Zao Thanatoo

A Final Response to Mitch Leblanc on the Argument from Horrific Suffering

2011-01-25T21:07:00.000-05:00

I will provide a brief rebuttal to Mitch’s response and grant him the last word in this discussion, if he would like to have it. I’ll put them under different headings to attempt to clarify the issues somewhat, with a quote from Mitch and my response.

Foundationalism

Mitch: “I have noticed a general trend amongst presuppositionalists to not only assume a sort of foundationalist epistemology, but to even assume others are foundationalists! How can I have properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions if I think foundationalism is false? This isn’t an immediately relevant thought, but it’s interesting enough to flag.”

Moi: One can be an anti-foundationalist and still have properly basic beliefs. Mitch may want to familiarize himself with Reformed epistemology and foundherentism in this regard, at least. Both are anti-foundationalist and maintain properly basic beliefs. Maybe Mitch didn’t know this or he doesn’t think it’s pertinent since he doesn’t subscribe to either epistemology. Of course, he offered no alternative, so he’s fallen back on giving biographical information rather than philosophical argumentation. At the risk of seeming brusque, who cares that Mitch thinks foundationalism is false? Philosophers only care about why. I agree with Mitch that his thought is irrelevant in this case.

Question-Begging

Mitch: “If it’s the case that assuming that God does not exist in order to argue that he does is self-contradictory there is a real problem for argumentation in general, as assuming the negation of some proposition to prove that proposition is simply what is meant by “proof via contradiction” or reductio ad absurdum and it would be highly controversial for Zao to claim that instances of reductio are self-contradictory, yet that seems to be his suggestion.”

Moi: I apologize for my lack of clarity here. Assuming ~A in order to prove A is self-contradictory, excluding cases of proof by contradiction. I thought this would have gone without saying, but that appears to be a faulty assumption on my part. However, I don’t see its relevance to the larger discussion, unless Mitch wants to argue that only a proof by contradiction would be a valid way of responding to the Argument from HS. But he hasn’t argued for that and I won’t put words into his mouth.

Mitch: “Further, it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she (sic) does not in analyzing the argument. This seems to entail that nobody who is agnostic with regards to the existence of God could ever analyze the argument, or that agnostics are committed to the claim that God does not exist, which is false. He appears to cite the “Law of Excluded Middle” as justification for this claim, but this seems confused. It may be the case that “God exists” is either true or false but this does not entail that one has to regard it as so.”

Moi: This is a red herring. Unless Mitch would like to defend agnosticism I suggest he keep his comments relevant to the discussion at hand. Otherwise, what third truth category does Mitch propose with reference to the agnostic, since he asserts that one does not have to regard a truth claim as true or false? If he’s going to treat agnosticism as an assertion of ignorance, then this is just more biographical information in lieu of philosophical argumentation (taken from somebody else’s hypothetical biography no less, since Mitch is not an agnostic, last I checked).

Mitch has been given argumentation throughout his discussions with Choosing Hats fellas to the effect that the nature of the question of the existence of the Christian God is so comprehensive that one must epistemically presuppose His existence as true or false in every arena, regardless of one’s psychological status with reference to the question. (See Chris’ recent post on the non-neutrality principle.) He has so far not responded substantially to me in that regard (which is his right); however, until he does responses like “…it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she (sic) does not in analyzing the argument” will seem disingenuous at best, obfuscatory at worst.

Straw Man

Mitch: “Here, unfortunately, Zao misconstrues the argument. The finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are not people living life simpliciter. They are the people who believe they are in a mutually interactive relationship with God of the sort to which theists commonly attest. This is a stipulative definition and I could have perhaps made it clearer, but this is one example of why I dislike long discussions pertaining to a brief survey article of some argument, there are things which get left out or overlooked that aren’t so left out or overlooked in the primary source. But, moving on, Zao is also mistaken about what it means to “realize one’s deepest good.” If you note premise (1) it’s explicitly defining what it means to realize one’s deepest good, and it means to ever more fully experience the reality of God. The rest of Zao’s response in its current form can be overlooked since it’s simply not relevant. Zao has, perhaps unintentionally, strawmanned the argument from Horrific Suffering.”

Moi: As I admitted, I haven’t read the primary source document for the argument and I agree that Mitch’s stipulative definition might have been clearer (though, as I said before, I think it was a good start). Recognize that I’ve simply stipulated a clearer definition of my own. If Mitch doesn’t like my stipulative definition as much as he likes his stipulative definition, again, so what? He will need to argue for his definition over against mine. Recognize also that my definition is taken from the Bible; if Mitch’s definition doesn’t take this into account, then the Argument from Horrific Suffering was never intended to target the Christian God and I see no point in taking further issue with it if that is, in fact, the case.

As a brief further comment in this respect, Mitch has asserted that the argument proves that no “perfect being”-type God exists, but this assertion rests on a whole mountain of argumentation regarding what is and is not a perfect being which has not been discussed. Mitch would like to sidestep all of this by an appeal to his intuitions and inferences about what a perfect being would be. I would simply posit the questions: Do you really think that you, as an imperfect finite being, can accurately infer the nature of a perfect being? Based on what? Your imperfect, finite thoughts and feelings? Really?

I would posit that such knowledge is impossible apart from the self-revelation of a “perfect being.”

Antitheistic Argument from Horrific Suffering

2011-01-13T18:07:00.000-05:00

Chris Bolt and Mitch Leblanc have been carrying on a discussion surrounding J. L. Schellenberg’s Antitheistic Argument from Horrors. The full exchange (to date) is linked here. As I’m occasionally wont, I’d like to throw my hat in the ring... now which hat will I choose…

The objective fact of suicide alone would appear to give some validity to Schellenberg’s subject-based definition of Horrific Suffering (HS):

“Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.”

Schellenberg’s argument:

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Notice the strong modal claims of the first five premises (i.e. “Necessarily, if God exists…). Admittedly, I have not read Schellenberg’s chapter as of yet, but I would be interested in seeing his argumentation establishing the necessity of these premises. At the very least it would give us a sketch of the sort of theology being targeted by the argument (while also giving us more than the mere assertion of necessity). Also, if the necessity of any of the premises can be reasonably denied then the entire argument is overturned. However, this is only a formal criticism and I’d rather respond more substantially.

It’s difficult to evaluate what is intended by the phrase taken from the first premise: “Finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.” Mitch has offered his own interpretation for consideration:

“To experience the reality of God, in the context of this argument, is to be in a personal relationship with the creator of the cosmos. A relationship of the type theists mention often. It is a being as aware of the existence of God as a child is aware of his or her loving mother. That such an experience occurs in the ‘ever more fully’ sense is to simply point out that given the infinite complexity of God, there will always be more about God for some finite human person to know. That is, if God exists and is as awesome as theists often claim, it is difficult to see how any finite human person can exhaust the things there are to know about God, or exhaust the feelings there are to be had about God, or exhaust the myriad of forms a personal relationship with her (sic) might take. It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships. Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals… I am speaking here of, in many ways, an experience of God that unfolds throughout eternity and is such that, given God’s infinite resourcefulness and creativity, the fruits of which are inexhaustible by the finite human person.”

I like this attempt at definition. I appreciate an atheist attempting to give a definition which reflects his reading of various theistic claims. At several points I think it’s quite insightful. I particularly like this part: “It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships. Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals.”

