On The Atonement, Part 6: Universal Atonement Fails to Actually Accomplish Redemption For Anyone

The final post from Dominic Bnonn Tennant's series on the atonement, regarding the objection that a universal atonement would not actually secure or guarantee salvation for anyone.

The last objection I’ll interact with in this series is the one which tries to show that a universal atonement is really an impotent atonement. In the words of Scobie Smith, people such as myself

"clearly cannot say that the satisfaction of Christ secures the salvation of all those for whom it was made [...] The atonement itself does not guarantee the salvation of those for whom it was made [...] All the satisfaction can do is make it possible for God then to choose whom to save and then to secure their salvation by some other means. Moreover, since there is no other satisfaction made to his justice, this other means (eg, irresistible grace) is simply an exercise of God’s sovereign will, not an act stemming from the justice of God (eg, to fulfill the obligation arising from the satisfaction of his justice)." (Note: quoted from a discussion on the Reformed Baptist Discussion List.)

At first glance, this seems like a good objection. It certainly gave me pause for thought. But upon reflection, it begins to appear rather confused. I think there are at least three obvious difficulties with it:

I. Huh? And, so what?

Firstly, what does it mean to say that the atonement does not guarantee or secure the salvation of all those for whom it was made? These terms are ambiguous. I can, for instance, go to SkyCity Chartwell and secure tickets for myself to see a movie. This guarantees that I will have a seat if I show up and present my ticket. But it doesn’t guarantee that I will show up and present my ticket. So, with that analogy in mind (even if it is a rather pecuniary one), it doesn’t appear that the objection — as stated at least — gains much traction against the universal view, under which Christ purchased movie tickets for everyone, but only the elect bother to show up at the cinema.

In light of this, I think the objection needs to be rephrased. What actually seems to be at issue is whether or not the atonement is a sufficient cause of justification. Under the universal view, of course, it is only a necessary cause — it had to happen in order for anyone to be justified, because it provides the grounds for justification by providing satisfaction to God’s justice. But it does not itself effect that justification, since although the satisfaction was made on the cross, there are still other conditions which must be fulfilled in order for it to be applied to anyone. This seems to be what the particularist is objecting to— yet it’s hard to see why he considers it a problem. It looks rather like he is just begging the question again. There aren’t any clear reasons for rejecting the view that the atonement is a necessary-but-not-sufficient cause of justification — except that it it doesn’t fit into the framework of particular atonement.

II. The alternative is unscriptural…

Secondly, as I’ve covered already in this series, the view that the atonement is, in and of itself, the sufficient cause of justification is highly problematic. If it were the case that the atonement “secured” salvation for the elect in the sense which is apparently intended by this objection — namely, that it satisfied the demands of God’s justice against all the elect, and this satisfaction itself guarantees their salvation — then it follows inevitably that the elect are justified from the cross. Since God’s wrath toward all the elect was appeased in about 29 AD, no elect person after that time could be under his wrath. But we know from Scripture and from experience that, in fact, we are all “children of wrath” (Ephesians 2:3) until we are made a “new creation” (2 Corinthians 5:7) by the rebirth in the Spirit. If the particularist is right in his objection, then he has some hard questions to answer regarding the purpose of the rebirth and the ordo salutis.

III. …while the view being objected to is scriptural

Thirdly, on the other side of that coin, the view which the particularist is objecting to is manifestly biblical. Indeed, it is the Reformed view — so he seems to be contradicting himself. Notice how the objection is that, under the universal view, the satisfaction of Christ only makes it possible for God to choose whom to save, and that he then has to secure their salvation by some other means. Well, maybe this is stating the obvious, but…“other means” such as faith? If, in fact, we are “justified by faith” (Romans 5:1), then plainly it is impossible that we are justified by the atonement as the particularist seems to want to say — that is, that the atonement itself is the sufficient cause of our justification. This is why we aren’t justified from the cross — because justification is by faith. (Unless the particularist is suggesting that we are justified twice — and it’s very hard to see what that even means.) Certainly, the atonement is a necessary cause of justification, since it provides the very grounds for satisfying the demands of God’s justice against us. And certainly, even, the work of Christ (whether in the atonement or not) is a necessary cause of our faith also, since Jesus is both its founder and perfecter (Hebrews 12:2). But just as certainly, the particularist cannot turn around and say that what he means is that the atonement must be the sufficient cause of faith, and by this relationship is then also the sufficient cause of justification. Clearly it is not. The atonement does not, in and of itself, bring about faith. Once more, without emotion: the atonement is the grounds for faith and for justification. It is what makes them possible — but it isn’t what makes them actual. It is the indwelling of the Spirit which makes faith actual; and it is faith which makes justification actual.

