocating a "classical Calvinistic" position which has a dual view of the extent of the atonement (both universalistic and particularistic, in different senses) a la Calvin, Charles Hodge, W.G.T. Shedd, Richard Baxter, etc.
Briefly, I hold that when the question "For whom did Christ die?" is asked, there is an unarticulated equivocation surrounding the terms "for whom," around which swirls much of the debate between Calvinistic universalists and particularists. I think a biblical resolution between the two positions can be made, in understanding that it can be true in one sense that Christ indeed died for all and every one, and also true in a different sense that Christ has died for the elect alone, rendering their salvation secure. In this there is no contradiction, for Christ has not died for "all" in the same sense as for "the elect." I point this out to make clear that Dr. Long does not appear to have my dualistic position in his sights in writing this paper, so it would be unfair of me to be overly critical of his paper in that respect. I also bring this to the reader's attention to prevent confounding my own position with that of the dispensational theologians mentioned before, as I will be criticizing Dr. Long's treatment.
Two terms are of pivotal importance in understanding this verse: "Lord" (despotes) and "bought" (agorazo). Dr. Long frames the issue surrounding these terms quite well: "First, it must be determined whether 'Lord' refers to God the Father or to God the Son as mediator, or to God the Father or God the Son as sovereign Lord. Second, it must be decided whether 'bought' is to be understood redemptively (referring to salvation or soteriologically), as most modified Calvinists claim, or non-redemptively (non-soteriologically), as most consistent Calvinists claim."
(I will make no further comment regarding the rather tendentious labeling of Dr. Long's own position as "consistent Calvinism.")
I largely agree with Dr. Long's conclusions regarding the use of despotes in this verse. Dr. Long points out that "Christ as mediator" is still sovereign, but it should also be noted that "Christ as sovereign" is still no less the "only mediator between God and man." I will also simply mention that Dr. Long's point regarding the explicit reference to a "redemptive price" in other contexts where "Christ is referred to as mediator" is nothing more than an argument from silence. A conspicuous silence is, of course, no less silent than any other. It's also not entirely accurate, since Christ's titles of "Lord and Savior" are mentioned in the preceding (2 Pet. 1:11) and ensuing (2 Pet. 2:20) contexts.
However, as Dr. Long recognizes, the understanding of the term agorazo is much more central to the conclusions one draws in interpeting this passage. To this we now turn.
Dr. Long:
"...of its thirty occurrences in the New Testament, agorazõ is never used in a salvation context (unless II Peter 2:1 is the exception) without the technical term “price” (times—a technical term for the blood of Christ) or its equivalent being stated or made explicit in the context (see I Cor. 6:20; 7:23; Rev. 5:9; 14:3-4)."
Not to be too picky, but agorazo actually appears thirty-one times in the NT. And it's already been pointed out that Christ is referred to as "Savior" in the context of 2 Pet. 2, which is no less "equivalent" in title than the "Lamb" of Rev. 14. It is also noteworthy that the term is never used in the NT in non-redemptive contexts with reference to persons. All other uses refer to commercial trade (such as the purchase of land, food, etc.). This is, of course, an equal and opposite grammatico-contextual problem for Dr. Long's kind of particularism, with reference to the issue he raises over the explicit "price." It is surprising that Dr. Long does not mention this fact.
Dr. Long:
"...in each of the latter five references the context clearly restricts the extent of agorazõ (regardless of what it means) to believers—never to non-believers."
An important (albeit somewhat peripheral) point should be raised here, I think. A certain amount of categorical confusion takes place in discussions of the extent of the atonement, largely due to the occasionally inexact usage of terms which have temporal reference (believers/non-believers) and eternal reference (elect/reprobate) as though they were synonymous. This is due, I think, in part to the difficulties associated with discussing eternality from a finite, time-bound perspective, which carries with it a certain amount of categorical overlap. On the day of judgment, the categories will become identical: believers/elect, non-believers/reprobate. But in the mean time, these categories only overlap each other, they are not identical. One might be a currently non-believing person who is elect and will eventually become a believer. This person is still accurately referred to as a non-believer from our current vantage point. One might be a reprobate who is a "believer" now, but who proves in time to finally be an apostate, becoming a non-believer once again. The extent of final salvation is always limited to the elect alone, since this is a fixed category, but redemption is not always finally limited to contemporary believers alone, since this is a fluctuating, temporal category. To assert that the five passages referenced above are restricted to believers alone is true, but we must keep in mind that the category of "believers" is not identical with the category of "the elect" until the analysis of the final judgment. "Believers" is simply a reference to a category of people who believe the Gospel. And if you believe the Gospel, you will be saved. Saving faith is persevering faith. So the extent of agorazo is limited to believers, but beware a tendency to use a bit of linguistic "sleight-of-hand" to make this term refer to "the elect alone" in an indentical 1:1 correspondence. It's not that simple; it's simpler.
(Note: Some of this eternal/temporal category confusion has led some to embrace the error of so-called "eternal justification," which confuses God's eternal decree (predestination) with the temporal effects of that decree (justification), effectively truncating the ordo Salutis into the eternal category. As Neil Chambers has pointed out, this reduces the gospel to a cipher which simply informs the elect of their already eternally blessed condition, rather than actually saving them from their lost and sinful condition through faith in Christ, as Scripture makes plain in Eph. 2:1-9. See Berkhof on the matter here.)
(Note: Another reason discussions of the eternal/temporal raises issues for people is due to humankind's constant desire to over-anthropopathize our eternal God (i.e. "How does God feel about me today? The same as yesterday or different? Is He happy with me today, now that I'm a Christian, when He was angry at me yesterday, since I was still in my sins? If I lie, is He angry at me? If I pray, is He happy again?" Or, more theologically-oriented, "Is there any sense in which God, even temporally, is pleased with the reprobate or is displeased with the elect?").
I think this line of questioning is fundamentally mistaken in its understanding of God's nature, since it literally ascribes to God merely human emotions, such as hatred, confusion or grief. The Scriptures use these terms as anthropopathisms, not as literal "feelings" in reference to an infinite, immutable, eternal, non-material, absolute personality. As John Owen rightly says, "To ascribe affections (emotions) properly to God is to make him weak, imperfect, dependent, changeable and impotent." (Owen, Works, Vol. XII, p. 110)
It is no less idolatry to humanize God than it is to deify man.
This position also mistakenly views the elect as a category abstracted from Christ, the truly "chosen one," with whom we are united. In Him we see God's eternal nature revealed as the ultimate anthropomorphism, the Incarnation.)
Dr. Long:
"...a word study of agorazõ, in both the Greek Old and New Testaments, reveals that the word itself does not include the payment price. When it is translated with a meaning 'to buy,' whether in a salvation or non-salvation context, a payment price is always stated or made explicit by the context. Fifth, in contexts where no payment price is stated or implied, agorazõ may often be better translated as 'acquire' or 'obtain'."
I'm not convinced that the term "buy" does not include, implicitly, the concept of a payment price. One may "acquire" things by other means than purchase (such as theft, extortion, inheritance, receiving a gift, creating, etc.), but why not use a term more apt to that concept? Why say "buy" if you mean "steal," "inherit," "create," etc.? I think Dr. Long is stretching the semantic range of the term agorazo a bit in order to justify his formula regarding an explicitly mentioned "price," which is necessary for him to preclude the "spiritual redemption view" he introduces later.
Also, there are no biblical examples of agorazo ever being translated as "acquire" or "obtain". It is always translated "buy" or "redeem".
Dr. Long:
"...agorazõ is never used in Scripture in a hypothetical sense unless II Peter 2:1 be the exception. Rather it is always used in a context where the buying or acquiring actually takes place."
As will be seen, I agree with Dr. Long that no "hypothetical buying" can be found in 2 Peter 2. Now that the preliminary matters have been surveyed, tomorrow we will analyze the four possible interpretations presented by Dr. Long, and I will respond a bit to his criticisms and his conclusions.
That being said, I will be responding to several problems I see in Dr. Long's treatment of 2 Peter 2:1. My response will assume that my audience has read Dr. Long's article (which I linked to above for that purpose) and will therefore only quote sections which are pertinent to the specific responses made within this post.
Dr. Long's initial survey of the usage of the pivotal Greek term agorazo in the NT is accurate and in accord with the standard reference works on the matter. It should be noted that Dr. Long is largely arguing against the 4-point Calvinism of many contemporary dispensationalists (such as Robert P. Lightner or Lewis Sperry Chafer), with whom I would also have much disagreement regarding many subjects, including their doctrine of the extent of the atonement. I'm not sure of Dr. Long's familiarity with the history of doctrine regarding the extent of the atonement. In much of Dr. Long's criticism of these dispensational 4-point Calvinists I would agree with him, for I am advocating a "classical Calvinistic" position which has a dual view of the extent of the atonement (both universalistic and particularistic, in different senses) a la Calvin, Charles Hodge, W.G.T. Shedd, Richard Baxter, etc.
Briefly, I hold that when the question "For whom did Christ die?" is asked, there is an unarticulated equivocation surrounding the terms "for whom," around which swirls much of the debate between Calvinistic universalists and particularists. I think a biblical resolution between the two positions can be made, in understanding that it can be true in one sense that Christ indeed died for all and every one, and also true in a different sense that Christ has died for the elect alone, rendering their salvation secure. In this there is no contradiction, for Christ has not died for "all" in the same sense as for "the elect." I point this out to make clear that Dr. Long does not appear to have my dualistic position in his sights in writing this paper, so it would be unfair of me to be overly critical of his paper in that respect. I also bring this to the reader's attention to prevent confounding my own position with that of the dispensational theologians mentioned before, as I will be criticizing Dr. Long's treatment.
Two terms are of pivotal importance in understanding this verse: "Lord" (despotes) and "bought" (agorazo). Dr. Long frames the issue surrounding these terms quite well: "First, it must be determined whether 'Lord' refers to God the Father or to God the Son as mediator, or to God the Father or God the Son as sovereign Lord. Second, it must be decided whether 'bought' is to be understood redemptively (referring to salvation or soteriologically), as most modified Calvinists claim, or non-redemptively (non-soteriologically), as most consistent Calvinists claim."
(I will make no further comment regarding the rather tendentious labeling of Dr. Long's own position as "consistent Calvinism.")
I largely agree with Dr. Long's conclusions regarding the use of despotes in this verse. Dr. Long points out that "Christ as mediator" is still sovereign, but it should also be noted that "Christ as sovereign" is still no less the "only mediator between God and man." I will also simply mention that Dr. Long's point regarding the explicit reference to a "redemptive price" in other contexts where "Christ is referred to as mediator" is nothing more than an argument from silence. A conspicuous silence is, of course, no less silent than any other. It's also not entirely accurate, since Christ's titles of "Lord and Savior" are mentioned in the preceding (2 Pet. 1:11) and ensuing (2 Pet. 2:20) contexts.