I’ll be referring back to this section of Mitch’s definition shortly, when I attempt to present what I contend is a more biblically faithful way of responding to Schellenberg’s argument. However, Mitch has already raised the objection that the use of Scripture in this regard is question-begging:

“(Schellenberg’s) argument, however, has as its conclusion that there is no God, so Chris must be careful not to beg the question against the argument by reasoning in a manner that assumes the conclusion false, to show the conclusion false.”

It seems appropriate, then, to respond to this objection before presenting my case.

Mitch contends that one must not assume that God exists (A) in order to disprove the above conclusion that God does not exist (~A). This, he asserts, is question-begging. However, for anyone wishing to criticize the conclusion, the alternative is to assume that God does not exist in order to argue that he does. This is self-contradictory. We must either assume God exists or God does not exist (A or ~A, Excluded Middle) in presenting our reasoning. But assuming ~A to prove A is self-contradictory and assuming A to prove ~~A Mitch asserts is question-begging.

What options remain for the Christian theist?

We can grant that Schellenberg’s argument is completely unassailable; but this entails atheism.
We can reject the logical principle of the excluded middle; but this leaves us with many-valued, non-classical logics and the host of truth gap/glut issues surrounding that option.
We can tie ourselves in philosophical knots attempting to assume ~A in order to prove A.
We can reject Mitch’s assertion that assuming A in order to prove ~~A is question-begging in this instance.

I choose (4) for a number of reasons. I’ve given Mitch one reason for this in the past (see point 1 under “Circular reasoning and a Euthyphro dilemma analog”), namely that there is an equal ultimacy to the criticism; given the comprehensive nature of the question of the Christian God’s existence, Schellenberg’s argument either assumes A or ~A in an effort at proving ~A. But lest Mitch think this is merely a tu quoque response, I’m attempting to elevate the conversation by recognizing the epistemic role which properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions (call them what you like) play in dealing with issues such as the problem of horrific suffering.

As R. M. Chisholm recognized in his Theory of Knowledge the “problem of the criterion” (i.e. the relation of metaphysics and epistemology, “What do we know?” and “What are the criteria for knowing?”), as he put it, is the interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology. The question of “what do we know” (e.g. Does God exist?) cannot be answered in isolation from the question “what are the criteria for knowing” (e.g. How do we know God exists?) and vice versa. As Chisholm states in The Problem of Criterion, “What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question. It seems to me that, if we do not recognize this fact, as we should, then it is unseemly for us to try to pretend that it isn’t so.” (p. 37)

So I “courageously” beg the question in favor of Christian theism and Mitch unadmittingly begs the question in favor of antitheism. What’s to be done to bridge this gap?

Well, until Mitch recognizes this to be the nature of the case he will probably continue to beg ultimate questions while accusing various theists of begging the same questions; and we’ll occasionally remind him about it. If Mitch does decide to elevate the discussion, we’ll be here waiting. Until then, he’s begging the question. :)

Another alternative would be to present a transcendental argument of some kind, attempting to demonstrate that even a skeptic’s skepticism presupposes the existence of God or something to that effect. For examples, email Chris Bolt. :)

With that issue set to one side, I’d like to briefly propose (like a “good Calvinist”) that the biblical doctrine of unconditional election presents an expansion of the definition given by Mitch above, which makes horrific suffering compatible with God’s existence.

(Note: I love little puns like “good Calvinist,” i.e. in order to be a Calvinist one must believe all people are totally depraved morally, so there are only “totally depraved Calvinists,” but if Chris is a consistent Calvinist then he might be described as “good” in that sense. Good pun, Mitch.)

In Premise 1 we are told “Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.” Let’s break this down quickly for definitional purposes. We’ll take “finite persons” to be, well, finite persons. Finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are people living life. Every day every finite person existing ever more fully experiences the reality of God in various ways and to varying degrees, but every aspect of life is an experience of God in one way or another. “Realizing their deepest good” means simply that they glorify God; and one may glorify God through either salvation or judgment.

So while Mitch’s definition is good, it is incomplete, as he stated: “…Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons.” Indeed, some people may realize their “deepest good” (glorifying God) through horrific suffering under the judgment of God for their sins. So, given the above definitions, Premise 2 is false since certain persons glorify God most fully by suffering horrifically under judgment for their sins; and preventing that category of people from suffering would prevent them from “realizing their deepest good.”

In fact, it is through the horrific suffering of Jesus Christ that finite persons realize their deepest good by glorifying God through salvation rather than judgment.

A Case Study in Apostasy

2011-01-02T22:15:00.000-05:00

I had planned to write a chapter-by-chapter critical review of prominent atheist John Loftus’ book, Why I Am an Atheist; however, upon reading the book I believed that such an analysis was overkill and unnecessary in refuting Loftus’ claims. Providentially, shortly after I finished reading Loftus’ three books the fellas over at Triablogue released their collaboration, The Infidel Delusion, in response to Loftus, et al. So I thought my little collection of posts might just be blogospheric white noise in the flurry of responses exchanged.

So I reworked the bit that I had written in response to Loftus as a brief case study in apostasy, viewed from an apologetic perspective. I hope that some might find it useful in recognizing and avoiding some of the pitfalls which may lead to apostasy. Some may object that doing a case study in apostasy is too critical or harsh. They would prefer to speak merely in categories or generalities about such issues. However, since he believes this chapter contains salient facts related to his cumulative case argument against Christianity, Loftus opens up his experience for critical analysis, which I will cautiously provide. Ad hominem fallacies will be consciously avoided, since the truth value of Loftus' argumentation should be considered independently from his biographical data.

They were sad chapters to read, in many ways and for many reasons. It's always sad to read of the failures of others. And these chapters were full of failures of many kinds.

Loftus begins the book with a challenge for Christians: "Anyway, Christian, for once in your life, you need to seriously examine your faith. By virtue of the fact that your faith is something you prefer to be true, you should subject it to critical analysis at least once in your life. If you laid aside the fact that you think Christianity is true and merely asked yourself if you prefer that it's true, you'll see quite plainly that you do. How do you know you don't believe what you prefer to be true?" (12)

In the above quote, take out the words "Christian/ity" and replace it with "atheist/atheism." It makes equal sense. This is what's called a double-edged criticism. There's no reason to grant presumptively that any given instance of atheism involves more examination than any given instance of Christianity; this is the author simply projecting his own experience onto his audience. If the criticism that "beliefs are based on preference" applies to Christianity, it applies equally to atheism, polytheism and fern worship. Either Loftus' criticism above is valid and he is an atheist because he prefers to believe atheism is true or he's guilty of granting atheism a special status that he doesn't grant to Christianity without providing any argumentation supporting that position. This is tendentious from the outset; however, no apologist familiar with the non-neutrality principle of covenantal apologetics should be surprised by this (for those unfamiliar read this, particularly pp. 447-448).

The problem is not that Loftus is not neutral in his statements; it's that he thinks he is and he purports to be while he is not. This is especially worth noting since many of his readers (regardless of their varied theistic commitments) will tend to grant that neutrality is possible, even desirable at times, and that many of Loftus' statements exemplify such neutrality. But neutrality is impossible; if Christ is Lord of all, nothing is neutral.