So this final objection once again highlights why it is so unreasonable to treat the atonement as a simple pecuniary transaction, as the particularist view is wont to do. Rather than gaining any real traction against universal atonement, it tends rather to discredit itself — as has been the case with all the rest of the objections I’ve handled.

To conclude, then, I can find no good reason to believe that the atonement is limited in the sense which most Calvinists today seem to mean. Rather, it is the historical alternative which is both reasonable and scriptural: namely, that Christ, in his death, represented all mankind, satisfying the demands of the law before God, and so made salvation possible for everyone without distinction who might appeal to that atonement — though it is apprehended only by the elect, through faith.

Resources For Easter

LOTS of solid apologetic resources on Christ's resurrection... just in time for Easter! Check 'em out at Triablogue: Resources For Easter

Job's Ordeal

Some more helpful thoughts that comport well with the current series on the Problem of Evil, Steve Hays responding to some of Bart Ehrman's contentions regarding the Book of Job, Triablogue: Job's Ordeal.

The Problem of Evil 3 - The Inductive Problem

Following right on the coattails of the Logical Problem of Evil is the Inductive Problem of Evil. In our discussion of the Logical Problem of Evil we saw that there are prior problems which an objector must resolve before any logical issue can be raised, and even if we pass over that issue a simple resolution of the objection can be drawn directly from the premises of the argument. However, once this is acknowledged (the gaining of which is no small task in actual apologetic conversations), a secondary objection can potentially be raised: granting that the existence of God and evil are not logically incompatible, what is the likelihood that this is true?

Using the language of our resolution of the Logical Problem of Evil, the Inductive Problem of Evil could be articulated like this: Granted, God has a morally sufficient reason for every evil event which occurs; however, there is a great deal of evil in the world for which it is difficult or even impossible to imagine a morally sufficient reason. For this reason, even if God's co-existence with evil is logically possible, it appears to be highly unlikely.

Some observations:

1.) If we haven't experienced it ourselves, we can at least think of events of brutal, senseless, incoherent evil. In other words, part of the force of the Inductive Problem of Evil is drawn from (what I called in the Introduction) the "Personal or Existential Problem of Evil." What morally sufficient reason could there be for God to eternally plan the gang rape of a Christian missionary or the genocide of millions of people in Germany or Cambodia or the serial molestation of young boys by Roman Catholic priests? All of the visceral, emotional weight of the questions aside, this is another appeal to examine some kind of a theodicy. What is this proposed morally sufficient reason for evil?

(Note: Yes, I self-consciously stated that God eternally plans, not permits, evil. I will be more thoroughly examining this issue in a later post on the Theological Problem of Evil, attempting to reconcile the biblical view of God's absolute sovereignty with the existence of evil.)

2.) One might alternatively offer that the inductive amount of good or pleasure in the world requires equal explanation as the amount of evil and suffering, especially from the objector's viewpoint. John Gerstner's little booklet The Problem of Pleasure: Why Good Things Happen to Bad People is insightful on this matter. Indeed, if there is not a good God behind the events of the universe, why is there so much goodness, beauty and pleasure in life? To take as a single, purely biological example, imagine how many orgasms must take place on a given day throughout the world (many of which would be enjoyed in outright rebellion against the purpose for which God created such things). Why should such pleasure exist in such empirically demonstrable abundance apart from the existence of a good God? The existence of such pleasure is even more staggering when considered alongside the biblical doctrine of the sinfulness of humanity.

3.) The assertion that God's co-existence with evil "seems unlikely" is a probabilistic statement. And whether or not something seems likely or unlikely depends rather heavily, not on the issue itself, but on other grounds. What seems quite probable to me might seem perfectly improbable to someone else, based largely on our differences of belief and experience (and especially on the way those beliefs lead us to interpret our experiences). Whether God's existence in the face of evil seems probable or not to a person rests on what one believes about God and evil considered separately. To put it differently, one's conclusion here primarily depends on the prior probability of God's existence.

(Note: A more precise theory regarding the examination of probabilities could be proposed through the use of Bayes' Theorem, which is an effort at viewing complex probabilities, such as the likelihood of the co-existence of God and evil, with mathematical precision. However, this would make our discussion far more technical than I think I would be able to sustain at this time. Essentially, Bayesian probability holds that the more a truth claim can explain, the better it can explain things; and the simpler it can explain things, the more likely that truth claim is to be true. For those interested, see Richard Swinburne's book Bayes' Theorem.)

One's views of the probability or improbability of a certain state or event tends to be a foregone conclusion based upon how one already views the world. As the Scottish minister Robert Leighton put it, "The natural mind sees God in nothing, not even spiritual things; the spiritual mind sees God in everything, even natural things."