However, as Dr. Long recognizes, the understanding of the term agorazo is much more central to the conclusions one draws in interpeting this passage. To this we now turn.
Dr. Long:
"...of its thirty occurrences in the New Testament, agorazõ is never used in a salvation context (unless II Peter 2:1 is the exception) without the technical term “price” (times—a technical term for the blood of Christ) or its equivalent being stated or made explicit in the context (see I Cor. 6:20; 7:23; Rev. 5:9; 14:3-4)."
Not to be too picky, but agorazo actually appears thirty-one times in the NT. And it's already been pointed out that Christ is referred to as "Savior" in the context of 2 Pet. 2, which is no less "equivalent" in title than the "Lamb" of Rev. 14. It is also noteworthy that the term is never used in the NT in non-redemptive contexts with reference to persons. All other uses refer to commercial trade (such as the purchase of land, food, etc.). This is, of course, an equal and opposite grammatico-contextual problem for Dr. Long's kind of particularism, with reference to the issue he raises over the explicit "price." It is surprising that Dr. Long does not mention this fact.
Dr. Long:
"...in each of the latter five references the context clearly restricts the extent of agorazõ (regardless of what it means) to believers—never to non-believers."
An important (albeit somewhat peripheral) point should be raised here, I think. A certain amount of categorical confusion takes place in discussions of the extent of the atonement, largely due to the occasionally inexact usage of terms which have temporal reference (believers/non-believers) and eternal reference (elect/reprobate) as though they were synonymous. This is due, I think, in part to the difficulties associated with discussing eternality from a finite, time-bound perspective, which carries with it a certain amount of categorical overlap. On the day of judgment, the categories will become identical: believers/elect, non-believers/reprobate. But in the mean time, these categories only overlap each other, they are not identical. One might be a currently non-believing person who is elect and will eventually become a believer. This person is still accurately referred to as a non-believer from our current vantage point. One might be a reprobate who is a "believer" now, but who proves in time to finally be an apostate, becoming a non-believer once again. The extent of final salvation is always limited to the elect alone, since this is a fixed category, but redemption is not always finally limited to contemporary believers alone, since this is a fluctuating, temporal category. To assert that the five passages referenced above are restricted to believers alone is true, but we must keep in mind that the category of "believers" is not identical with the category of "the elect" until the analysis of the final judgment. "Believers" is simply a reference to a category of people who believe the Gospel. And if you believe the Gospel, you will be saved. Saving faith is persevering faith. So the extent of agorazo is limited to believers, but beware a tendency to use a bit of linguistic "sleight-of-hand" to make this term refer to "the elect alone" in an indentical 1:1 correspondence. It's not that simple; it's simpler.
(Note: Some of this eternal/temporal category confusion has led some to embrace the error of so-called "eternal justification," which confuses God's eternal decree (predestination) with the temporal effects of that decree (justification), effectively truncating the ordo Salutis into the eternal category. As Neil Chambers has pointed out, this reduces the gospel to a cipher which simply informs the elect of their already eternally blessed condition, rather than actually saving them from their lost and sinful condition through faith in Christ, as Scripture makes plain in Eph. 2:1-9. See Berkhof on the matter here.)
(Note: Another reason discussions of the eternal/temporal raises issues for people is due to humankind's constant desire to over-anthropopathize our eternal God (i.e. "How does God feel about me today? The same as yesterday or different? Is He happy with me today, now that I'm a Christian, when He was angry at me yesterday, since I was still in my sins? If I lie, is He angry at me? If I pray, is He happy again?" Or, more theologically-oriented, "Is there any sense in which God, even temporally, is pleased with the reprobate or is displeased with the elect?").
I think this line of questioning is fundamentally mistaken in its understanding of God's nature, since it literally ascribes to God merely human emotions, such as hatred, confusion or grief. The Scriptures use these terms as anthropopathisms, not as literal "feelings" in reference to an infinite, immutable, eternal, non-material, absolute personality. As John Owen rightly says, "To ascribe affections (emotions) properly to God is to make him weak, imperfect, dependent, changeable and impotent." (Owen, Works, Vol. XII, p. 110)
It is no less idolatry to humanize God than it is to deify man.
This position also mistakenly views the elect as a category abstracted from Christ, the truly "chosen one," with whom we are united. In Him we see God's eternal nature revealed as the ultimate anthropomorphism, the Incarnation.)
Dr. Long:
"...a word study of agorazõ, in both the Greek Old and New Testaments, reveals that the word itself does not include the payment price. When it is translated with a meaning 'to buy,' whether in a salvation or non-salvation context, a payment price is always stated or made explicit by the context. Fifth, in contexts where no payment price is stated or implied, agorazõ may often be better translated as 'acquire' or 'obtain'."
I'm not convinced that the term "buy" does not include, implicitly, the concept of a payment price. One may "acquire" things by other means than purchase (such as theft, extortion, inheritance, receiving a gift, creating, etc.), but why not use a term more apt to that concept? Why say "buy" if you mean "steal," "inherit," "create," etc.? I think Dr. Long is stretching the semantic range of the term agorazo a bit in order to justify his formula regarding an explicitly mentioned "price," which is necessary for him to preclude the "spiritual redemption view" he introduces later.
Also, there are no biblical examples of agorazo ever being translated as "acquire" or "obtain". It is always translated "buy" or "redeem".
Dr. Long:
"...agorazõ is never used in Scripture in a hypothetical sense unless II Peter 2:1 be the exception. Rather it is always used in a context where the buying or acquiring actually takes place."
As will be seen, I agree with Dr. Long that no "hypothetical buying" can be found in 2 Peter 2. Now that the preliminary matters have been surveyed, tomorrow we will analyze the four possible interpretations presented by Dr. Long, and I will respond a bit to his criticisms and his conclusions.
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
"God is the Gospel"
While I might quibble about some of the details within the post, I do agree with the general thrust of this criticism of John Piper's theology (one of the few times I have found myself a bit at odds with Piper): Triablogue: "God is the Gospel"
Prophetic...
From Herbert Schlossberg's book Idols For Destruction (pp. 183-185):
"Rulers have ever been tempted to play the role of father to their people... The state that acts like a wise parent instead of a vindictive judge has been an attractive image to many people. They include ecclesiastical authorities who have completely missed the point of the gospel warning to “call no man your father on earth, for you have one Father, who is in heaven” (Matt. 23:9). The father is the symbol not only of authority but also of provision. “Our Father who art in heaven... Give us this day our daily bread” (Matt. 6:9, 11). Looking to the state for sustenance is a cultic act [an act of worship]; we rightly learn to expect food from parents, and when we regard the state as the source of physical provision we render to it the obeisance of idolatry. The crowds who had fed on the multiplied loaves and fishes were ready to receive Christ as their ruler, not because of who he was but because of the provision. John Howard Yoder has rightly interpreted that scene: “The distribution of bread moved the crowd to acclaim Jesus as the new Moses, the provider, the Welfare King whom they had been waiting for.”(John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Angus Noster, p.34–35)...
"The paternal state not only feeds its children, but nurtures, educates, comforts, and disciplines them, providing all they need for their security. This appears to be a mildly insulting way to treat adults, but it is really a great crime because it transforms the state from being a gift of God, given to protect us against violence, into an idol. It supplies us with all blessings, and we look to it for all our needs. Once we sink to that level, as Lewis says, there is no point in telling state officials to mind their own business. “Our whole lives are their business.” (Note: C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock, p. 314) The paternalism of the state is that of the bad parent who wants his children dependent on him forever. That is an evil impulse. The good parent prepares his children for independence, trains them to make responsible decisions, knows that he harms them by not helping them to break loose. The paternal state thrives on dependency. When the dependents free themselves, it loses power. It is, therefore, parasitic on the very persons whom it turns into parasites. Thus, the state and its dependents march symbiotically [in close union with one another] to destruction...
"When the provision of paternal security replaces the provision of justice as the function of the state, the state stops providing justice. The ersatz [artificial and inferior substitute] parent ceases executing judgment against those who violate the law, and the nation begins losing benefits of justice. Those who are concerned about the chaos into which the criminal justice system has fallen should consider what the state’s function has become. Because the state can only be a bad imitation of a father, as a dancing bear act is of a ballerina, the protection of this Leviathan of a father turns out to be a bear hug...
"The idol state uses the language of compassion because its intention is a messianic one. It finds the masses harassed and helpless, like sheep without a shepherd, needing a savior."
"Rulers have ever been tempted to play the role of father to their people... The state that acts like a wise parent instead of a vindictive judge has been an attractive image to many people. They include ecclesiastical authorities who have completely missed the point of the gospel warning to “call no man your father on earth, for you have one Father, who is in heaven” (Matt. 23:9). The father is the symbol not only of authority but also of provision. “Our Father who art in heaven... Give us this day our daily bread” (Matt. 6:9, 11). Looking to the state for sustenance is a cultic act [an act of worship]; we rightly learn to expect food from parents, and when we regard the state as the source of physical provision we render to it the obeisance of idolatry. The crowds who had fed on the multiplied loaves and fishes were ready to receive Christ as their ruler, not because of who he was but because of the provision. John Howard Yoder has rightly interpreted that scene: “The distribution of bread moved the crowd to acclaim Jesus as the new Moses, the provider, the Welfare King whom they had been waiting for.”(John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Angus Noster, p.34–35)...
"The paternal state not only feeds its children, but nurtures, educates, comforts, and disciplines them, providing all they need for their security. This appears to be a mildly insulting way to treat adults, but it is really a great crime because it transforms the state from being a gift of God, given to protect us against violence, into an idol. It supplies us with all blessings, and we look to it for all our needs. Once we sink to that level, as Lewis says, there is no point in telling state officials to mind their own business. “Our whole lives are their business.” (Note: C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock, p. 314) The paternalism of the state is that of the bad parent who wants his children dependent on him forever. That is an evil impulse. The good parent prepares his children for independence, trains them to make responsible decisions, knows that he harms them by not helping them to break loose. The paternal state thrives on dependency. When the dependents free themselves, it loses power. It is, therefore, parasitic on the very persons whom it turns into parasites. Thus, the state and its dependents march symbiotically [in close union with one another] to destruction...