"...I consider part 1, "The Basis for My Control Beliefs," to be the most significant part of my whole case... But since my skeptical control beliefs don't tell me what to think about the specific evidence itself, I'll also examine the biblical evidence in part 2, and then conclude with what I believe today in part 3." (emphasis added, 12)

It seems like it should be too early in the book for the author to have made such a complete blunder. Loftus asserts that his "skeptical control beliefs don't tell (him) what to think about the specific evidence itself," essentially stating that his control beliefs don't control his beliefs about evidence. Either the beliefs control or they don't. This is flagrantly self-contradictory and demonstrates a deep lack of epistemological self-consciousness. This is further exemplified by simply citing the author's own definition of "control beliefs" given later in the book: "Control beliefs are those beliefs that control how we view the evidence... Since how we each look at the evidence is controlled to a large degree by certain control beliefs of ours, I want to know how to justify those control beliefs themselves." (emphasis added, 59)

This error reflects the same problem of non-neutrality mentioned above. Loftus wishes to present himself as objective and neutral regarding the biblical evidence he surveys in part 2 of the book, but this contradicts his stated recognition that control beliefs exert control over other beliefs. Skeptical control beliefs control his view of the biblical evidence; to admit this is to admit that part 2 of the book is entirely question-begging (and little worth reading, therefore). It's either dishonest or naive to recognize the role "control beliefs" or presuppositions play in examining evidence, then to declare the opposite when it is convenient for one's own position.

Loftus then gives us his bona fides as a Christian apologist, having (among other things) earned a Th.M. under William Lane Craig at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in '85. "I was a Christian apologist with the equivalent of a PhD degree in the philosophy of religion, set for the express purpose of defending Christianity from intellectual attacks. I was not afraid of any idea because I was convinced that Christianity was true and could withstand all attacks." (13)

The reader should recognize that Loftus failed in his "express purpose of defending Christianity from intellectual attacks," and is in this very significant respect nothing like "us." He was "convinced that Christianity was true"... until he wasn't. He proved that, in fact, he wasn't just like "us," and no Christian should be tricked by such attempts at short-circuiting our critical thinking with biographical narratives.

Loftus imports many biographical tidbits into his argumentation, attempting subversive persuasion based on his superficial once-Christian credentials. How can I call a Th.M from TEDS a superficial mark of Christianity? Well, quite easily, actually, since, the most significant Christian credential is persevering faith, which Loftus never had, and his Christian readers would do well to keep that in mind. "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us. But they went out, that it might become plain that they all are not of us." (1 Jn 2:19)

Loftus was "a problem teenager" (20), who came to Christianity through a Pentecostal ministry in Ft. Wayne, IN, where his life was "radically changed" (20). Shortly thereafter he was introduced to the evidentialism of Josh McDowell's Evidence That Demands a Verdict, Hal Lindsey's predictive dispensational premillennialism, the pragmatistic presuppositionalism of Francis Schaeffer, and the ubiquitous works of C.S. Lewis. Sounds like a fairly standard 20th century evangelical experience. Loftus is briefly critical of each author and footnotes various criticisms he believes conclusively demonstrate problems with each. Apart from the varied merits (or lack of merits, as would apply) of each theologian mentioned, one could be critical of each and still remain a Christian. In fact, I would recommend it. Of those mentioned, I have benefited most from Schaeffer's work, though I do recognize the validity of Thomas V. Morris' criticisms (as cited by Loftus). So much the worse for Schaeffer's particular methodology and so much the better for mine.

Loftus wants to look at some key initial questions: "...what bias or presumption is the correct one when approaching the Christian faith? None of us sets out to study Christianity without some bias one way or another." (22)

This is a valid and important question for us all, and it appears to recognize the nature of the antithesis mentioned above. Briefly, I will propose that there are only two options: one will approach Christianity either presuming its claims to be true or false. This sounds a bit outlandish at first, doesn’t it? Can’t someone approach Christianity as possibly true or false? This is a very reasonable question.

There is no third option as the result of the all-encompassing nature of the claims of Christianity. The de jure question is not independent of the de facto question. To assume that one is "objectively" judging the claims of Christianity is to assume an autonomy from Christ which contradicts Christianity; meaning that one is assuming that Christianity is false in order to conclude that it is false.

But, if this is the case, musn’t the Christian be guilty of fallacious circular reasoning in assuming the truth of Christianity? For brevity’s sake, I’ll answer this question with an argument from the lesser to the greater by analogy. Imagine you are called upon to prove the existence of space or time to someone who doubts or denies their existence. How would you do it without assuming the existence of space or time? The short answer is, you couldn't. Even more so regarding arguing for the existence of the Creator of space and time.

Loftus mentions that a professor of his "drummed into his students the perfectly reasonable Christian idea that 'all truth is God's truth' - that all truth comes from God whether considered sacred or secular." (23) I take note of this statement because the idea that "all truth is God's truth" is as common as it is misbegotten. While it may have meant one thing when Augustine first said it (in book two of De Doctrina Christiana, "A person who is a good and a true Christian should realize that truth belongs to his Lord, wherever it is found, gathering and acknowledging it even in pagan literature."), it has come to be something of a wax nose today, used to justify any anti-Christian position which one desires to synthesize with biblical Christianity.

We also see in Loftus' quoted statement above an example of inconsistent thinking which is wide-spread in contemporary evangelical worldviews. If all truth really is God's truth then a distinction between sacred and secular makes no sense, since it would clearly follow that all truth is sacred truth. Loftus' sacred-secular dualism was anti-biblical and a philosophical wedge in his thinking, waiting to be driven home, separating him from Christ. Where has dualism crept into your worldview?

Loftus' stated deconversion story begins when he commits adultery with a woman, Linda, with whom he worked in ministry. Immediately, Loftus shifts the blame to Linda, stating that "she had it in for preachers, and she took out her wrath on me... There are mitigating factors here, even if I did do wrong. And I did do wrong. But until you experience something like this you will never understand." (25) Even if he did do wrong? Why must I commit adultery and take no responsibility for it in order to understand that adultery is a sin and the fallout from sin is horrendously undesirable? It requires a hardened, irrational heart to admit guilt and provide self-justification in nearly the same breath.

Loftus even blames God for his sin: "The biggest question of all was why God tested me by allowing her to come into my life when she did if he knew in advance I would fail the test?"(26) Loftus portrays himself as a cosmic victim. However, an even bigger question might be, since Loftus was a highly-educated Christian minister, why hadn't he thought about such matters (God's sovereignty over sin) before this, maybe when he had committed other (albeit less consequentially painful) sins? Finding a biblical answer to questions of this nature is one major step toward apostasy-proofing one's self. Fleeing adultery would be another aid. "Can a man carry fire next to his chest and his clothes not be burned? Or can one walk on hot coals and his feet not be scorched? So is he who goes in to his neighbor's wife; none who touches her will go unpunished." (Pr 6:27-29)

It appears that after the adultery, at a time when resolving marital issues might have wisely been a top priority, Loftus chose rather to investigate the theological implications of the age of the universe, engaging in a correspondence debate with his biochemist cousin. It's hard to imagine a subject which has less to do with repenting from adultery and restoring a gutted marriage than academically investigating the age of the universe for the first time. A word for theologians and students: repentance must always precede research. You cannot move directly from bickering with your spouse or slandering an associate to unrepentantly studying God’s word without consequences on your heart and mind.