So the Inductive Problem of Evil essentially turns the Personal Problem of Evil into a cumulative case argument against the likelihood of God's existence. However, the Inductive Problem of Evil itself rests on the prior consideration of the probability of God's existence abstracted from the Problem of Evil. In other words, if one already has good reason for a belief in the existence of God, the inductive problem does not raise any sufficient objection for rejecting those prior reasons for belief. And, of course, the opposite is true as well, namely, if one has little reason for belief in God, the inductive problem may readily provide a bit of a theological "shove" toward greater skepticism.

(For those who see little reason for belief in the existence of God, I will offer some brief arguments for your consideration as a post-script to this post. Many other arguments could be considered, but I will give two of my personal favorites, for what that may be worth.)

Regarding the cumulative case raised by the monumental amount of suffering in the world, it is valuable to recognize that there may not be a single explanation for every instance of evil. That is another part of the apparent force of the Inductive Problem of Evil. When one has difficulty making sense of one's own personal suffering, this issue is only compounded by considering that there are billions of others in the world suffering with more or less intensity than one's self. It can indeed be immensely overwhelming to consider.

Even if a widely applicable theodicy is offered, it may not have absolute explanatory power; exceptions to it might be found. Evil may take place to: refine one's faith, discipline a person, reveal God's glory in justice or mercy, display God's patience with rebel humanity, to produce courage and character and hope in response, to alert us of danger (as in physical pain), to learn the consequences of evil, to point people to the means of salvation in Christ, and on, and on, and on... For a given instance of evil there may be multiple applicable explanations, though we may have difficulty in discerning them. Again, this is the role of theodicies, which are helpful in attempting to give us broadly useful truths regarding the co-existence of God and evil. But finding an absolute theodicy may prove difficult. Lord willing, we will soon consider several theodicies in this series.

So, to recap, the Inductive Problem of Evil: (1) borrows its argumentative force from the Personal Problem of Evil, for which there is an almost infinite number of potential responses; (2) the "problem of pleasure" is no less difficult for an objector to account for than the "problem of pain" may be for a believer; and (3) if one has good reason for belief in God considered apart from evil, the Inductive Problem raises no objections to those reasons, so it really presents no challenge to a thoughtful Christian's theism.

Next post we will consider the Theological Problem of Evil mentioned earlier. I will leave you to consider two arguments for God's existence. The first argument we could call the Transcendental Ontological Argument from Mathematical Infinites, or (to use the language of the Children's Catechism) God Is Big. The second argument I'll call the Incomparability of Christ argument.

I am indebted to the writing of Triablogue's Steve Hays for introducing me to the concepts found in these arguments (who is in turn indebted to Alvin Plantinga on the first argument), though the formulations (and any problems with them) are my own.

God Is Big

Mathematical entities, such as numbers, appear to be mental entities. They don't exist in time and space. 1+1 doesn't become 2. There is no secret valley where the CIA keeps all of the numbers. They don't have physical features. 2 is not red or hairy or confused. Numbers exist as mental constructs. This is rather uncontroversial.

In a system of internal relations, all of the relations must be true for any to be true. 2+2=4 is true because 1+1=2 and 4-2=2 and so on. Multiplication implies division, addition implies subtraction, etc. The entire system of mathematics, from basic algebra to advanced calculus, rests on these internal relationships between numbers. This is rather self-evident, and few would advocate that 2+2=5. However, as soon as one admits that 2+2=4, one is presupposing the existence of God. Don't believe it? Here's the demonstration: in a system of infinite internal relations, the infinite must be actual rather than potential.

(Note: A potential infinite is a procedure by which one approaches infinity without ever reaching it, such as constantly adding 1 to a number. It is potentially infinite, since you can always add 1 to it. An actual (or complete) infinite is a closed set with an infinite number of entities contained therein. As demonstrated above, for 2+2=4 to be true, an infinite number of other internal relations must also be true, demonstrating that the set of whole numbers must be an actual infinite.)

If numbers are mental entities (and what else could they be?), and the set of whole numbers must be an actual infinite for any even simple mathematical equation to obtain, then they must inhere in an actually infinite and timeless mind — the mind of an eternal and omniscient God. Therefore, 2+2=4 if and only if God exists. QED

The Incomparability of Christ

When we read the Bible, we can identify with almost every character. Some of them are better than us, others far worse. Yet we can project ourselves into their circumstances and experiences. What would we have done in such-and-such a circumstance? But there is one clear, surpassing exception. In Jesus Christ we encounter a figure who is at once one with us and yet apart from us, who inspires admiration and defies emulation. He has fraternal feeling without loss of firm moral clarity, and familiarity without hint of complicity. He can speak at the level of a child, yet with a reserve of wisdom and nuance that leaves the keenest listener out of his depth. No other figure, in either fact or fiction, covers such a range or strikes such a balance, for in him we witness perfect manhood and perfect Godhood conjoined in one utterly peerless person.