"When the provision of paternal security replaces the provision of justice as the function of the state, the state stops providing justice. The ersatz [artificial and inferior substitute] parent ceases executing judgment against those who violate the law, and the nation begins losing benefits of justice. Those who are concerned about the chaos into which the criminal justice system has fallen should consider what the state’s function has become. Because the state can only be a bad imitation of a father, as a dancing bear act is of a ballerina, the protection of this Leviathan of a father turns out to be a bear hug...
"The idol state uses the language of compassion because its intention is a messianic one. It finds the masses harassed and helpless, like sheep without a shepherd, needing a savior."
Monday, February 16, 2009
On The Atonement, Part 4: God's Desires Frustrated?
Completing Dominic Bnonn Tennant's series on the atonement, relating it to the objection of God's desires being frustrated in a universalistic scheme.
This is part 4 of 4, in which I interact with the objection that universal atonement requires that God be at cross-purposes with himself, entertaining frustrated desires which he cannot fulfill.
This objection is, in my view, the least compelling of those I’m going to consider. Generally speaking, it focuses on the sincere offer of the gospel—which universal atonement typically upholds—and tries to show that it forces inconsistency or irrationality on God. That is, if salvation is sincerely offered to everyone, then it follows that God must in fact desire the salvation of everyone. If he didn’t so desire, then he would be insincere to so offer.
(Note: Note that this seems to me a sound argument which does reflect what proponents of universal atonement believe. It may be contrasted with an argument sometimes forwarded, but which is unsound, that if Christ died for everyone, then God must desire the salvation of everyone. Given my discussion of federal headship and forensic imputation in part 1 of this series, it should go without saying that this conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow (even if it is true for other reasons). God may have no desire whatsoever for the salvation of the reprobate, yet the nature of federal headship would still make it true that Christ died for everyone.)
Therefore, universal atonement is said to make God conflicted and irrational—since, as John Owen puts it,
"They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. ‘We grant,’ saith Corvinus, ‘that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled,’ Now, surely, to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel; and, therefore, they must grant that before he did not know but perhaps so it might be. ‘God wisheth and desireth some good things, which yet come not to pass,’ say they, in their Confession; whence one of these two things must need follow, —either, first, that there is a great deal of imperfection in his nature, to desire and expect what he knows shall never come to pass; or else he did not know but it might, which overthrows his prescience." (The Works of John Owen, volume 10, p. 25.)
Subsequently, consistent particularists deny that God can offer the reprobate salvation sincerely, since to offer something sincerely means that you desire the person take it. Since God knows that the reprobate will not take it, he would be irrational to offer it to them. In fact, since he has decreed that they not take it, it seems plain that he desires the opposite. Vincent Cheung states the matter with his customary force:
"The doctrine in question has been called 'the free offer,' 'the well-meant offer,' and 'the sincere offer' of the gospel [...] My position is that it makes God into a schizophrenic fool. It is unbiblical and irrational, and thus must be rejected and opposed [...] we must not present the gospel as a sincere offer to all, as if God’s 'desire' can differ from his decree, as if God could or would decree against his 'desire' (when Scripture teaches that he decrees what he desires—that is, his 'good pleasure'—and what he desires, he decrees and makes certain), and as if it is possible for even the non-elect to be saved [...]"
There are three main faults with this objection:
I. Universal atonement doesn’t necessitate the sincere offer
It must be noted that the arguments I’ve given for a universal scope to the atonement don’t, in and of themselves, necessitate the view that God offers the gospel to the reprobate. As far as I can see, the sincere offer is really a separate issue from the scope of the atonement. My argument that the universal gospel call is undermined if the atonement is not universal does not require that the call be couched as an offer. That’s why I used the term “call”—because it doesn’t favor either view. The gospel is certainly a call, regardless of whether it’s a command only, or an offer as well.
Having said that, though, I think most proponents of universal atonement do believe that the gospel is more than just a command: they do believe that God offers salvation sincerely to the reprobate. Certainly I do. Therefore, it behooves me to defuse the particularist objection in other ways.
II. If it succeeds, it refutes particularism as well
It seems very obvious to me that the particularist is either severely myopic in making this objection, or he’s engaging in some monumental special pleading. To show what I mean, let me lay out Owen’s argument that “to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel”:
i. If one acts to desire a thing (A), knowing that thing will not come to pass (P), then one does not act in a way regulated by wisdom (W).
ii. If God acts, then he does act in a way regulated by wisdom.
iii. Therefore, if God acts to desire a thing, then he does not act to desire a thing which he knows will not come to pass [by modus tollens].
iv. If the gospel is offered sincerely to everyone (S), this implies that God desires the salvation of everyone (E).
v. But the salvation of everyone will not come to pass.
vi. Therefore, if the gospel is offered sincerely to everyone, God desires a thing which he knows will not come to pass [by hypothetical syllogism].
vii. But we know that God does not desire anything which will not come to pass [from iii].
viii. Therefore, the gospel is not offered sincerely to everyone [by modus tollens].
(Note: In formal logic,
For A:
i. ~P → ~W
ii. W
iii. P [mt]
iv. S → E
v. E → ~P
vi. S → ~P [hs]
vii. P [iii]
viii. ~S [mt]
End note.)
But taking the gospel call on the particularist’s own terms, wherein it is only a command, the same argument appears to lead to absurd results. Does God not desire or expect his commands to be obeyed? Surely it isn’t even in question that in some sense he desires what he commands, even if only in the sense that his commands are “holy and righteous and good” (Romans 7:12), since they are reflections of his own character. And because they are reflections of his own character, because “just and upright is he”, he has “pleasure in uprightness” (1 Chronicles 29:17) and indeed “loves righteous deeds” (Psalm 11:7). Do I even need to mention that to love something is, by definition, to desire it in some sense?
Given this, in the argument above, if we replace “offered” with “commanded” in regards to the gospel, we are led to the same result. If God really does desire his commands to be obeyed (in whatever sense) when he knows that they will not be obeyed, then he must not be acting in a way “regulated by wisdom”. The particularist therefore is left defending the absurd notion that God in no sense desires what he nonetheless commands, lest he somehow be irrational.
Similarly and conversely, it’s also plain that if you hate something, then in some sense you don’t desire it. Yet, God is “not a God who delights in wickedness” but one who “hates all evildoers” (Psalm 5:4–5). Given the argument above, surely it is equally true that to not desire what one is sure will come to pass demonstrates just as much of a failure of God’s wisdom and counsel? Under any Calvinistic view, God decrees everything which comes to pass. So, in making this argument, the particularist is caught on the horns of a dilemma.
III. The mistake of assuming that God has only a single intention in the atonement
Given the particularist’s argument, either God cannot desire what he decrees, or he cannot desire what he commands. In fact, Vincent Cheung seems to plainly affirm this, saying that we must not pretend “as if God’s ‘desire’ can differ from his decree, as if God could or would decree against his ‘desire’”, because “Scripture teaches that he decrees what he desires” “and what he desires, he decrees”. Vincent seems to be drawing an exclusive relationship between God’s decrees and his desires, so that if—and only if—God has decreed something, then he desires it. This necessarily means, as I’m sure someone with as sharp a mind as Vincent’s will have recognized, that if God has not decreed something, he does not desire it. As I argued to Ron Di Giacomo, who takes a very similar view, while it’s certainly true that God decrees something if and only if he desires it, it can’t be commensurately true that he desires something if and only if he decrees it. In fact, it is this view which makes God insane, since under it he in no sense desires that his commands always be followed—in which case they become unintelligible as moral imperatives.
For example, if there is no sense in which God desires all people to repent, then why does he command it? It goes without saying that since he has commanded it, all people ought to do it. But what does it mean for God to absolutely not desire what ought to happen; and instead absolutely desire what ought not to happen? Surely this is a genuine self-contradiction, as opposed to the merely superficial appearance of contradiction entailed by universal atonement, where God has multiple desires regarding the same situation. Ultimately, if the particularist’s objection does succeed here, he commits himself to believing that, in some situations, God desires what is evil while in no sense desiring the opposite.
This is an absurd view of God—one where he appears to unequivocally desire that which is completely contrary to his character, while not desiring in any sense its antithesis, even though it conforms to his character. The only way to make sense of such a view is to assert that God has no desires or attitudes or intentions toward anything whatsoever, except those desires and attitudes and intentions he has toward his ultimate purpose. But what possible justification can there be for such an extreme notion? Can I not simply deny this as plainly absurd given all the times where God evidences genuine desires which are situation specific? As I wrote recently about Jesus’ lament in Matthew 23:37, “it must be acknowledged, and not downplayed, that Jesus is evidencing a sincere and heartfelt lament. As Matthew Henry puts it, ‘the repetition is emphatical, and bespeaks abundance of commiseration’. So we can’t accept [...] that Jesus didn’t really want to gather Israel, despite saying that he did. That would be a plain falsehood, and God cannot lie. It must be the case that our Lord genuinely did want what he said he wanted.” (Dominic Bnonn Tennant, ‘Understanding God’s Desires'). This passage alone refutes the particularist view.
As regards the atonement specifically, I argue with Bruce Ware that,
"God’s intentions in the death of Christ are complex not simple, multiple not single: 1) Christ died for the purpose of securing the sure and certain salvation of his own, his elect. 2) Christ died for the purpose of paying the penalty for the sin of all people making it possible for all who believe to be saved. 3) Christ died for the purpose of securing the bone fide offer of salvation to all people everywhere. 4) Christ died for the purpose of providing an additional basis for condemnation for those who hear and reject the gospel that has been genuinely offered to them. 5) Christ died for the purpose of reconciling all things to the Father."
Put simply, I deny the premise that it’s somehow irrational for God to desire a thing which he knows won’t occur. In fact, it seems entirely congruent that he entertain a genuine affection toward the reprobate, despite that it will never see fruition—more, it appears to be a logical necessity. In creation, he brings about the circumstances which he most desires—namely a world of sinners who will not all be saved, so that he may be most glorified—and in doing so he necessarily instantiates circumstances wherein he contingently desires the salvation of those already chosen to be lost. Do not the mere facts of (a) his perfect moral character, and (b) the existence of these lost sinners necessitate that he in some sense desires the very thing he has decreed from eternity will not occur? The desire is predicated upon the circumstances which deny its fulfillment (his plan in creation; the ultimate purpose of his will)—yet it is still real. But by merit of the fact that it’s entirely established upon the basis of his greater intention to glorify his name through the reprobation of the sinners towards whom he feels it, it is neither fulfilled nor frustrated. For it to be frustrated, it would have to be in opposition to his greater desire to glorify his name—but certainly he consented to entertain this lesser desire, and to not fulfill it, when he established his plan in creation from eternity. Given this internal consent, I can’t see any way in which he may rightly be called frustrated.