Loftus recognized that the biblical pattern for creation "doesn't square with astronomy," (26) as its been most recently formulated and adopts the position that the early chapters of Genesis are myth. He then projects onto the sky various intuitions about what he would do if he created the universe, and "nearly two years later, (he) came to deny the Christian faith." He states that "it required too much intellectual gerrymandering to believe." (27)

For those interested in the age of the universe controversy, see Harvard PhD geologist Kurt Wise's article here. It's a "gerrymandering"-free article, which presents the consistent antithesis between Christianity and unbelief.

It appears that Loftus remained in the pulpit of his church and various other ministries during this period; this was an utter failure of church discipline, which is ultimately a failure of love. It's sad to read a story of such thorough faithlessness on so many levels, involving so many people. He outlines various "he said - she said" situations of small church and broader denominational politics which led to him eventually leaving the church altogether. "I often ask myself why Christians don't seem to act any better than others when they alone claim to have the power, wisdom, and guidance of God right there within them." (30) Intellectually, that sinners (even redeemed ones) still act like sinners is not problematic, but it can produce some of the greatest suffering in life; and sin and suffering combine well to short-circuit reason.

Loftus' story presents a "sincere and honest" picture of apostasy. It shows clearly the irrationality of sin and the inextricable link between moral and theological failure. It is a cautionary tale for all Christians, and the Bible is not silent on matters such as these either. 1 Timothy 1 closes with these words, "This charge I entrust to you, Timothy, my child, in accordance with the prophecies previously made about you, that by them you may wage the good warfare, holding faith and a good conscience. By rejecting this, some have made shipwreck of their faith, among whom are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have handed over to Satan that they may learn not to blaspheme."

By rejecting faith and a good conscience some have made shipwreck of their faith. A characteristic of Christian ministry is waging good warfare, "fighting the good fight." It is a struggle, a battle, a way of life; and the weapons of this good warfare are holding faith and a good conscience. Faith is never an end in itself, it doesn't mean anything by itself. When the NT refers to "faith" it is referring to more than mere belief, because belief in itself is nothing. It is inseparable from its object: Christ. Paul is telling Timothy to hold onto Christ. A "good conscience" is not merely finding peace with one's self by appealing to universal guilt or the specific guilt of others (as Loftus does), but results from a careful, sensitive application of the Gospel to our lives, to our sins. Christ bears our guilt and produces in us a good conscience, so that we can have hope and begin to act like what we are in Him.

Paul goes on and shows the opposite of this good warfare, those who have not kept faith and a good conscience. The rejection, the shipwreck of the faith begins with a certain carelessness or indifference in Christian living and in applying the Gospel to ourselves. It begins with a careless conscience and it ends with a "seared conscience" (1 Tim 4:2). The result of stifling one's conscience produces a moral derailment which more and more eats away at our sensitivity to truth. Violating one's conscience in one way or another undermines our ability to discern true from false, right from wrong, through a process of self-justification (e.g. Loftus' blame-shifting or his sudden desire to investigate the age of the universe, etc.), rather than seeking justification in Christ.

This violation persists until it is as if the conscience were seared with a hot iron, so that one can blaspheme openly and unabashedly in a good conscience (e.g. Loftus' entire book).

Moral and theological decline go together. We need to recognize there is no such thing as a purely theological controversy. And we must not underestimate the centrality of the Gospel in all of life, including our philosophy and apologetics. Moral decay breeds rational decline. “Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling.” (Ps. 2:11)

Limited Atonement?

2010-07-08T22:54:00.000-04:00

An insightful post by Ed Ross over at Christ My Covenant blog.

A Baptist Defends Postmillennialism

2010-05-05T19:00:00.004-04:00

Introduction

Every locus of systematic theology raises questions which can only be answered by an understanding of biblical eschatology, for “eschatology is the crown and capstone of dogmatic theology.”(1) The entire trajectory of biblical revelation and human history is resolved in eschatological conclusions. The Church lives in the time of Christ’s already inaugurated but not yet fully consummated Kingdom. Expectations regarding the nature and timeline of the Kingdom must be biblical, so that the Church may have a correct understanding of her purpose and direction as vicegerents in his Kingdom and members of his Body.

A central point of disagreement among evangelicals respecting the broader realm of eschatology is the “millennial debate” over the timing of Christ’s prophesied second advent. The debate is complex by nature, involving every loci of theology, hermeneutical prioritizing, higher criticism, diachronic and synchronic biblical theology, exegesis of prophetic and apocalyptic literature, theories of progressive revelation, and a philosophy of history. The discussion can be further complicated by the use of somewhat inadequate traditional terminology to delineate the different positions: dispensational premillennialism, historic premillennialism, amillennialism, and postmillennialism.(2)

Survey of Various Positions

In order to obediently fulfill the Great Commission of Christ the King it is necessary to understand the chronology and nature of his Kingdom; these two issues are also of use in distinguishing millennial views from each other.(3) Briefly, the question of chronology has to do with the relationship between the timing of Christ’s second coming and the establishment of his Millennial Kingdom. Premillennialism holds that the second coming precedes the Millennium; post- and amillennialists believe the second coming succeeds the Millennium. The question of the nature of the Kingdom has to do with its historical character. If the Kingdom is expected to be characterized by radically pervasive righteousness then the position is either premillennial or postmillennial; if it is characterized by the nearly parallel growth of good and evil, it is amillennial.(4)

Dispensational Premillennialism

Premillenarians… insist that one general rule of interpretation should be applied to all areas of theology and that prophecy does not require spiritualization any more than other aspects of truth… History is history, not allegory. Facts are facts. Prophesied future events are just what they are prophesied.(5)

At the heart of classical dispensationalism is a hermeneutic of literal interpretation. Applying this hermeneutic to biblical prophecy leads invariably to the complex premillennial eschatological conclusions of the dispensational system. The cataclysmic culmination of history leads into a “Great Tribulation” period of seven years, which believers will narrowly escape when Christ returns part way to earth and raptures the Church.(6) Christ then physically returns after the Tribulation with the saints to establish his millennial kingdom of righteousness, peace and prosperity on earth.(7) This millennial period occupies the time between the two resurrections of Revelation 20, between the second coming of Christ and the final Day of Judgment.

Consistent literalism maintains that God’s two “projects” in history (Israel and the Church) remain entirely separate, Israel inheriting the OT promises of earthly, material blessing and the Church inheriting heavenly, spiritual blessing. The present age of the Church is a parenthesis in redemptive history. The coming of God’s Kingdom has been postponed due to its rejection by rebellious Israel; Gentiles have been allowed to receive God’s blessings, while awaiting the fulfillment of all promises to Israel and the Church in the millennium.(8)

Historic Premillennialism

The literalistic hermeneutic of classical dispensationalism has been challenged and attenuated by so-called “progressive dispensationalists” who have adopted an eschatological view more akin to historic premillennialism.(9) Adherents of the historic position have often sought to distinguish themselves from dispensationalists,(10) adhering to a more holistic view of biblical revelation, while still maintaining a literal reading of Revelation 20 with the millennium intervening between two resurrections. The two premillennial positions actually hold little in common theologically; in fact,

…the only positive features that unify premillennial views ancient and modern are those that dispensational premillennialism affirms as well – a millennial kingdom in which Satan is bound, instituted after the visible coming of Christ, and a partial resurrection of the dead but prior to the Final Judgment.(11)

Historic premillennialists also maintain that the second coming of Christ will be preceded by a period of Great Tribulation on the earth, though without the controversial rapture debates of the dispensationalist framework.