It is considered a truism to say that creative writing is autobiographical. This can even be unwittingly and uncomfortably revealing. A famous instance is the figure of Satan in Paradise Lost. He is easily the most vivid, memorable and well-rounded character in the epic. And the reason is that John Milton put so much of himself into the character. Milton was an imperious, independent, versatile, and supremely self-confident man — and all these traits are reproduced in his diabolical antihero.

Now what I’ve said about Milton holds true of Austen, Dante, Bunyan, Eliot, Clancy, and Grisham as well — to name a few. You could construct a psychological profile from their imaginative visions. If you had no other source of biographical information you could still deduce their sex, social standing, period, place, taste, talent and worldview from their creative labors.

Skeptics regard the Gospel portrait of Christ as a complete or fairly free invention of the Gosepl authors or redactors — especially in the more exalted aspects of its conception. But here we immediately run into a roadblock. For powers of characterization are constrained by the personal resources of an author’s own personality and experience. Every storybook character is a psychological projection. To be sure, it may be modeled on close observation of humanity in general. But that is still filtered and distilled through the psyche of the writer.

Now the problem with reducing Jesus to an imaginative construct is that it would take a Jesus to make a Jesus. And, I ask you, have you ever met anyone like Christ? I know I haven’t. What is more, I have never encountered his like in all the multiplied histories of great men, real or fictitious. Indeed, it’s disillusioning to read about great men. The more I learn about them, the less I like them. When you study their life in detail, there always emerges some unseemly or unscrupulous side to their character.

There is only one credible explanation for the portrait of Christ that forms itself from the pages of Gospel history: the Gospels present us with a realistic depiction of a real person. To attribute this feat to the creative energies of the evangelist or redactor only pushes the problem back a step. For if we knew nothing else about the author, we would know this much — that he was a man of like passions as ourselves, sharing our fallenness and finitude. Just as water cannot rise above its own level, and muddy water cannot clarify its own source, a characterization cannot ultimately improve on the character of the creative writer. His writing is ultimately an exercise in mirror-writing as he makes out his own distorted visage at the bottom of the well. "That which born of the flesh is flesh, but that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." (John 3:6)

On the Atonement 5: Universal Salvation or Double Payment

An addition to Dominic Bnonn Tennant's series on the atonement, regarding "double jeopardy" or "double payment" for sins and universalism.

This is part 5 of 6, in which I refute the objection that universal atonement entails either universal salvation, or a double payment for sins.

Perhaps the most common objection to universal atonement is the double jeopardy or double payment argument, which says: if Christ died for everyone without exception, then either (a) everyone is saved, or (b) those in hell pay for sins which were already paid for once on the cross. The former is obviously unbiblical — not everyone will be saved (Matthew 7:13–14) — and the latter is plainly unjust — and shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just (Genesis 18:25)?

In this way, universal redemption seems to be skewered effectively on the horns of a dilemma. This is the same argument I used in my discussion with Darryl Burling when we were thinking about the atonement. The way I formulated it then was as a reductio ad absurdum of the universal view:

1.) Christ’s atonement was sufficient to save from all sin (as per universal atonement).

2.) Unbelief is a sin (by definition).

3.) Therefore, Christ’s atonement was sufficient to save from [all] unbelief.

4.) But unbelievers are not saved (standard biblical doctrine).

5.) Therefore, Christ’s atonement does not save from [all] unbelief.

6.) Therefore, his atonement is not sufficient to save from all sin.

The problem with this line of argumentation, as I acknowledged to Darryl in my followup article ‘Thinking more clearly about the atonement’, is that it presupposes a pecuniary view of the atonement — that is, a view which treats penal substitution as a commercial transaction, as described in part 1 of this series. Aside from the problems with this which I brought up there, there are two obviously fatal defects with presupposing this view for the purpose of disproving a universal atonement:

i. It begs the question against universal atonement, which presupposes not a pecuniary, but a judicial view. By taking the pecuniary view, the double jeopardy argument misrepresents — or at best misunderstands — the view it attempts to refute, and so does not actually interact with it at all.

ii. It proves too much, since the implication follows unavoidably that, were the argument to succeed, God’s elect would never have been under his wrath, having been justified from the cross — a view which most particularists reject.