Particularists (if they are consistent) believe that God’s moral nature does not entail any attitude of benevolence toward even the most wretched of damned sinners. But that is not how Calvinists have traditionally understood God’s character. That does not describe a God who is love (1 John 4:8), but merely a God who has love. It does not describe a God who is so perfect that he loves even his enemies, but a God who does no more than the tax collectors by loving his friends (Matthew 5:43ff). So it seems to me that particularists are setting up God as having to be a certain way in order to conform to some platonic ideal of their own making, and then pushing and pulling on Scripture to make it fit. And not to sound uncharitable, but that is a kind of idolatry.
This is part 4 of 4, in which I interact with the objection that universal atonement requires that God be at cross-purposes with himself, entertaining frustrated desires which he cannot fulfill.
This objection is, in my view, the least compelling of those I’m going to consider. Generally speaking, it focuses on the sincere offer of the gospel—which universal atonement typically upholds—and tries to show that it forces inconsistency or irrationality on God. That is, if salvation is sincerely offered to everyone, then it follows that God must in fact desire the salvation of everyone. If he didn’t so desire, then he would be insincere to so offer.
(Note: Note that this seems to me a sound argument which does reflect what proponents of universal atonement believe. It may be contrasted with an argument sometimes forwarded, but which is unsound, that if Christ died for everyone, then God must desire the salvation of everyone. Given my discussion of federal headship and forensic imputation in part 1 of this series, it should go without saying that this conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow (even if it is true for other reasons). God may have no desire whatsoever for the salvation of the reprobate, yet the nature of federal headship would still make it true that Christ died for everyone.)
Therefore, universal atonement is said to make God conflicted and irrational—since, as John Owen puts it,
"They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. ‘We grant,’ saith Corvinus, ‘that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled,’ Now, surely, to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel; and, therefore, they must grant that before he did not know but perhaps so it might be. ‘God wisheth and desireth some good things, which yet come not to pass,’ say they, in their Confession; whence one of these two things must need follow, —either, first, that there is a great deal of imperfection in his nature, to desire and expect what he knows shall never come to pass; or else he did not know but it might, which overthrows his prescience." (The Works of John Owen, volume 10, p. 25.)
Subsequently, consistent particularists deny that God can offer the reprobate salvation sincerely, since to offer something sincerely means that you desire the person take it. Since God knows that the reprobate will not take it, he would be irrational to offer it to them. In fact, since he has decreed that they not take it, it seems plain that he desires the opposite. Vincent Cheung states the matter with his customary force:
"The doctrine in question has been called 'the free offer,' 'the well-meant offer,' and 'the sincere offer' of the gospel [...] My position is that it makes God into a schizophrenic fool. It is unbiblical and irrational, and thus must be rejected and opposed [...] we must not present the gospel as a sincere offer to all, as if God’s 'desire' can differ from his decree, as if God could or would decree against his 'desire' (when Scripture teaches that he decrees what he desires—that is, his 'good pleasure'—and what he desires, he decrees and makes certain), and as if it is possible for even the non-elect to be saved [...]"
There are three main faults with this objection:
I. Universal atonement doesn’t necessitate the sincere offer
It must be noted that the arguments I’ve given for a universal scope to the atonement don’t, in and of themselves, necessitate the view that God offers the gospel to the reprobate. As far as I can see, the sincere offer is really a separate issue from the scope of the atonement. My argument that the universal gospel call is undermined if the atonement is not universal does not require that the call be couched as an offer. That’s why I used the term “call”—because it doesn’t favor either view. The gospel is certainly a call, regardless of whether it’s a command only, or an offer as well.
Having said that, though, I think most proponents of universal atonement do believe that the gospel is more than just a command: they do believe that God offers salvation sincerely to the reprobate. Certainly I do. Therefore, it behooves me to defuse the particularist objection in other ways.
II. If it succeeds, it refutes particularism as well
It seems very obvious to me that the particularist is either severely myopic in making this objection, or he’s engaging in some monumental special pleading. To show what I mean, let me lay out Owen’s argument that “to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel”:
i. If one acts to desire a thing (A), knowing that thing will not come to pass (P), then one does not act in a way regulated by wisdom (W).
ii. If God acts, then he does act in a way regulated by wisdom.
iii. Therefore, if God acts to desire a thing, then he does not act to desire a thing which he knows will not come to pass [by modus tollens].
iv. If the gospel is offered sincerely to everyone (S), this implies that God desires the salvation of everyone (E).
v. But the salvation of everyone will not come to pass.
vi. Therefore, if the gospel is offered sincerely to everyone, God desires a thing which he knows will not come to pass [by hypothetical syllogism].
vii. But we know that God does not desire anything which will not come to pass [from iii].
viii. Therefore, the gospel is not offered sincerely to everyone [by modus tollens].
(Note: In formal logic,
For A:
i. ~P → ~W
ii. W
iii. P [mt]
iv. S → E
v. E → ~P
vi. S → ~P [hs]
vii. P [iii]
viii. ~S [mt]
End note.)
But taking the gospel call on the particularist’s own terms, wherein it is only a command, the same argument appears to lead to absurd results. Does God not desire or expect his commands to be obeyed? Surely it isn’t even in question that in some sense he desires what he commands, even if only in the sense that his commands are “holy and righteous and good” (Romans 7:12), since they are reflections of his own character. And because they are reflections of his own character, because “just and upright is he”, he has “pleasure in uprightness” (1 Chronicles 29:17) and indeed “loves righteous deeds” (Psalm 11:7). Do I even need to mention that to love something is, by definition, to desire it in some sense?
Given this, in the argument above, if we replace “offered” with “commanded” in regards to the gospel, we are led to the same result. If God really does desire his commands to be obeyed (in whatever sense) when he knows that they will not be obeyed, then he must not be acting in a way “regulated by wisdom”. The particularist therefore is left defending the absurd notion that God in no sense desires what he nonetheless commands, lest he somehow be irrational.
Similarly and conversely, it’s also plain that if you hate something, then in some sense you don’t desire it. Yet, God is “not a God who delights in wickedness” but one who “hates all evildoers” (Psalm 5:4–5). Given the argument above, surely it is equally true that to not desire what one is sure will come to pass demonstrates just as much of a failure of God’s wisdom and counsel? Under any Calvinistic view, God decrees everything which comes to pass. So, in making this argument, the particularist is caught on the horns of a dilemma.
III. The mistake of assuming that God has only a single intention in the atonement
Given the particularist’s argument, either God cannot desire what he decrees, or he cannot desire what he commands. In fact, Vincent Cheung seems to plainly affirm this, saying that we must not pretend “as if God’s ‘desire’ can differ from his decree, as if God could or would decree against his ‘desire’”, because “Scripture teaches that he decrees what he desires” “and what he desires, he decrees”. Vincent seems to be drawing an exclusive relationship between God’s decrees and his desires, so that if—and only if—God has decreed something, then he desires it. This necessarily means, as I’m sure someone with as sharp a mind as Vincent’s will have recognized, that if God has not decreed something, he does not desire it. As I argued to Ron Di Giacomo, who takes a very similar view, while it’s certainly true that God decrees something if and only if he desires it, it can’t be commensurately true that he desires something if and only if he decrees it. In fact, it is this view which makes God insane, since under it he in no sense desires that his commands always be followed—in which case they become unintelligible as moral imperatives.
For example, if there is no sense in which God desires all people to repent, then why does he command it? It goes without saying that since he has commanded it, all people ought to do it. But what does it mean for God to absolutely not desire what ought to happen; and instead absolutely desire what ought not to happen? Surely this is a genuine self-contradiction, as opposed to the merely superficial appearance of contradiction entailed by universal atonement, where God has multiple desires regarding the same situation. Ultimately, if the particularist’s objection does succeed here, he commits himself to believing that, in some situations, God desires what is evil while in no sense desiring the opposite.
This is an absurd view of God—one where he appears to unequivocally desire that which is completely contrary to his character, while not desiring in any sense its antithesis, even though it conforms to his character. The only way to make sense of such a view is to assert that God has no desires or attitudes or intentions toward anything whatsoever, except those desires and attitudes and intentions he has toward his ultimate purpose. But what possible justification can there be for such an extreme notion? Can I not simply deny this as plainly absurd given all the times where God evidences genuine desires which are situation specific? As I wrote recently about Jesus’ lament in Matthew 23:37, “it must be acknowledged, and not downplayed, that Jesus is evidencing a sincere and heartfelt lament. As Matthew Henry puts it, ‘the repetition is emphatical, and bespeaks abundance of commiseration’. So we can’t accept [...] that Jesus didn’t really want to gather Israel, despite saying that he did. That would be a plain falsehood, and God cannot lie. It must be the case that our Lord genuinely did want what he said he wanted.” (Dominic Bnonn Tennant, ‘Understanding God’s Desires'). This passage alone refutes the particularist view.
As regards the atonement specifically, I argue with Bruce Ware that,
"God’s intentions in the death of Christ are complex not simple, multiple not single: 1) Christ died for the purpose of securing the sure and certain salvation of his own, his elect. 2) Christ died for the purpose of paying the penalty for the sin of all people making it possible for all who believe to be saved. 3) Christ died for the purpose of securing the bone fide offer of salvation to all people everywhere. 4) Christ died for the purpose of providing an additional basis for condemnation for those who hear and reject the gospel that has been genuinely offered to them. 5) Christ died for the purpose of reconciling all things to the Father."
Put simply, I deny the premise that it’s somehow irrational for God to desire a thing which he knows won’t occur. In fact, it seems entirely congruent that he entertain a genuine affection toward the reprobate, despite that it will never see fruition—more, it appears to be a logical necessity. In creation, he brings about the circumstances which he most desires—namely a world of sinners who will not all be saved, so that he may be most glorified—and in doing so he necessarily instantiates circumstances wherein he contingently desires the salvation of those already chosen to be lost. Do not the mere facts of (a) his perfect moral character, and (b) the existence of these lost sinners necessitate that he in some sense desires the very thing he has decreed from eternity will not occur? The desire is predicated upon the circumstances which deny its fulfillment (his plan in creation; the ultimate purpose of his will)—yet it is still real. But by merit of the fact that it’s entirely established upon the basis of his greater intention to glorify his name through the reprobation of the sinners towards whom he feels it, it is neither fulfilled nor frustrated. For it to be frustrated, it would have to be in opposition to his greater desire to glorify his name—but certainly he consented to entertain this lesser desire, and to not fulfill it, when he established his plan in creation from eternity. Given this internal consent, I can’t see any way in which he may rightly be called frustrated.