Amillennialism

Amillennialism has been characterized as the “simplest”(12) of the millennial positions. Amillennialists maintain that the millennium of Revelation 20 is symbolic of the present Church Age and that all eschatological events not yet fulfilled will occur contemporaneously with Christ’s return at the end of this age. The millennium is characterized throughout by the parallel growth and struggle between good and evil, the kingdom of darkness and the kingdom of light. This struggle is expected to intensify in a period of persecution just prior to Christ’s Parousia.

Robert Reymond puts it succinctly:

The concept of a millennial reign per se is found only in Revelation 20, a book with extensive symbolism. It is most likely that this Johannine “millennium” should be construed symbolically either of the present spiritual reign of Christians with Christ… or of the present reign of the martyred saints in the intermediate state… or perhaps even both together, rather than be construed literally as an aspect of the Eschaton…(13)

Postmillennialism

Postmillennialism agrees with premillennialism regarding the nature of the millennial kingdom as a time of unprecedented historical glory and righteousness under the reign of King Jesus.(14) Postmillennialism also agrees with amillennialism regarding the chronology of the millennium; the “thousand years” of Revelation 20 precedes the second coming of Christ.(15)

According to postmillennialism, the millennium is characterized by the gradual fulfillment of the Great Commission with the Holy Spirit drawing unprecedented multitudes to Christ through the faithful preaching of the gospel, transforming global society through discipleship; among those converted are the ethnic Israelites who have thus far rejected the Messiah.(16) At the end of the present age there is a brief period of rebellion, after which Christ will return to consummate his Kingdom, there will be a general resurrection, and the final judgment of the just and the unjust will take place. Postmillennialism maintains a gospel-centered, missiologically-driven realistic optimism regarding the future of the present age under the reign of the ascended Christ.

Support for Position

It could be argued that a diachronic view of the corpus of Scripture provides a strong case for postmillennialism, from the protoevangelium (Gen 3:15) through the promises of the Abrahamic covenant (Gen 12, 15, 17) and the Messianic psalms (Ps 2, 22, 110), to the predictions of the Prophets (especially Is 9:6-7; Dan 2:31-35, 44; 7:13-27), as well as Christ’s Kingdom Parables (Matt 13:31-33), the Great Commission (Matt 28:18-20, with its allusion to Dan 7:13-14(17)), the role of ethnic Israel (Rom 9-11), and finally the perpetually controversial millennial passage in Revelation 20. Unfortunately, such an extensive undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper.(18)

Instead, this paper will present an exegetical defense of postmillennialism from 1 Corinthians 15:22-26. If the interpretation here is correct it should be sufficient to establish that only postmillennialism properly apprehends both the biblical chronology and nature of the eschatological millennial kingdom.

For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who belong to Christ. Then comes the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power. For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy to be destroyed is death (1 Cor 15:22-26).(19)

The context of 1 Corinthians 15 is Paul’s response to the question of the validity of bodily resurrection (15:12). Paul provides an eschatological answer, moving from Christ’s resurrection to the telos (“end”).(20) Resurrection is invariably intertwined with Christ’s kingdom reign, since death is an enemy (15:26). The origin of death was sin (“as in Adam all die”) and the deliverance from death is in the Messiah (“in Christ shall all be made alive”). He then gives the eschatological sequence (tagmati) of this deliverance: “each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who belong to Christ.” Christ was resurrected,(21) “then” (epeita) the resurrection “at his coming” of “those who belong to (him),” “then the end” (eita to telos). It is clear from the adverb usage (epeita, eita) that Paul is presenting a chronological sequence of eschatological events.(22)

Paul expands on the meaning of eita to telos by teaching that the “end” (telos) is “when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power.”(23) The “end” is when the kingdom is consummated, not initiated, and Christ reigns from his resurrection “until he has put all his enemies under his feet.” This demonstrates that the kingdom is a reality before it is delivered to God the Father (contradicting the premillennial view of millennial chronology), but it is also delivered after Christ’s reign has brought about the destruction of every rule, authority and power (contradicting the amillennial view of the equal progression of good and evil throughout the interadvental period).

When the connection between 15:24 and 15:25 is analyzed in relation to the remainder of the pericope, the postmillennial interpretation is established. The gar (“for”) of 15:25 “introduces an explanation,” namely, indicating that the kingdom actions of 15:24 are the result of Christ’s “current but ongoing rule.”(24) The chronological key, then, is that Christ’s established reign persists “until he has put all his enemies under his feet” and “the last enemy… is death,” which is “swallowed up in victory” (15:54) at his “coming” (15:23).(25) Christ’s reign is interadvental, because the last enemy defeated before “the end” is death; and his reign is characterized by progressively putting all his enemies under his feet through the fulfillment of the Great Commission, until he has destroyed every rule, authority and power, since this occurs before the kingdom is delivered to God the Father.(26)

The premillennialist will interject that the adverb usage of 15:23-24 allows for the possibility of an intervening period between the “coming” (parousia) of Christ and “the end” (to telos).(27) The semantic range of the terms and grammatical possibility of the interpretation are admitted by all sides.(28) However, Paul’s usage of the term telos precludes such a conclusion, recognizing that telos is never used to refer to an “end period.”(29) Theological presuppositions appear to drive this interpretation, rather than syntactical analyses, since there is no positive exegetical evidence in the passage referring to an intervening period between the present interadvental age and the age to come.(30)

The premillennialist rightly recognizes the nature of the millennial kingdom, that Christ reigns in a kingdom of righteousness, but abstracts this “end period” from the present interadvental age in contradiction to the teaching of Paul in this passage of 1 Corinthians.

The amillennialist agrees with the postmillennial assessment of the premillennial interpretation above. In fact, “optimistic amillennialists”(31) aren’t presented with any difficulty by the above exegesis. Problems arise when some amillennialists insist that the destruction of Christ’s enemies is contemporaneous with the second coming.(32) This clearly contradicts the proper sequential translation of the second o[tan clause in 15:24 and its explanatory link to 15:25, as discussed above. The amillennialist correctly apprehends the biblical chronology regarding the millennial kingdom, but not the biblical testimony regarding its nature.(33)

Objections to Position

Without exaggeration postmillennialism is the most often caricatured eschatological position within professing evangelical circles. From the numerous premature reports of its death, to grossly distorted definitions, the postmillennialism that one reads about in popular works of theology is hardly recognizable by those who consider themselves postmillennialists… Postmillennialism is not liberalism, the social gospel, universalism, perfectionism, or some form of nationalism. Biblical postmillennialism teaches that the kingdom of Christ has been inaugurated and is redemptive, that its supernatural growth is progressive and will lead to worldwide conversion, and, finally, that it will be perfectly consummated only at the Second Coming of Christ.(34)

Apart from the numerous straw men erected in the place of postmillennialism (referred to in the quote above) one of the most common objections to postmillennialism is the imputation of guilt by its historical associations with modern theological liberalism.(35) Guilt-by-association and slippery slope arguments are fallacious and, as such, are unworthy of Christian discourse. It is no less fallacious to point out that premillennialism is invariably the eschatology of anti-Christian cults such as Islam, Mormonism, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, while amillennialism is the doctrine of Roman Catholicism and Neo-Orthodoxy. Such observations only muddy already turbid waters, rather than providing biblical clarity.