The first premise of the argument is sound, as far as it goes. It could be better phrased to say that Christ’s atonement was sufficient to save all people from all sin — but this is a minor point. Certainly, the view I’m defending has it that the atonement was, and is, sufficient to save from all sin — that is, that its scope includes every person, and every sin of every person. Premises (2)–(4) are also entirely indisputable under the universal view: unbelief is a sin, the atonement covers it, and yet unbelievers aren’t saved. And premise (5) is not in question either — though, to offset confusion, let me admit that I have amended it slightly with the inclusion of the word “all”. I think this more fairly represents the way the particularist would argue (its omission was really an oversight on my part to begin with) because obviously he does believe the atonement covers the unbelief of the elect prior to conversion. This is the very premise which leads inevitably to the conclusion that the elect, in the new era at least, have been saved since the cross — that they were, in fact, never “children of wrath, like the rest of mankind” (Ephesians 2:3).

The double jeopardy argument runs into trouble at (6), however. Notice the obvious non-sequitur. What does the fact that the atonement does not save all people have to do with whether it can not save all people? Plainly, there is a connection in the particularist’s mind — but that connection doesn’t reflect anything in the universal view. It is being unnaturally imposed upon it in order for the argument to work. The universal view admits no such connection, because it does not suppose that specific sins were imputed to Christ at the cross — rather, it recognizes that such a notion leads to real problems, both in terms of the mechanism of federal headship (as noted in part 1), and in the temporal justification of the elect (as noted above). But, as James Anderson once explained to the Reformed Baptist Discussion List,

"The double-jeopardy argument only assumes that for any person S, S’s sins will be atoned for if and only if (i) S’s sins are imputed to Christ and (ii) Christ suffers a punishment for those sins sufficient to fully satisfy the demands of divine justice."

But of course, the universal view rejects (i), denying that imputation occurs in this way at all. For one thing, imputation is not quantitative as the argument assumes. For another, it takes place at the moment of justification — that’s what justification is: the imputation both of our guilt to Christ and his righteousness to us — and not at the cross. As I discussed in part 1, it’s reasonable to think that Christ represented us on the cross in a penal or judicial payment; not in a pecuniary or commercial one.

So I reject the conclusion of the double jeopardy argument as a non-sequitur. It merely presupposes the particularist view of imputation, and tries to tacitly impose this on the universal view. In contrast, if the argument is corrected so that it no longer begs the question, (6) might look something like this:

6. Therefore, the nature of Christ’s atonement is not such that it actually saves all people from sin.

This, of course, says nothing necessarily about the scope of the atonement being limited, and everything possibly about its application being so. Subsequently, since it doesn’t entail a limited scope, it isn’t contradictory with any of the prior premises which have been accepted. Thus, the argument, fairly reworked, does not select for the particularist view: it merely selects for a view wherein the atonement is limited either in scope or in application.

In light of my previous arguments in this series, I think it far more reasonable to take the latter view. In other words, the atonement, in and of itself, does not justify anyone: it only provides the grounds of justification, so that it may then be applied by faith. But this leads into the final objection I’m going to consider: that a universal atonement doesn’t accomplish actual redemption for anyone.

The Fate of Infants

I thought this post might be of some value in our current discussion of the Problems of Evil, regarding the fate of infants dying in infancy. Triablogue: The fate of infants

Bart Ehrman's Proposed Contradictions Resolved

Here's two posts by Triablogue's Steve Hays resolving some of the purported biblical contradictions adduced by scholar Bart Ehrman in his latest publication, which bears a title (and contains scholarship) that would've been super-hip back in 1999: Jesus, Interrupted.

NT: The Hidden Contradictions of Ehrman

OT: I Was A Teenage Werewolf

The Problem of Evil 2 - The Logical Problem

The logical problem of evil is often raised as an objection to the existence of the biblical God. Informally, it asserts that a perfect God is inconsistent with the existence of evil. More formally it can be stated:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.

3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.

4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.

5. Evil exists.

6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil.

7. Therefore, God doesn't exist.

(Note: Above formulation taken from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

Granting certain definitions, the form of the above argument is valid, since if we deny the conclusion (7) but affirm the premises (1) through (6) we are left with contradictions. So the premises imply the conclusion. Therefore, the ensuing debate generally revolves around whether or not one of the premises is false. The Christian affirms that the conclusion is false, but this entails demonstrating that one of the premises is also false, eliminating a contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of evil.

In responding to the logical problem of evil, it is probably best to begin at the beginning: defining terms. This is where problems arise immediately. The fact is that any absolute conception of evil rests on an absolute conception of morality, which is a theistic concept. Apart from the existence of a transcendent God (as in Scripture) there is no basis for moral absolutes. To adopt a portion of a worldview in order to argue that the rest of that worldview is false only demonstrates an inconsistency in an objector's method of argumentation, not an inconsistency in that worldview itself. It's like putting a cannon on top of a platform just to blow up that platform. It's a mistake (to put it mildly).