Particularists (if they are consistent) believe that God’s moral nature does not entail any attitude of benevolence toward even the most wretched of damned sinners. But that is not how Calvinists have traditionally understood God’s character. That does not describe a God who is love (1 John 4:8), but merely a God who has love. It does not describe a God who is so perfect that he loves even his enemies, but a God who does no more than the tax collectors by loving his friends (Matthew 5:43ff). So it seems to me that particularists are setting up God as having to be a certain way in order to conform to some platonic ideal of their own making, and then pushing and pulling on Scripture to make it fit. And not to sound uncharitable, but that is a kind of idolatry.
Saturday, February 14, 2009
On The Atonement, Part 3: The Objective Grounds for Faith
Continuing Dominic Bnonn Tennant's series on the atonement, relating it to the Objective Grounds for Faith.
This is part 3 of 4, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement provides no grounds for faith, and makes the assurance of salvation impossible.
Previously, I concluded that a particular atonement makes it impossible for any given person—even if he’s elect—to trust the promise of salvation. If you were paying attention, you’d have noticed that as well as making a sincere, universal gospel call impossible, this has a much more serious and direct consequence: namely, the impossibility of Christian faith. In order to draw this implication out, I really only need to define what faith is, since the argument I made in part 2 does the rest of the work for me.
Faith Defined
Hebrews tells us that “faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (11:1) It further observes that faith was both authored and perfected by Jesus himself (12:2)—in other words, he is the exemplar of Christian faith. And I’ve argued in the past that the assurance and conviction which sets the benchmark for our own, being grounded in his perfect communion with the Godhead, was without even a glimmer of uncertainty, wishful thinking, doubt, or unbelief. Therefore, it necessarily follows that faith, at least in its paradigm form, is a justified and true belief (cf. Dominic Bnonn Tennant, The Wisdom Of God; p 140.)
More particularly, it is a justified and true belief of God’s favor toward the believer. Thus, since this favor is availed to us by the atonement, the object of faith is the person and work of Jesus Christ. Or we could say that the object of faith is the promise of salvation through that work. In either case, in order for faith to be faith, a believer needs to have a justified and true belief that the work and the promise are actually availed to him. When I speak about a belief being justified here, I mean simply that a person has a good and right reason for holding it.
The problem should immediately be obvious. Just as this work and promise, under a particular atonement, can only be extended sincerely to those actually covered by it, so belief in the work and the promise is only justified in the case of those covered by it. That is, the work and the promise can only be extended to, and believed by, the elect. But how are we to know who the elect are? How, in fact, are the elect themselves to know who they are, that they might have the requisite justification for believing the promise or trusting the work? So it is that a particular atonement, in the absence of any information as to its specific recipients, makes it impossible not only for the work or promise of salvation to be extended to, but also believed by, anyone. Even if some person hears it, he does not know that he is elect, and so he has no justification, no reason, for believing that it’s for him.
A Possible Answer Examined
Now, a particularist may reject my epistemically stringent definition of faith in the hopes of side-stepping this problem. I think he should at least show why the definition is wrong, aside from because it makes his commitment to particular atonement impossible—but if he does reject my view, then he may say that faith is only an internal assurance or conviction of God’s favor toward me which comes by way of the indwelling Spirit. Thus, an external assurance in reference to the atonement, in the form of the knowledge that it can cover me is unnecessary; because I have an internal assurance given by the Spirit, in the form of the knowledge that it does apply to me.
Of course, I agree that the Spirit does lend such assurance. However, notice that my objection has not actually been refuted. The particularist may side-step the difficulty by diluting his definition of faith, but he can’t actually remove it. Subsequently, he is left with a very weak notion of faith indeed. Under it, he believes that God’s favor is availed to him not because he knows that the atonement was made for everyone including him, but merely because—despite it being made only for a chosen few—he experiences certain inward perceptions which convince him that it extends to him.
This seems to me an essentially impotent position. Faith which is not grounded in an external and objective knowledge that Christ atoned for my sins; but rather in an internal and subjective perception that he did so, is not actually faith at all. Faith which is not rooted in the infallible promise that the cross-work extends to me, made by God himself in Scripture; but rather on my own, fallible perception that it does, is as fickle and unreliable as I am. Scripture doesn’t have a directory of the elect tucked away at the back where I can look myself up and make sure I’m actually in there. So, while under a universal view my faith is as sure as the word of God, under a particular view my faith is only as sure as my inward conviction.
This in turn leads invariably into a violation of sola fide. If my faith is only as strong as my own internal perception of God’s favor towards me, rather than the external certainty of that favor grounded in Christ’s work, then my assurance of salvation is derived ultimately from my own spiritual life. When I feel I’m doing well, I feel God’s favor towards me. But if I feel spiritually depressed or weak, if I am failing to overcome sin, if I think I am backsliding, then my assurance is undermined and damaged and potentially even removed entirely. The less confident I feel about myself, the less confident I feel that God really has availed salvation to me. Indeed, knowing how deceitful and wicked my heart is, I ultimately have no assurance at all. If my faith is based on me, then it isn’t faith. It’s more akin to wishful thinking. Maybe God loves me and Christ died for me. But maybe not. Sometimes I feel that way. Sometimes I don’t.
In this way, then, particular atonement utterly undermines Christian faith and the assurance of our salvation.
An Objection Anticipated
I expect some particularists, at this point if not before, would say that I’m hugely misrepresenting their view. They’d say that their faith is not based on some burning in the bosom; some subjective sensation of their own salvation. Rather, “everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved”, and they have called on the name of the Lord. Their doing so is evidence that the atonement extends to them. In other words, they merely recognize that the promise of salvation is conditional:
i. If you believe, then you will be saved.
ii. You believe.
iii. Therefore, you will be saved.
A parallel argument can then be constructed:
iv. If you will be saved, the atonement extends to you.
v. You will be saved (from (iii)).
vi. Therefore, the atonement extends to you.
But I think it goes without saying that the particularist is playing a bit of a game here. The first premise is conveniently incomplete. “If you believe, then you will be saved”—but believe what? Obviously “the promise”. But that either refers to the very statement at hand, or to the promise that salvation is availed to him. It can’t be the former, namely that “if you believe you will be saved”, because that leads to a vicious infinite regress: if you believe that if you believe you will be saved; if you believe that if you believe that if you believe you will be saved; and so on. But it can’t be the latter either, since that would run afoul of the argument I’ve already given in part 2, and briefly reiterated here, which establishes the impossibility of believing the promise without prior knowledge that you’re elect.
Thus, I believe my objections all succeed: particular atonement is incompatible with federal headship and forensic imputation; it makes a universal gospel call impossible and impugns God’s justice and truthfulness; and ultimately—pressed consistently—it reduces Christian faith and assurance to wishful thinking. Does this mean that the universal view is correct? It certainly seems to imply it; but there are some objections against that view which must be considered on their own merits. The next three parts of this series will therefore attend to that task.
This is part 3 of 4, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement provides no grounds for faith, and makes the assurance of salvation impossible.
Previously, I concluded that a particular atonement makes it impossible for any given person—even if he’s elect—to trust the promise of salvation. If you were paying attention, you’d have noticed that as well as making a sincere, universal gospel call impossible, this has a much more serious and direct consequence: namely, the impossibility of Christian faith. In order to draw this implication out, I really only need to define what faith is, since the argument I made in part 2 does the rest of the work for me.
Faith Defined
Hebrews tells us that “faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (11:1) It further observes that faith was both authored and perfected by Jesus himself (12:2)—in other words, he is the exemplar of Christian faith. And I’ve argued in the past that the assurance and conviction which sets the benchmark for our own, being grounded in his perfect communion with the Godhead, was without even a glimmer of uncertainty, wishful thinking, doubt, or unbelief. Therefore, it necessarily follows that faith, at least in its paradigm form, is a justified and true belief (cf. Dominic Bnonn Tennant, The Wisdom Of God; p 140.)
More particularly, it is a justified and true belief of God’s favor toward the believer. Thus, since this favor is availed to us by the atonement, the object of faith is the person and work of Jesus Christ. Or we could say that the object of faith is the promise of salvation through that work. In either case, in order for faith to be faith, a believer needs to have a justified and true belief that the work and the promise are actually availed to him. When I speak about a belief being justified here, I mean simply that a person has a good and right reason for holding it.
The problem should immediately be obvious. Just as this work and promise, under a particular atonement, can only be extended sincerely to those actually covered by it, so belief in the work and the promise is only justified in the case of those covered by it. That is, the work and the promise can only be extended to, and believed by, the elect. But how are we to know who the elect are? How, in fact, are the elect themselves to know who they are, that they might have the requisite justification for believing the promise or trusting the work? So it is that a particular atonement, in the absence of any information as to its specific recipients, makes it impossible not only for the work or promise of salvation to be extended to, but also believed by, anyone. Even if some person hears it, he does not know that he is elect, and so he has no justification, no reason, for believing that it’s for him.
A Possible Answer Examined
Now, a particularist may reject my epistemically stringent definition of faith in the hopes of side-stepping this problem. I think he should at least show why the definition is wrong, aside from because it makes his commitment to particular atonement impossible—but if he does reject my view, then he may say that faith is only an internal assurance or conviction of God’s favor toward me which comes by way of the indwelling Spirit. Thus, an external assurance in reference to the atonement, in the form of the knowledge that it can cover me is unnecessary; because I have an internal assurance given by the Spirit, in the form of the knowledge that it does apply to me.
Of course, I agree that the Spirit does lend such assurance. However, notice that my objection has not actually been refuted. The particularist may side-step the difficulty by diluting his definition of faith, but he can’t actually remove it. Subsequently, he is left with a very weak notion of faith indeed. Under it, he believes that God’s favor is availed to him not because he knows that the atonement was made for everyone including him, but merely because—despite it being made only for a chosen few—he experiences certain inward perceptions which convince him that it extends to him.
This seems to me an essentially impotent position. Faith which is not grounded in an external and objective knowledge that Christ atoned for my sins; but rather in an internal and subjective perception that he did so, is not actually faith at all. Faith which is not rooted in the infallible promise that the cross-work extends to me, made by God himself in Scripture; but rather on my own, fallible perception that it does, is as fickle and unreliable as I am. Scripture doesn’t have a directory of the elect tucked away at the back where I can look myself up and make sure I’m actually in there. So, while under a universal view my faith is as sure as the word of God, under a particular view my faith is only as sure as my inward conviction.