Having very briefly pointed out the mistaken or fallacious nature of the most common objections to postmillennialism,(36) we will look at two of the most substantial objections presented to the postmillennial position, one from each respective alternative position.

The majority of premillennial objections to the postmillennial thesis center on the proper interpretation of New Testament prophecies, particularly the parallel passages of the Olivet Discourse and Revelation 20. If the catastrophic events depicted in these passages characterize the circumstances in the intervening period before Christ’s return, then it would appear to rule out the postmillennialist’s optimism regarding the progress of the gospel until the end of human history.(37)

More specifically, Revelation 20 depicts the binding of Satan for one thousand years (to prevent him from continuing to deceive the nations), during which the saints are resurrected and reign with Christ (20:1-6). Satan is then released from his prison and he deceives the nations into going to war with Christ and the saints, where the devil is defeated and cast into eternal torment (20:7-10). These events precede the Final Judgment (20:11-15). This all takes place subsequent to a period of great tribulation (12:1-19:5) and Christ’s intervention in history (19:6-21).

Using a literal, chronologically sequential reading of Revelation the premillennialist draws the conclusion that Christ’s return in Revelation 19 precedes his millennial reign in Revelation 20; hence, pre-millennial.(38) Of particular significance in establishing a literal interpretation of Revelation 20:1-6 is the use of the term anastasis (“resurrection”), which is used to refer to “the elimination of the condition of physical death through bodily resurrection” in every instance of its use in the New Testament (with the single exception of Lk 2:34).(39) Given that the only explicit discussion in Scripture regarding the Millennium is this passage, it would seem that the appropriate interpretation here should carry the most force in the millennial debate, establishing the premillennial position. If the premillennial interpretation of Revelation 20 is correct then postmillennialism is refuted.

As mentioned above, amillennial objections have shifted in recent history from arguments based on specific exegetical matters to general soteriological arguments.(40) The general thrust of the argument is that the Church will suffer persecution on earth throughout her existence as an essential facet of her union with Christ in his sufferings. In effect, “inaugurated eschatology comes across as ‘victory now for the One (Christ) and not yet for the many (the church).’”(41) The nature of the church age is that “over the interadvental period in its entirety, from beginning to end, a fundamental aspect of the church’s existence is ‘suffering with Christ’; nothing, the NT teaches, is more basic to its identity than that.”(42)

Arguments in favor of this view of Christ’s interadvental millennial reign generally appeal to two biblical themes for support: redemptive/retributive irony and perseverance as spiritual victory. From the protoevangelium (Gen 3:15), White presents the case for gospel irony (ultimate victory through apparent defeat) as the paradigm for understanding biblical eschatology:

…the eschatologically significant moral principles by which his enemies would defeat him would end up being the very means by which he defeats them; in addition, the actual results effected by God are the opposite or a greater degree of the results intended by his enemies.(43)

Redemptive irony then entails defining the church’s victory in terms of perseverance through suffering, demonstrating that the church is characterized throughout by persecution, since perseverance through suffering is inherent in victory. As stated above, the church (ironically) overcomes through enduring persecution, just as Christ overcame sin through death. If the amillennialist is correct regarding the nature of the general soteriological principles at work during the kingdom reign of Christ then postmillennialism is refuted.

Defense of Position

B.B. Warfield once remarked (in reference to Revelation 20),

Nothing, indeed, seems to have been more common in all ages of the Church than to frame an eschatological scheme from this passage, imperfectly understood, and then to impose this scheme on the rest of Scripture vi et armis.(44)

The one point of agreement among scholars regarding the interpretation of Revelation appears to be the extreme difficulty of the task. Revelation is arguably the most figurative book in all of Scripture and it is the only place in all of Scripture which associates a “millennium” with the reign of Christ. Premillennialism rests its entire case regarding the chronology of the millennium on a literal interpretation of the most symbolic book in the New Testament.(45)

Significantly, Revelation contains clearly non-symbolic statements regarding the fulfillment of its own prophecies shortly after they have been given.(46) This, when combined with other internal evidence, suggests the plausibility of a partial preterist understanding of Revelation, as well as a pre-70 A.D. date of authorship.(47) The premillennialist’s futurism leaves these pressing time-frame indicator statements unfulfilled for centuries upon centuries. Also, as Luke 2:34 demonstrates, the semantic range of the term anastasij (“resurrection”) allows for its use in reference beyond “physical resurrection” alone.

The entire edifice of premillennialism appears to rest on an unjustified assertion of the necessity of a literal interpretation of an apocalyptically symbolic book. At the very least, the analogy of faith requires that the more complicated passage in Revelation 20 be understood in light of the much clearer statements of passages such as 1 Corinthians 15:22-26, so that a harmony may be found within Scripture. The premillennial eschatology is irreconcilable with Paul’s end time chronology in 1 Corinthians 15, though neither a partial preterist nor a recapitulatory interpretation of Revelation 20 presents any obstacle to finding a unity of New Testament interpretation.

The amillennialist has objected that union with Christ entails the essential, perpetual suffering of the Church. However, the amillennial position in this regard suffers from a subtle equivocation regarding the terms persecution and suffering; for not all suffering is reducible to persecution, and it is only the perpetuity of persecution which contradicts the postmillennial position. The postmillennialist agrees that suffering is central to the identity of the Church, but denies that persecutional suffering must necessarily persist until Christ’s second advent. If persecutional suffering is essential to the identity of the Church, then there has been no Church in North America for many years.

Postmillennialism affirms that any time the Church is persecuted she must persevere and that suffering is central to her identity; it simply denies that persecution is a necessary condition for spiritual victory, especially considering that there will be no persecution in heaven, the place of ultimate spiritual victory. Suffering may be the perpetual result of sin without being persecutional.

Also, the amillennialists cited above appear to use the redemptive irony theme in a selective manner, omitting important facets of gospel irony which can be seen to bolster the postmillennial thesis. The ironic victory of the gospel is also historical and gradually pervasive. Discussing these aspects of gospel irony, Gentry comments:

…the serpent sought to be like the most high, but was brought low – in history. The craftiest creature became the accursed creature – in history. The woman desired to rule her husband, but was ruled by him – in history. Man from the dust wanted to be like God, but was brought back to the dust – in history. The serpent sought the woman as his ally, but she became the mother of the righteous conqueror – in history. The serpent subdued the man, but the man’s son, the Son of Man, subdued the serpent – in history.(48)

However, given the amillennial view of the nature of history it appears that the serpent attempts to destroy the greater part of the human race – and succeeds(!) since God only saves “a remnant” of mankind. This hardly appears to be the irony which God has in mind.(49)

The amillennial conclusions here are based on a rejection of the principle of the gradual pervasiveness of the gospel in history. One more point of gospel irony is that the tiny, severely persecuted Church of the first century will be the tool by which Christ will destroy every rule and authority and power, reigning until he has put all his enemies under his feet (Matt 28:18-20; 1 Cor 15:24-25).

In fact, Matthew organizes the revelation of the kingdom in a surprising and ironic context: In Matthew 12:28 Christ proclaimed the presence of the kingdom (the kingdom is present); in 13:53-58 Matthew records Christ’s rejection (the kingdom appears to fail). Yet between these two kingdom data, the kingdom parables explain the irony of the kingdom’s method: it grows from a small seed to a great plant (13:31-32); it acts like a little yeast leavening the whole (13:33).(50)

The amillennial objections to postmillennialism rest on an equivocation regarding the role of suffering and persecution in the life of the Church and a selective understanding of redemptive irony. While the postmillennialist agrees with the amillennial assessment of the importance of perseverance through suffering in the life of the Church, the postmillennialist sees no warrant for the amillennial view of the nature of the interadvental reign of Christ.