If "evil" is merely a human opinion regarding certain natural phenomena or a utilitarian social convention describing certain collections of opinions, then it really doesn't bear on the existence of God at all. It should be recognized that if there is such a thing as a logical problem of evil, it is a theistic problem, not an atheistic proof.

What I call the "Definitional Problem of Evil" is the problem which must be addressed to a skeptic before the logical problem of evil can even be raised as an objection to the Christian doctrine of God. Any absolute definition of evil will presuppose the existence of absolute morality which is derived from the existence of God. Any other definition of evil as such (utilitarian, conventional, cultural, social, relative, etc.) is not actually a problem for the Christian Theist, since it will be variable.

Tactically speaking, this is an offensive approach to the logical problem of evil. It is disarming an objection, rather than negotiating. This can, in itself, de-fang the logical problem as such.

However, if we choose (for whatever reason) to take a defensive approach, one simply needs to posit that a perfect God has a perfectly sufficient and good reason for the existence of evil. This is to add a fourth option to premise (6) above. It's really only being consistent with the first 5 premises. If God is actually perfectly powerful, all-knowing and good, and evil actually exists, then there must be a good reason for its existence. Logical problem solved.

So on one hand, the logical problem of evil presupposes the theism which it is trying to destroy; on the other hand, a very simple resolution can be given drawn directly from the premises of the problem itself.

The skeptic should honestly admit that these answers remove any logical problem of evil. However, the Christian should also readily admit that this answer is not remotely existentially satisfying. They are logical answers to a logical objection. Nothing more.

But there is much more invested in the problem of evil than mere logic or terminology. Most commonly people of all kinds (skeptic and believer and everyone else) want to know: what is God's morally sufficient reason for the existence of evil?

This is where various theodicies (explanations for the co-existence of God and evil) are offered. Again, whether or not these theodicies succeed or fail in giving satisfying answers is to a great degree person-variable; however, even if you cannot find a personally-satisfying theodicy, that doesn't mean the logical problem of evil hasn't been resolved. God's morally sufficient reason for the existence of evil may be mysterious. But it would be silly to argue that the existence of a mystery is proof that mysteries don't exist.

If you can't find a personally-satisfying theodicy, it may simply be that you are not looking in the right place.

Eventually, Lord willing, I would like to briefly survey and consider several theodicies. However, before that I will be considering the Inductive Problem of Evil in my next post.

Fight Club

Triablogue: Fight Club

The Problem of Evil - Intro

I'd like to begin a series on what is commonly called the "Problem of Evil". The Problem of Evil takes several different forms, so it's not as though there is some generic, formulaic response which can be given to the problem.

The Deductive or Logical Problem of Evil is an intellectual objection raised against the Christian conception of God. It is an argument which attempts to demonstrate that the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful, good and loving God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. This argument can be presented in several forms, which we may look at in more detail eventually. There are several potential refutations worthy of consideration.

If an objector grants the soundness of one of the refutations of the deductive problem of evil (and many do), they may seek to raise a secondary objection. A second category of objection which might be raised is that of the Inductive or Empirical Problem of Evil. This objection states that granting (at least for the sake of argument) that it is logically possible that the Christian God created a world where evil exists, how likely is that to actually be the case?

The deductive problem asks if it is possible for the Christian God to coexist with evil; the inductive problem asks if this is at all a plausible reality.

Again, there are several potential responses to the inductive problem which, Lord willing, I would like to survey in this series.

However, I also adhere to a biblical view of the absolute sovereignty of God in all things. This doctrine often raises questions (even among Christians) regarding what we can call the Theological Problem of Evil. To put it bluntly, the question raised is, if God is the author of all how can He not be the author of sin? We will consider some answers here as well.

Finally, each of these issues/objections, despite the intellectual nature and tone surrounding some of the discussions, has within it (at one level or another) the Existential or Personal Problem of Evil. This issue is the embodiment of those intellectual questions raised earlier, the heart-wrenching near-accusation uttered by those in deeply personal anguish: "Why?"

Even if satisfactory answers can be given to the first three categories of the problem of evil, the fourth remains so long as life persists. And answers don't come so easily to any of us in the fog of pain, regret, loss and debilitation. At bottom of this is a question which is difficult (some might say impossible) to answer logically, empirically or even theologically: "Can I trust God?"

And that is a question which must find a personal answer.

That being said by way of introduction, I would like to commend to you several authors for further reading on the subject. First, I do this because there are many resources available on this topic (some better than others) and would like to recommend a few of the better ones, in my humble opinion; and second, because in this series I am going to try to minimize the amount of rehearsing which I do. By this I mean that since Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense Theodicy is probably the best formulation of that argument available, I will recommend you read his book and I won't spend much time trying to summarize or survey it here. I would like to spend my time on trying out some arguments which I see as having more-or-less potential value in this arena, but about which I haven't seen much (or any) discussion.