This in turn leads invariably into a violation of sola fide. If my faith is only as strong as my own internal perception of God’s favor towards me, rather than the external certainty of that favor grounded in Christ’s work, then my assurance of salvation is derived ultimately from my own spiritual life. When I feel I’m doing well, I feel God’s favor towards me. But if I feel spiritually depressed or weak, if I am failing to overcome sin, if I think I am backsliding, then my assurance is undermined and damaged and potentially even removed entirely. The less confident I feel about myself, the less confident I feel that God really has availed salvation to me. Indeed, knowing how deceitful and wicked my heart is, I ultimately have no assurance at all. If my faith is based on me, then it isn’t faith. It’s more akin to wishful thinking. Maybe God loves me and Christ died for me. But maybe not. Sometimes I feel that way. Sometimes I don’t.
In this way, then, particular atonement utterly undermines Christian faith and the assurance of our salvation.
An Objection Anticipated
I expect some particularists, at this point if not before, would say that I’m hugely misrepresenting their view. They’d say that their faith is not based on some burning in the bosom; some subjective sensation of their own salvation. Rather, “everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved”, and they have called on the name of the Lord. Their doing so is evidence that the atonement extends to them. In other words, they merely recognize that the promise of salvation is conditional:
i. If you believe, then you will be saved.
ii. You believe.
iii. Therefore, you will be saved.
A parallel argument can then be constructed:
iv. If you will be saved, the atonement extends to you.
v. You will be saved (from (iii)).
vi. Therefore, the atonement extends to you.
But I think it goes without saying that the particularist is playing a bit of a game here. The first premise is conveniently incomplete. “If you believe, then you will be saved”—but believe what? Obviously “the promise”. But that either refers to the very statement at hand, or to the promise that salvation is availed to him. It can’t be the former, namely that “if you believe you will be saved”, because that leads to a vicious infinite regress: if you believe that if you believe you will be saved; if you believe that if you believe that if you believe you will be saved; and so on. But it can’t be the latter either, since that would run afoul of the argument I’ve already given in part 2, and briefly reiterated here, which establishes the impossibility of believing the promise without prior knowledge that you’re elect.
Thus, I believe my objections all succeed: particular atonement is incompatible with federal headship and forensic imputation; it makes a universal gospel call impossible and impugns God’s justice and truthfulness; and ultimately—pressed consistently—it reduces Christian faith and assurance to wishful thinking. Does this mean that the universal view is correct? It certainly seems to imply it; but there are some objections against that view which must be considered on their own merits. The next three parts of this series will therefore attend to that task.
Friday, February 13, 2009
Islam and Arminianism
Some more on Determinism, Combatibilism and Free Will. Looking at some interesting relations between various lesser-known Islamic traditions and modern Arminianism. I've always been intrigued by the similarities, ever since I heard a local imam use the "Free Will Defense" against the problem of evil in a discussion forum. See below...
Triablogue: Islam and Arminianism
Triablogue: Islam and Arminianism
On The Atonement, Part 2: The Grounds for The Universal Gospel Call
Continuing Dominic Bnonn Tennant's series on the atonement, relating it to the Universal Gospel Call.
This is part 2 of 4, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement is inconsistent with the universal gospel call, whether it is conceived of as an invitation, or as a command only.
It is a truth universally recognized that a sinner under God’s wrath must be in want of the gospel. See, for example, Romans 1:16. This is the very reason it is called the gospel—the god spel, Old English for “good news”, as translated from the Greek euaggelion. This is “the good news about Jesus”; namely peace with God, since “everyone who believes in him receives forgiveness of sins through his name” if they should “repent and turn to God” (Acts 8:35; 10:36,43; 26:20). As the ESV Study Bible puts it, in its commentary of 2 Corinthians 5:18–20, “‘Be reconciled to God’ is a summary of the gospel message Paul proclaims to unbelievers; it is a call to receive the reconciliation that God has wrought (Rom 5:11).” In short, the gospel is a promise of reconciliation to the sinner via faith in Christ.
This is certainly prima facie good news to every sinner to whom the gospel is proclaimed. And we know it is to be proclaimed to every sinner. The gospel is, in fact, proclaimed as an invitation to all—although it’s an invitation which places the invitee under obligation to respond favorably, as illustrated in the parable of the wedding feast. It is thus a universal call, even though few are chosen to believe it (Matthew 22:14).
Now, particularists would say that this universality in proclamation does not reflect the scope of the atonement. Since Christ did not die for all, the promise of salvation through his death cannot be actually extended to all. Rather, it is extended only to the elect, but is proclaimed indiscriminately to all people because we don’t know who the elect are. Some would add that another reason for it to be proclaimed indiscriminately is to further condemn sinners who reject it.
God’s Sincerity Impugned
However, if this is the case, then it’s hard to see how a sinner, upon hearing the gospel, can—without any distrust—regard it as genuinely good news. In fact, it’s hard to see how a sinner can trust the gospel at all. If I am such a sinner, the call to trust the promise seems to imply that the promise is actually made to me. So a universal call to take hold of the promise seems to imply a universal applicability of that promise (though not necessarily a universal application).
But the particularist says that the promise of salvation is only actually extended to the elect. How, then, can God call everyone indiscriminately to trust it? Just what exactly are they being called to trust? If Christ died for the elect exclusively, then there is no sense in which the promise of salvation can be extended to the non-elect, whether as an invitation, or purely as a command. Consider what exactly the sinner is being called to do. Is it not to trust in the work of Christ on the cross, and the promise that he thereby can be reconciled to God? Is it not, in fact, to thereby be reconciled to God? Certainly it is. The promise refers to the atonement—and so if someone (anyone) is called to trust it, he needs to know that there is something to trust. If the atonement was only for the elect, and the promise is thereby commensurately only for the elect, then a sinner would have to first know that he is elect before he can trust the promise. It does no good to say to him, “Trust the promise and you will know that you are elect”, because the very issue at hand is whether there is anything in which he can trust. What is he being asked to place his faith in? In the work of Christ? For whom? For the elect? But he doesn’t know he’s elect. So how can he be asked to trust the promise?
God simply cannot promise to save someone for whom Christ did not die. Such a promise would be empty; insincere; a lie—and it is impossible for God to lie (Hebrews 6:18). Therefore, if the particularist is right, he cannot say to all people without exception, “Be reconciled to God”—because God has not made provision for all people to be reconciled to him. He cannot say to the reprobate sinner, as the ESV Study Bible would have it, “Receive the reconciliation that God has wrought”—for no such reconciliation exists for that sinner. He cannot tell a non-elect man, “Believe and you will be saved”—that is, quite flatly, a lie. He can only say these things to the elect. The moral inability of the reprobate sinner to respond to the call is irrelevant because the reality, the atonement, which would save him does not exist. There is nothing for him to trust. In this way, the universal gospel call is utterly undermined and shown to be without basis under the particularist view. In fact, it is so undermined that the particularist, to avoid misrepresenting God, is forced into the most extreme hyper-Calvinism, and is crippled in his evangelism.
God’s Justice Impugned
Furthermore, not only is the gospel call undermined, but so is God’s justice in condemning those who refuse it. Just as a non-elect sinner cannot be asked to take hold of an atonement which was not actually made for him, so he equally cannot be punished for failing to do so. How can he heap condemnation on himself for rejecting the gospel, as in John 3:18, when the gospel was never for him? Indeed, what sense is there to even speak of him “rejecting” something which was never sincerely offered him to begin with? May he not actually turn around and, without any impertinence, point out that God is manifestly dishonest to call everyone to believe a promise which is not made to everyone, and manifestly unjust to punish those who don’t believe when there is nothing for them to believe in? Yet John says, to the contrary, that “whoever does not believe God has made him a liar, because he has not believed in the testimony that God has borne concerning his Son. And this is the testimony, that God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. Whoever has the Son has life; whoever does not have the Son of God does not have life” (1 John 5:10–12). Eric Svendsen further expands this point by bringing to bear passages which describe the additional condemnation of those who profess the faith, but later fall away. In part 1 of his dialog with James White, ‘When Does Our Union With Christ’s Death Occur?’ he asks, why are they condemned if the gospel was not for them? But Peter says that they deny the Master who bought them (2 Peter 2:1).
Given these two considerations—the impugning of God’s sincerity and justice by removing the grounds for the universal call—the particularist ought to concede that the atonement just wasn’t limited in its scope. Moreover, there is another problem which flows directly from what I’ve outlined above, which I’ll forward as the final argument of this series, before moving on to deal with objections to my view.
This is part 2 of 4, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement is inconsistent with the universal gospel call, whether it is conceived of as an invitation, or as a command only.
It is a truth universally recognized that a sinner under God’s wrath must be in want of the gospel. See, for example, Romans 1:16. This is the very reason it is called the gospel—the god spel, Old English for “good news”, as translated from the Greek euaggelion. This is “the good news about Jesus”; namely peace with God, since “everyone who believes in him receives forgiveness of sins through his name” if they should “repent and turn to God” (Acts 8:35; 10:36,43; 26:20). As the ESV Study Bible puts it, in its commentary of 2 Corinthians 5:18–20, “‘Be reconciled to God’ is a summary of the gospel message Paul proclaims to unbelievers; it is a call to receive the reconciliation that God has wrought (Rom 5:11).” In short, the gospel is a promise of reconciliation to the sinner via faith in Christ.
This is certainly prima facie good news to every sinner to whom the gospel is proclaimed. And we know it is to be proclaimed to every sinner. The gospel is, in fact, proclaimed as an invitation to all—although it’s an invitation which places the invitee under obligation to respond favorably, as illustrated in the parable of the wedding feast. It is thus a universal call, even though few are chosen to believe it (Matthew 22:14).
Now, particularists would say that this universality in proclamation does not reflect the scope of the atonement. Since Christ did not die for all, the promise of salvation through his death cannot be actually extended to all. Rather, it is extended only to the elect, but is proclaimed indiscriminately to all people because we don’t know who the elect are. Some would add that another reason for it to be proclaimed indiscriminately is to further condemn sinners who reject it.
God’s Sincerity Impugned
However, if this is the case, then it’s hard to see how a sinner, upon hearing the gospel, can—without any distrust—regard it as genuinely good news. In fact, it’s hard to see how a sinner can trust the gospel at all. If I am such a sinner, the call to trust the promise seems to imply that the promise is actually made to me. So a universal call to take hold of the promise seems to imply a universal applicability of that promise (though not necessarily a universal application).