Before concluding, it may be of use to bring into focus a point which appears to have been “lost in the shuffle” of postmillennial polemics, but which may help advance the cause for an evangelical consensus regarding the millennial debate.

Specifically, postmillennialists believe there will be a Satan-led rebellion subsequent to the pervasive reign of Christ on earth (the millennium), but prior to Christ’s return (in accordance with Rev 20:7-8).(51) In this respect, the “judgment coming” of Christ in destroying the Jerusalem temple in A. D. 70 may be viewed as a part of the continuing typological foreshadowing of the final, terrible Day of the Lord, which will only be completely fulfilled at Christ’s second coming. This creates a potential point of agreement on all sides regarding the “already-not yet” character of the interpretation of Revelation and the Olivet Discourse.

Postmillennialism agrees with premillennialism regarding the nature of the millennial kingdom of Christ and agrees with amillennialism regarding the chronology of Christ’s return. Some points of disagreement have been discussed and a case has been presented for viewing postmillennialism as the most biblical view in the millennial debate, combining tempered optimism regarding the future of world history, and an absolute optimism regarding the return of Christ and consummation of his Kingdom.

Notes:

¹ Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1996), 665.

² "These categories, although helpful and widely accepted, are in certain respects unfortunate as the distinctions involve a great deal more than the time of Christ's return." Robert G. Clouse. “Introduction.” In The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, ed. Robert G. Clouse (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 7.

³ This “eschatological sorting device” was adapted from: Jay E. Adams, The Time Is At Hand (Stanley: Timeless Texts, 2004), 8-11.

⁴ Anthony A. Hoekema, The Bible and The Future (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 174.

⁵ John F. Walvoord, The Millennial Kingdom (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1973), 129-130.

⁶ There is an intramural debate among dispensationalists regarding the timing of the rapture, whether it will be pre-tribulational, mid-tribulational or post-tribulational. See Gleason L. Archer, Jr. et al., Three Views on the Rapture (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996). More recently some have also argued in favor of a “pre-wrath” rapture, occurring sometime between the middle and end of the Tribulation. See Marvin J. Rosenthal, The Pre-Wrath Rapture of the Church (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990). Historically, most dispensationalists have favored a pre-tribulational perspective.

⁷ Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 1112-1114.

⁸ Herman A. Hoyt, "Dispensational Premillennialism," in The Meaning of the Millennium, ed. Robert G. Clouse (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977).

⁹ Russell D. Moore, The Kingdom of Christ: The New Evangelical Perspective (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 25-80.

¹⁰ George Eldon Ladd, "Historic Premillennialism," in The Meaning of the Millennium, ed. Robert G. Clouse (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 18-21.

¹¹ Craig A. Blaising, "Premillennialism," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 187.

¹² Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 1109.

¹³ Robert L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 1033.

¹⁴ "The 'reign' that Christ promises to His believers, furthermore, is not a 'spiritual' reign through the church. It is instead a coercive rule over the cosmos (Rev. 5:10)... It would seem therefore that a temporal millennial reign of Christ in the flow of this age's history is part of the messianic hope of Scripture." Russell D. Moore, The Kingdom of Christ: The New Evangelical Perspective (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 64-65.

¹⁵ Some postmillennialists maintain that the "thousand years" refers to a long period of global prosperity in the present age preceding Christ's return; others agree with amillennialists that it refers to the entire era between the two advents.

¹⁶ Keith A. Mathison, Postmillennialism: An Eschatology of Hope (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1999), 10.

¹⁷ Craig L. Blomberg, Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, ed. D.A. Carson, G.K. Beale (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 100.

¹⁸ For a more extensive treatment of relevant passages from a postmillennial perspective see Roderick Campbell, Israel and the New Covenant (Philadephia: P&R Publishing, 1954); Kenneth L. Gentry, He Shall Have Dominion (Tyler: Institute for Christian Economics, 1992).

¹⁹ The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Wheaton: Good News Publishers, 2002), 961.

²⁰ Paul, the archetypal apologist, argues his case evangelistically (15:1-2), scripturally (15:3-4), evidentially (15:5–7), experientially (15:8-11), logically (15:12-19), soteriologically (15:20-22), eschatologically (15:23-27, 51-54), via reductio ad absurdum (29-34), somatologically (15:35-49), and practically (15:58)!

²¹ It is possible that "firstfruits" refers to Christ or (given the nominative case of aparche) a group raised at the time of Christ’s resurrection (Mt 27:52-53). Either interpretation comports with the argument presented in this paper.

²² Walter Bauer, W.F. Arndt, F.W. Gingrich, F.W. Danker, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed, ed. Frederick William Danker (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 295, 361.

²³Note that in the ESV the second hotan of 15:24 with the subjunctive aorist (katargese) is correctly rendered “after,” in accord with BAGD p. 731 (“with the aorist subjunctive, when the action of the subordinate clause precedes that of the main clause”).

²⁴ Darrell L. Bock, "The Son of David and the Saints’ Task: The Hermeneutics of Initial Fulfillment," Bibliotheca Sacra 150, no. 600 (October 1993): 455.

²⁵ Paul's clear allusion to Ps 110 in 15:25 is important, but space limitations prevent a further investigation into the matter. Suffice it to say that, given the pervasive use of Ps 110 by NT authors, a biblical view of the Messianic Kingdom cannot in any instance utterly divorce Ps 110's usage in the NT from Paul's eschatological usage here in 1 Corinthians 15. If this interpretation is correct then the allusion to Ps 110 gives greater support prima facie to the earlier assertion regarding diachronic biblical support for postmillennialism.

²⁶ This view of Pauline eschatology coheres well with the NT eschatological teachings of Jesus and John. See Keith A. Mathison, Postmillennialism: An Eschatology of Hope (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1999), 178-179.

²⁷ "Like the preceding epeita (v. 23), the temporal adverb eita most likely implies an interval of time between the coming of Christ and the end... If epeita, a closely related word can mark an interval of 1900 years in the previous verse, may not eita allow for a 1,000-year interval in verse 24?... Therefore, by "the end" Paul means an end period, which includes Christ's conquest of enemy powers followed by the handing over of the kingdom to the Father... Thus the most probable meaning of eita and to telos in verse 24 lends evidence to a time gap between the coming of Christ and the end, which allows for a millennial reign of Christ, the very kingdom (ten basileian) mentioned in verse 24." D. Edmond Hiebert, "Evidence from 1 Corinthians 15," in A Case for Premillennialism, ed. Donald K. Campbell, Jeffrey L. Townsend (Chicago: Moody Bible Institute, 1992), 230-231.

²⁸ Geerhardus Vos, The Pauline Eschatology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930), 243.

²⁹ Paul uses telos 12 other times, never to indicate an “end period” (Rom 6:21, 22; 10:4; 13:7; 1 Cor 1:8; 10:11; 2 Cor 1:13; 3:13; 11:15; Phil 3:19; 1Th 2:16; 1Tim 1:5).