Some of these arguments may be "new" to some of you; some not. I am posting them largely to see what sort of discussion they might induce in the comments box. Some of them will be drawn from a more philosophical theology, others straight from the Bible. So, please feel free to comment with any objections or problems you see with my arguments, as well as counter-arguments you think are worth considering. I always appreciate thoughtful comments.

So, Lord willing, in my next post in the series we will begin to consider the deductive or logical problem of evil.

For further reading, consider: Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, Jay Adams, Gordon Clark, Blaise Pascal, C.S. Lewis.

The best single book I have ever read on the Problem of Evil is Os Guinness' Unspeakable. It is wide-ranging, hard-hitting and very readable.

On Suffering and Evil I would recommend D.A. Carson's How Long, O Lord? and Mark Driscoll and Gerry Breshears' Death By Love.

The American Form of Government

A video worth pondering, especially for our generation and the next: The American Form of Government.

The Divine Decree

There is an intramural debate among Reformed theologians regarding some of the specifics of God's eternal decree which results in the creation-fall-redemption-restoration of the universe (the "lapsarian debate" or the debate over the "order of the divine decrees").

Essentially, God's decree is what determines the course of history, down to the finest of details. I won't be touching on the issue of whether or not the decree is compatible with contingency, human responsibility, secondary causality, etc. in this post. (For a bit of what I think about such things see here.)

You'll notice that I've been referring to God's decree (singular) not God's decrees (plural). This is because it is biblical to say that God is eternal (timeless, "outside-of-time", the Creator of time, pre-temporal, transcendent, etc.), which constrains us to believe that God made a single decree which resulted in everything, not several successive decrees. Several successive decrees implies a sequence of actions, which is inconsistent with eternal timelessness. There may be many intentions in the decree (and therefore many results from the decree in space and time), but there is only one, single, eternal decree of God.

It is a common theological misnomer in the intramural debate I mentioned above for some to speak of the "order of the decrees" of God in creation, redemption, predestination, etc. The fact is that all sides of the debate agree that God's decree is singular, because God is one and eternal. This is not controversial.

The language of plural decrees sneaks into the discussion because the debate centers around questions regarding the "logical order" of events in the mind of God in decreeing all things which come to pass. (Note: Using the plural term "decrees" is not always inaccurate or something to be avoided in all circumstances. Indeed, Scripture often uses the plural term, but more often as a synonym for God's purposes, plans or intentions, rather than as a technical theological term for His divine ordination.)

There are generally three positions given in this regard: supralapsarian, infralapsarian and post-redemptionist. I will be foregoing any discussion of the history or evolution of these positions at this time. A brief synopsis of each position will be offered below, with my (humble) analysis following.

(Note: The suffix "-lapsarian" refers specifically to God's ordaining of The Fall of Man in the Garden of Eden, when sin entered creation. "To lapse" into something is used as synonymous with "to fall." So one's view of the logical place of The Fall in relation to God's other decrees largely determines whether one "falls into" the supra- or infra- camp (pun intended). More will be said on this shortly.)

Supralapsarianism

One of the "7 Habits of Highly Effective People" is to begin a project with the end in mind. It could be said that this is the driving principle behind the supralapsarian's view of the order of the divine decrees. The supra position states that a rational mind begins with an intended end and works back from that end through the means to the beginning. It is a telelogical or purpose-driven view of the order of the decrees. The supra contention is that God is a supremely rational being (or one could *chuckle* say the "most highly effective person") and therefore the logical order of the decrees, beginning with the end in mind, is most commonly formulated as:

1.) The decree to elect some creatable people for salvation and blessing (and the reprobation of others).
2.) The decree to create.
3.) The decree that all men would fall.
4.) The decree to redeem the elect, who are now sinners, by the cross work of Christ.
5.) The decree to apply Christ's redemptive benefits to the elect.
6.) The decree to glorify the elect.

This formulation is (obviously) inconsistent with its first principle of working from the end backwards, and this has been recognized by many theologians who have offered a more consistent supralapsarian framework. However, the above formulation remains the most common supralapsarian view point so it is what I will use as the standard for the supra position. Also, I'm not interested (in this particular post) in explicating an intramural debate within an intramural debate within a particular theological tradition within historical Protestantism.

Infralapsarianism

Infralapsarianism, in contrast to the supra position above, takes chronology as its central principle, rather than teleology. God is said to logically progress in his decrees from the beginning to the end, reasoning from cause to effect. The order of the decrees reflects the order of the historical events which they produce. The infra position presents the order of the decrees as:

1.) The decree to create.
2.) The decree that all men would fall.
3.) The decree to elect some creatable people for salvation and blessing (and the reprobation of others).
4.) The decree to redeem the elect, who are now sinners, by the cross work of Christ.
5.) The decree to apply Christ's redemptive benefits to the elect.
6.) The decree to glorify the elect.