But the particularist says that the promise of salvation is only actually extended to the elect. How, then, can God call everyone indiscriminately to trust it? Just what exactly are they being called to trust? If Christ died for the elect exclusively, then there is no sense in which the promise of salvation can be extended to the non-elect, whether as an invitation, or purely as a command. Consider what exactly the sinner is being called to do. Is it not to trust in the work of Christ on the cross, and the promise that he thereby can be reconciled to God? Is it not, in fact, to thereby be reconciled to God? Certainly it is. The promise refers to the atonement—and so if someone (anyone) is called to trust it, he needs to know that there is something to trust. If the atonement was only for the elect, and the promise is thereby commensurately only for the elect, then a sinner would have to first know that he is elect before he can trust the promise. It does no good to say to him, “Trust the promise and you will know that you are elect”, because the very issue at hand is whether there is anything in which he can trust. What is he being asked to place his faith in? In the work of Christ? For whom? For the elect? But he doesn’t know he’s elect. So how can he be asked to trust the promise?
God simply cannot promise to save someone for whom Christ did not die. Such a promise would be empty; insincere; a lie—and it is impossible for God to lie (Hebrews 6:18). Therefore, if the particularist is right, he cannot say to all people without exception, “Be reconciled to God”—because God has not made provision for all people to be reconciled to him. He cannot say to the reprobate sinner, as the ESV Study Bible would have it, “Receive the reconciliation that God has wrought”—for no such reconciliation exists for that sinner. He cannot tell a non-elect man, “Believe and you will be saved”—that is, quite flatly, a lie. He can only say these things to the elect. The moral inability of the reprobate sinner to respond to the call is irrelevant because the reality, the atonement, which would save him does not exist. There is nothing for him to trust. In this way, the universal gospel call is utterly undermined and shown to be without basis under the particularist view. In fact, it is so undermined that the particularist, to avoid misrepresenting God, is forced into the most extreme hyper-Calvinism, and is crippled in his evangelism.
God’s Justice Impugned
Furthermore, not only is the gospel call undermined, but so is God’s justice in condemning those who refuse it. Just as a non-elect sinner cannot be asked to take hold of an atonement which was not actually made for him, so he equally cannot be punished for failing to do so. How can he heap condemnation on himself for rejecting the gospel, as in John 3:18, when the gospel was never for him? Indeed, what sense is there to even speak of him “rejecting” something which was never sincerely offered him to begin with? May he not actually turn around and, without any impertinence, point out that God is manifestly dishonest to call everyone to believe a promise which is not made to everyone, and manifestly unjust to punish those who don’t believe when there is nothing for them to believe in? Yet John says, to the contrary, that “whoever does not believe God has made him a liar, because he has not believed in the testimony that God has borne concerning his Son. And this is the testimony, that God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. Whoever has the Son has life; whoever does not have the Son of God does not have life” (1 John 5:10–12). Eric Svendsen further expands this point by bringing to bear passages which describe the additional condemnation of those who profess the faith, but later fall away. In part 1 of his dialog with James White, ‘When Does Our Union With Christ’s Death Occur?’ he asks, why are they condemned if the gospel was not for them? But Peter says that they deny the Master who bought them (2 Peter 2:1).
Given these two considerations—the impugning of God’s sincerity and justice by removing the grounds for the universal call—the particularist ought to concede that the atonement just wasn’t limited in its scope. Moreover, there is another problem which flows directly from what I’ve outlined above, which I’ll forward as the final argument of this series, before moving on to deal with objections to my view.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
On The Atonement, Part 1: Federal Headship and Forensic Imputation
Continuing Dominic Bnonn Tennant's series on the atonement. This first post in the series relates the atonement to federal headship and forensic imputation.
In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.
This is part 1 of 4, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement is inconsistent with what is revealed in Scripture about federal headship and forensic imputation: two doctrines central to Christ’s penal substitution.
My first argument is that limited atonement is incongruent with federal headship and forensic imputation. These two doctrines are central to penal substitution, which in turn is at the heart of the atonement: they say firstly that one man can represent another so that even his sin or righteousness can be regarded as the other’s; and secondly that God, in fact, does impute our sin to Christ and his righteousness to us, by which we may be saved apart from any merit of our own—for we have none.
The Mechanism of Imputation
In considering how imputation works, certain conclusions present themselves to my mind which contradict particular atonement.
Imputation to us
Christ, having fulfilled the whole law, is counted righteous, and this righteousness is imputed to us by God. But what is the form of this righteousness? It doesn’t seem to me that it can be in the form of specific acts, for this would result in obvious absurdities. For example, suppose I ask: did Christ fulfill the whole law in the sense of keeping every single commandment given? Of course he kept every commandment which applied to him—but what if he never encountered his enemy’s donkey going astray, that he might return it (Deuteronomy 23:4)? Does this imply that his adherence to the law was less than perfect? Does it imply that his righteousness, imputed to me, is in any way deficient? Does it imply that, if I were a Jew prior to my conversion and had encountered my enemy’s donkey and returned it, I would have added to his imputed righteousness?
The answer to these questions must plainly be no. God does not view the law in this way; as if, in Christ, I am counted as having done exactly the acts he did, and no others. It is not the acts of Jesus which are imputed to me, but the righteousness grounded in those acts. Since “the one who loves another has fulfilled the law” (Romans 13:8), and Christ loved perfectly, I am counted as having loved perfectly, and thus as having fulfilled the law. Therefore, I conclude that the righteousness imputed to me is qualitative, rather than quantitative. It is not a series of righteous acts which are imputed—it is righteousness itself: that is, the condition of being righteous, which is grounded in those acts.
Inherited sin, it seems, works in the same way. It is not the action of Adam, the specific sin of eating the fruit, which is imputed to me; it is guilt itself. That is, it’s the condition of being disobedient, which is grounded in the eating of the fruit, which is imputed. Or, put another way, I am a sinner in Adam—not a fruit eater.
Imputation to Christ
Now, it seems very reasonable to me to think that there’s a symmetry between imputation to us, and imputation to Christ. Anyone is welcome to argue otherwise in the comments below—but such an argument must offer good reasons for the disparity. It can’t just be asserted; neither will it do to say that it must be so on the basis of particular atonement, since this would merely beg the question against me. Lacking any evident reason to the contrary, I take it as given that imputation is imputation—if it works a certain way for us, it works the same way for Christ.
Subsequently, although many Reformed Christians seem to assume that it is our specific acts of sin which are imputed to Jesus, it seems to me that this can’t be the case. Rather, what is imputed is our qualitative condition of sinfulness. This is certainly what 2 Corinthians 5:21 and Galatians 3:13 seem to say: that for our sake God made him to be sin (singular), so that he became a curse (singular), so that in him we might become the righteousness of God (singular). And is this not very congruent with John, who says that Jesus takes away the sin of the world—singular? These terms all seem to suggest an overarching, qualitative condition, rather than specific, quantitative acts.
This is because (at the risk of making this seem simple) guilt is guilt, and righteousness is righteousness. You’re either righteous or you’re guilty, “for whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it. For he who said, ‘Do not commit adultery,’ also said, ‘Do not murder.’ If you do not commit adultery but do murder, you have become a transgressor of the law” (James 2:10–11). The law is a single, indivisible specification of obedience. The one principle of obedience is manifested in the various articles of the law, so that to break one of these is to break the whole law—and to break the whole law is to be disobedient and guilty. There may be a quality and a quantity to my guilt in terms of the articles of the law—that is, I break a certain number of laws a certain number of times (quantity); and each on occasion with a certain severity (quality). But in terms of the law, either I am obedient—or I am not.
With this in mind, it seems evident to me that where penal substitution is concerned, it is obedience or disobedience, righteousness or guilt, which is being substituted. It is not individual acts of obedience or disobedience, righteousness or guilt.
A Bit of Further Explanation
So my contention is that imputation is the legal transferral only of a condition or a quality. As regards righteousness, it means I’m regarded as obedient, a law-keeper, and sinless. The ground for being so regarded is the federal representation of Christ, who actually was sinless in his personal life. But it is not his personal life which is accounted to me; rather, it is the obedience of that life. Conversely, as regards sin, imputation means Christ was regarded as disobedient, a law-breaker, a sinner. The grounds for being so regarded is the people whom he federally represents, who actually were and are and will be sinful in their personal lives. But again—it is not their personal lives which are accounted to him, and not their personal sins; rather, it is the disobedience of those lives. Therefore, even if it was only the elect whose sin was the grounds of imputation (a notion I am sympathetic to), it remains that the scope of the atonement is unlimited or universal, since individual sins were not part of the equation. It was the condition of being a sinner which was imputed to him—and so he represented any and all sinners by merit of sharing in their humanity.
This is a view which can be called judicial atonement, which sees the payment of sin as penal, to be paid in our own persons—as death. It is opposed to pecuniary atonement, which views the payment of sin as transactional, like the payment of an amount of money. As Steve Costley puts it, “Christ has not paid a certain amount for so many sins. His blood is not like a quantity of money. His suffering is not a pain-for-pain equivalent for the suffering due to us.”
If this is so, then it’s nonsensical to think that the atonement is particular or limited in its scope. Particularity requires a pecuniary view in which specific sins and no others were imputed to Christ. I think this view is faulty, and that when Scripture likens the atonement to the payment of a ransom, this metaphor should not be taken that literally. It is not the case that certain people were excluded from being federally represented on the cross. Although Christ may have had the elect specifically in view when died, knowing that it was for them alone that his death was intended to be efficacious, it was still be the case in practice that he represented all humankind—because he himself was a human being. Thus his atonement could be made efficacious for even the reprobate, would they only turn and live.
A Couple of Supporting Observations
The Facts of Christ’s Death
One of the particular aspects of the atonement which I think supports my view is the way in which Christ paid the penalty for sin. His payment was not the same penalty which I myself would pay, were I to die in unbelief. For me, eternal suffering in a physical location known as hell would be the just and necessary consequence of my disobedience to God. Jesus, however, did not suffer in a physical place called hell after he died—not even for even a short time. He went “that day” to his Father’s side (Luke 23:43). In fact, the only obvious similarity between the actions of Christ which atoned for my sin, and the actions which I myself would owe in atonement, is death.
This is entirely congruent with Scripture, for “the wages of sin is death” (Romans 6:23). That is, the wages of any and every sin is death. Now, the death of an unregenerate sinner is an imperfect wage—it can neither take away guilt, nor reconcile the sinner to God. Thus, hell. But being perfect God himself, Christ’s death counted as a perfect wage—it was a perfect propitiation for the guilt of transgressing the whole law, and can reconcile anyone to God, because Christ is God. Therefore, whatever sin I have committed, its wages are covered to the uttermost in Christ (Hebrews 7:25) if he is counted as a transgressor in my place.