It should be recognized at this point that the supra and infra positions are not in the kind of opposition that they are often thought to be. They are answering the question of the order of the decrees with a different conception of order: one telelogical (purpose-driven), one chronological (history-driven) (both still logical). Much (though not all) of the disagreement between the two groups has to do with an unarticulated equivocation of the term order.

Post-Redemptionism

The third, and least popular, view of the divine decrees is post-redemptionism (sometimes called ante-applicationism). Post-redemptionists are rarely welcome to sit at the same cafeteria table with the supras and infras at the theological academy. Post-redemptionism is the view of the decrees most commonly associated with Amyraldianism (a view commonly, though mistakenly, associated with so-called "4-point Calvinism"). The post-redemptionists hold to a view of the decrees which reflects their convictions regarding both universal and particular aspects of the atonement of Christ. The post-redemptionist view of the order of the decrees is:

1.) The decree to create.
2.) The decree that all men would fall.
3.) The decree to redeem all men by the cross work of Christ.
4.) The decree to elect some creatable people for salvation and blessing (and the reprobation of others).
5.) The decree to apply Christ's redemptive benefits to the elect.
6.) The decree to glorify the elect.

This view is called "post-redemptionist" because it places the decree to elect after the decree to redeem, in contradistinction with the other two positions.

Some Thoughts on the Divine Decree

All sides of the debate agree that God's decree is, in itself, singular (as I mentioned early in this post). This is the testimony of both Scripture and reason and is not debated by any of the three positions above.

Let me then raise the questions: what warrant do we have for going any further in the discussion? What warrant is there for going beyond the testimony of Scripture and reason in an effort at applying our own logical intuitions and inferences to the mind of God?

"For who has known the mind of the Lord or who has been His counselor?" (Romans 11:34)

"The secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law." (Deuteronomy 29:29)

"For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the Lord." (Isaiah 55:8)

It is my contention that there are at least four problems with the debate over the "logical order of the divine decrees":

1.) As mentioned above, the debate largely rests on an unarticulated equivocation over the term "order," since both telelogical and chronological orders are logical in their own way.

2.) Practically-speaking, the debate itself seems to center less on the actual question under investigation and tends to locate itself more readily on the issue of The Fall, the Problem of Evil. When viewed from this perspective, the debate between the supra and infra positions tends to merely be over a difference of emphasis rather than difference of content. One tends to emphasize a logical place for evil in God's plan (supra), the other emphasizes the heinous nature of sin (infra). But the one abstracted from the other can be problematic. The supra might present sin and evil as merely one link in a logical chain to God's glory, while the infra might not make clear the wisdom and harmony of God's eternal plan.

3.) All of the above positions tend to exert an inordinate amount of influence over one's biblical interpretations. It is not proper hermeneutics for an extra-biblical discussion of the logical order of the divine decrees to be the controlling influence of one's understanding of the Scripture. Scripture must be our sole infallible authority, and all other secondary authorities must bow the knee to it (including, and I might say especially, our own intuitions regarding the logical inner workings of God's mind). It becomes far too easy to implicitly and almost unconsciously make supralapsarianism into the filter through which all of Scripture must be viewed.

4.) There is no warrant for exceeding the revelation of Scripture in seeking to "read God's mind," prying into the "secret things (which) belong to the Lord our God," seeking to apply our thoughts to His thoughts. In fact, Scripture explicitly warns against such things. It seems that the debate as it is most commonly framed is condemned as unethical by Scripture. Therefore, I advocate a fourth position regarding the "logical order of the divine decrees in the mind of God": agnosticism.

The debate itself seems to be a strange sort of rationalistic mysticism. The ancient mystics sought to contemplate, think and meditate until they gained insights into the divine nature (but largely appear from their own writings to only gain greater insight into their own thoughts and feelings, then project them onto God). The lapsarian debate is largely indistinct from those activities, apart from the deep commitment to rational investigation rather than the more common emotional mysticism. But, to paraphrase Martin Luther on the matter, when one seeks to find the "hidden God" (Deus absconditus) apart from His self-revelation, one will only find the "naked God" (Deus nudus). And a naked God is always an angry God.

So, it is my contention that the lapsarian debate is essentially akin to attempting to catch a glimpse of God's "secrets" while He is "getting dressed". Some will no doubt find this statement irreverent, but it is in fact merely an accurate analogy for the starkly inappropriate nature of the lapsarian debate. One would do well not to go beyond what one's Father has revealed to us.

Stimulusol XR

New Prescription for Anxiety over the "Economic Stimulus Plan"