The Actual Event of Imputation
Now, his atonement must be applied to me in order for me to be counted righteous. That is, at some point in time my sin must be imputed to Christ, otherwise I would not be saved. Under the pecuniary view, Christ paid for my sins at the cross. That being so, for God to ever count me as a sinner seems unjust. If my sins were covered in Christ since before I was born, then there was no time in my life when I ever owed a penalty for them. Since my conception, I would have been in Christ. But I know that if anyone is in Christ he is a new creation (2 Corinthians 5:17). And indeed, I know that I am now a new creation—a spiritual person, rather than a natural one (1 Corinthians 2:6ff), and am reconciled to God—because I remember a time before I was such. I remember a time when I was a “child of wrath” (Ephesians 2:3), and a point in time when I was reconciled to God through the Spirit, by faith (Romans 5:1).
To be fair, there is a distinction between the imputation of my sin to Christ, and of his righteousness to me. Many Christians would argue that it is only on the event of the latter, when I obtain faith, that I stop being under God’s wrath. However, I find it difficult to see how I could justly be under God’s wrath given the former. If my sin is paid, it is paid, and wrath remains on me no longer. Therefore, I conclude that the application of the atonement—the actual imputation of my sin to Christ—could not have occurred at the cross. Christ’s death really was representative, and is held up as an object of salvation. I am counted as being represented by him on the occasion of my faith in this object. This in turn aligns well with the way in which the bronze serpent of Numbers 21 worked. As a type of Christ’s atonement, it fits perfectly with a judicial view—but it doesn’t seem congruent with a pecuniary one.
These seem to me the major considerations as regards federal headship and imputation. They all appear to point to a judicial atonement, rather than the pecuniary one. It’s hard to see how any of these elements are congruent with a pecuniary atonement—yet they fit hand-in-glove into the judicial view.
In this series, I forward a considered case for a universal atonement, presenting what I find to be the most compelling arguments for it, defining what exactly it entails, and interacting with the most common and persuasive objections against it.
This is part 1 of 4, in which I forward the argument that particular atonement is inconsistent with what is revealed in Scripture about federal headship and forensic imputation: two doctrines central to Christ’s penal substitution.
My first argument is that limited atonement is incongruent with federal headship and forensic imputation. These two doctrines are central to penal substitution, which in turn is at the heart of the atonement: they say firstly that one man can represent another so that even his sin or righteousness can be regarded as the other’s; and secondly that God, in fact, does impute our sin to Christ and his righteousness to us, by which we may be saved apart from any merit of our own—for we have none.
The Mechanism of Imputation
In considering how imputation works, certain conclusions present themselves to my mind which contradict particular atonement.
Imputation to us
Christ, having fulfilled the whole law, is counted righteous, and this righteousness is imputed to us by God. But what is the form of this righteousness? It doesn’t seem to me that it can be in the form of specific acts, for this would result in obvious absurdities. For example, suppose I ask: did Christ fulfill the whole law in the sense of keeping every single commandment given? Of course he kept every commandment which applied to him—but what if he never encountered his enemy’s donkey going astray, that he might return it (Deuteronomy 23:4)? Does this imply that his adherence to the law was less than perfect? Does it imply that his righteousness, imputed to me, is in any way deficient? Does it imply that, if I were a Jew prior to my conversion and had encountered my enemy’s donkey and returned it, I would have added to his imputed righteousness?
The answer to these questions must plainly be no. God does not view the law in this way; as if, in Christ, I am counted as having done exactly the acts he did, and no others. It is not the acts of Jesus which are imputed to me, but the righteousness grounded in those acts. Since “the one who loves another has fulfilled the law” (Romans 13:8), and Christ loved perfectly, I am counted as having loved perfectly, and thus as having fulfilled the law. Therefore, I conclude that the righteousness imputed to me is qualitative, rather than quantitative. It is not a series of righteous acts which are imputed—it is righteousness itself: that is, the condition of being righteous, which is grounded in those acts.
Inherited sin, it seems, works in the same way. It is not the action of Adam, the specific sin of eating the fruit, which is imputed to me; it is guilt itself. That is, it’s the condition of being disobedient, which is grounded in the eating of the fruit, which is imputed. Or, put another way, I am a sinner in Adam—not a fruit eater.
Imputation to Christ
Now, it seems very reasonable to me to think that there’s a symmetry between imputation to us, and imputation to Christ. Anyone is welcome to argue otherwise in the comments below—but such an argument must offer good reasons for the disparity. It can’t just be asserted; neither will it do to say that it must be so on the basis of particular atonement, since this would merely beg the question against me. Lacking any evident reason to the contrary, I take it as given that imputation is imputation—if it works a certain way for us, it works the same way for Christ.
Subsequently, although many Reformed Christians seem to assume that it is our specific acts of sin which are imputed to Jesus, it seems to me that this can’t be the case. Rather, what is imputed is our qualitative condition of sinfulness. This is certainly what 2 Corinthians 5:21 and Galatians 3:13 seem to say: that for our sake God made him to be sin (singular), so that he became a curse (singular), so that in him we might become the righteousness of God (singular). And is this not very congruent with John, who says that Jesus takes away the sin of the world—singular? These terms all seem to suggest an overarching, qualitative condition, rather than specific, quantitative acts.
This is because (at the risk of making this seem simple) guilt is guilt, and righteousness is righteousness. You’re either righteous or you’re guilty, “for whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it. For he who said, ‘Do not commit adultery,’ also said, ‘Do not murder.’ If you do not commit adultery but do murder, you have become a transgressor of the law” (James 2:10–11). The law is a single, indivisible specification of obedience. The one principle of obedience is manifested in the various articles of the law, so that to break one of these is to break the whole law—and to break the whole law is to be disobedient and guilty. There may be a quality and a quantity to my guilt in terms of the articles of the law—that is, I break a certain number of laws a certain number of times (quantity); and each on occasion with a certain severity (quality). But in terms of the law, either I am obedient—or I am not.
With this in mind, it seems evident to me that where penal substitution is concerned, it is obedience or disobedience, righteousness or guilt, which is being substituted. It is not individual acts of obedience or disobedience, righteousness or guilt.
A Bit of Further Explanation
So my contention is that imputation is the legal transferral only of a condition or a quality. As regards righteousness, it means I’m regarded as obedient, a law-keeper, and sinless. The ground for being so regarded is the federal representation of Christ, who actually was sinless in his personal life. But it is not his personal life which is accounted to me; rather, it is the obedience of that life. Conversely, as regards sin, imputation means Christ was regarded as disobedient, a law-breaker, a sinner. The grounds for being so regarded is the people whom he federally represents, who actually were and are and will be sinful in their personal lives. But again—it is not their personal lives which are accounted to him, and not their personal sins; rather, it is the disobedience of those lives. Therefore, even if it was only the elect whose sin was the grounds of imputation (a notion I am sympathetic to), it remains that the scope of the atonement is unlimited or universal, since individual sins were not part of the equation. It was the condition of being a sinner which was imputed to him—and so he represented any and all sinners by merit of sharing in their humanity.
This is a view which can be called judicial atonement, which sees the payment of sin as penal, to be paid in our own persons—as death. It is opposed to pecuniary atonement, which views the payment of sin as transactional, like the payment of an amount of money. As Steve Costley puts it, “Christ has not paid a certain amount for so many sins. His blood is not like a quantity of money. His suffering is not a pain-for-pain equivalent for the suffering due to us.”
If this is so, then it’s nonsensical to think that the atonement is particular or limited in its scope. Particularity requires a pecuniary view in which specific sins and no others were imputed to Christ. I think this view is faulty, and that when Scripture likens the atonement to the payment of a ransom, this metaphor should not be taken that literally. It is not the case that certain people were excluded from being federally represented on the cross. Although Christ may have had the elect specifically in view when died, knowing that it was for them alone that his death was intended to be efficacious, it was still be the case in practice that he represented all humankind—because he himself was a human being. Thus his atonement could be made efficacious for even the reprobate, would they only turn and live.
A Couple of Supporting Observations
The Facts of Christ’s Death
One of the particular aspects of the atonement which I think supports my view is the way in which Christ paid the penalty for sin. His payment was not the same penalty which I myself would pay, were I to die in unbelief. For me, eternal suffering in a physical location known as hell would be the just and necessary consequence of my disobedience to God. Jesus, however, did not suffer in a physical place called hell after he died—not even for even a short time. He went “that day” to his Father’s side (Luke 23:43). In fact, the only obvious similarity between the actions of Christ which atoned for my sin, and the actions which I myself would owe in atonement, is death.
This is entirely congruent with Scripture, for “the wages of sin is death” (Romans 6:23). That is, the wages of any and every sin is death. Now, the death of an unregenerate sinner is an imperfect wage—it can neither take away guilt, nor reconcile the sinner to God. Thus, hell. But being perfect God himself, Christ’s death counted as a perfect wage—it was a perfect propitiation for the guilt of transgressing the whole law, and can reconcile anyone to God, because Christ is God. Therefore, whatever sin I have committed, its wages are covered to the uttermost in Christ (Hebrews 7:25) if he is counted as a transgressor in my place.
The Actual Event of Imputation
Now, his atonement must be applied to me in order for me to be counted righteous. That is, at some point in time my sin must be imputed to Christ, otherwise I would not be saved. Under the pecuniary view, Christ paid for my sins at the cross. That being so, for God to ever count me as a sinner seems unjust. If my sins were covered in Christ since before I was born, then there was no time in my life when I ever owed a penalty for them. Since my conception, I would have been in Christ. But I know that if anyone is in Christ he is a new creation (2 Corinthians 5:17). And indeed, I know that I am now a new creation—a spiritual person, rather than a natural one (1 Corinthians 2:6ff), and am reconciled to God—because I remember a time before I was such. I remember a time when I was a “child of wrath” (Ephesians 2:3), and a point in time when I was reconciled to God through the Spirit, by faith (Romans 5:1).
To be fair, there is a distinction between the imputation of my sin to Christ, and of his righteousness to me. Many Christians would argue that it is only on the event of the latter, when I obtain faith, that I stop being under God’s wrath. However, I find it difficult to see how I could justly be under God’s wrath given the former. If my sin is paid, it is paid, and wrath remains on me no longer. Therefore, I conclude that the application of the atonement—the actual imputation of my sin to Christ—could not have occurred at the cross. Christ’s death really was representative, and is held up as an object of salvation. I am counted as being represented by him on the occasion of my faith in this object. This in turn aligns well with the way in which the bronze serpent of Numbers 21 worked. As a type of Christ’s atonement, it fits perfectly with a judicial view—but it doesn’t seem congruent with a pecuniary one.
These seem to me the major considerations as regards federal headship and imputation. They all appear to point to a judicial atonement, rather than the pecuniary one. It’s hard to see how any of these elements are congruent with a pecuniary atonement—yet they fit hand-in-glove into the judicial view.
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