³⁰ Wallis’ statement can be taken as representative, “Therefore, since there is a sequence clearly marked, the telos cannot be simultaneous with the Parousia. Because the telos is preceded by the destruction of enemies, and the destruction of enemies cannot be put before the Parousia, the telos must stand beyond the Parousia and judgment.” Wilber B. Wallis, "The Problem of an Intermediate Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 18, no. 4 (Fall 1975 ): 231.

The postmillennialist simply asks why the destruction of enemies cannot be put before the Parousia? In context, Wallis gives no argument in support of his assertion. Yet this contradicts what seems to be the most straightforward reading of the passage. In part, Wallis’ interpretation is due to a prior commitment to a pessimistic view of interadvental history which precludes following 1 Corinthians 15:22-26 to its clearest conclusion, while also permitting a particular interpretation of Revelation 20 to be the exegetical boundary marker on this passage, leading to the interjection of an extra millennial period which is entirely alien to the text under discussion. Issues surrounding Revelation 20 will be discussed in the next two sections of this paper.

³¹ Or “nonquantitative postmillennialists.” See Vern S. Poythress, "Currents within Amillennialism," Presbyterion 26, no. 1 (2000): 21-25; "2 Thessalonians 1 Supports Amillennialism," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37, no. 4 (1995): 534.

³² Robert B. Strimple, "Amillennialism," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 109-111; Simon J. Kistemaker, Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1993), 552-553.

³³ In the literature surveyed in researching this paper, it appeared that contemporary amillennialists believed there were sufficient general soteriological reasons for rejecting postmillennialism, without sufficient consideration of the exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15:22-26. Those “general soteriological reasons” will be discussed in the next two sections of this paper; suffice it to say, however, if the interpretation above is correct, no general soteriological reasons will be sufficient to overturn Paul’s teaching in this regard.

³⁴ Keith A. Mathison, "A Summary Case for Postmillennialism," in Thine Is the Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry (Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003), 1, 3.

³⁵ There can be no such thing as a "liberal postmillennialist," by definition. Postmillennialism is the doctrine that Christ will return after the Millennium. No liberal theologian believes in the bodily return of Christ at the close of human history.

³⁶ For a fuller response to common misrepresentations see Greg L. Bahnsen, "The Prima Facie Acceptability of Postmillennialism," The Journal of Christian Reconstruction 3, no. 2 (Winter 1976-77).

³⁷ Craig A. Blaising, "A Premillennial Response to Kenneth L. Gentry Jr," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 73-78.

³⁸ Harold W. Hoehner, "Evidence from Revelation 20," in A Case for Premillenialism, ed. Donald K. Campbell, Jeffrey L. Townsend (Chicago: Moody Press, 1992), 245-250.

³⁹ Craig A. Blaising, "Premillennialism," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 223-224.

⁴⁰ Richard B. Gaffin, Jr, "Theonomy and Eschatology: Reflections on Postmillennialism," in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, ed. Will S. Barker, W. Robert Godfrey (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), 197-226; R. Fowler White, "Agony, Irony, and Victory in Inaugurated Eschatology: Reflections on the Current Amillennial-Postmillennial Debate," Westminster Theological Journal 62, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 161-176.

⁴¹ White, ibid., p. 167.

⁴² Gaffin, ibid., p. 211.

⁴³ White, ibid., p. 170.

⁴⁴ B. B. Warfield, "The Millennium and The Apocalypse," Princeton Theological Review 2 (October 1904): 3.

⁴⁵ John repeatedly interjects explanations for the meanings of various symbols throughout the book, severely undercutting literalistic interpretations, e.g. lampstands represent churches (1:20), eyes represent the Spirit (5:6), incense represents prayers (5:8), a serpent represents Satan (12:9), heads represent mountains (17:9), horns represent kings (17:12), waters represent people (17:15), etc.

⁴⁶ Rev 1:1, 3; 3:10; 22:6, 10. Similar statements were made by Christ during the parallel passages in the Olivet Discourse, cf. Mt 24:34, Lk 21:32, Mk 13:30.

⁴⁷ Gentry, Jr., Kenneth L, Before Jerusalem Fell: Dating the Book of Revelation (San Francisco: Christian Universities Press, 1997). While the scope of this paper precludes further discussion of preterism and higher criticism regarding Revelation’s date of authorship, it is worth noting that a preterist, like the premillennialist, maintains a sequentialist interpretation of Rev 19-20; however, a recapitulatory reading of Rev 19-20 with a post-70 A.D. date of authorship (often held to by amillennialists) does not necessarily preclude the postmillennial view, especially when one considers the parallels between Ps 110 and Rev 19 in light of Ps 110’s use throughout the NT. See: William O. Einwechter, "Psalm 110 and the Postmillennial Hope," in Thine Is the Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry (Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003), 55-59.

⁴⁸ Kenneth L. Gentry Jr., "Agony, Irony, and the Postmillennialist," in Thine Is The Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr (Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003), 98-99.

⁴⁹ The belief that only a remnant of mankind will ultimately be saved explicitly contradicts the definition of "redemptive irony" given by White, as quoted above; namely, "the actual results effected by God are the opposite or a greater degree of the results intended by his enemies." If this is the case then "a greater degree" of mankind must be saved than lost. The postmillennialist recognizes that the discipleship - in history - of the greater degree of mankind carries historical implications for society and culture. See B. B. Warfield, "Jesus Christ the Propitiation for the Whole World," The Expositor 21 (1921): 241-253.

⁵⁰ Gentry, ibid., p. 98.

⁵¹ Kenneth L. Gentry Jr., "A Postmillennial Response to Craig L. Blaising" in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 237.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Adams, Jay E. The Time Is At Hand. Stanley: Timeless Texts, 2004.

Archer Jr., Gleason L, Stanley N. Gundry, Paul D. Feinberg, Douglas J. Moo, Richard R. Reiter. Three Views on the Rapture. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996.

Bauer, Walter, W.F. Arndt, F.W. Gingrich, F.W. Danker. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed. Edited by Frederick William Danker. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1996.

Blomberg, Craig L. Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament. Edited by D.A.

Carson, G.K. Beale. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007.

Campbell, Roderick. Israel and the New Covenant. Philadephia: P&R Publishing, 1954.

Gentry, Jr., Kenneth L. Before Jerusalem Fell: Dating the Book of Revelation. San Francisco: Christian Universities Press, 1997.

_________. He Shall Have Dominion. Tyler: Institute for Christian Economics, 1992.

Grudem, Wayne. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994.

Hoekema, Anthony A. The Bible and The Future. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979.

Kistemaker, Simon J. Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1993.

Mathison, Keith A. Postmillennialism: An Eschatology of Hope. Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1999.

Moore, Russell D. The Kingdom of Christ: The New Evangelical Perspective. Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004.

Reymond, Robert L. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998.

Rosenthal, Marvin J. The Pre-Wrath Rapture of the Church. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990.

The Holy Bible, English Standard Version. Wheaton: Good News Publishers, 2002.

Vos, Geerhardus. The Pauline Eschatology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930.

Walvoord, John F. The Millennial Kingdom. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1973.

Articles

Bahnsen, Greg L. "The Prima Facie Acceptability of Postmillennialism." The Journal of Christian Reconstruction 3, no. 2 (Winter 1976-77).

Blaising, Craig A. "Premillennialism." In Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock, 187. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999.

_________. "A Premillennial Response to Kenneth L. Gentry Jr." In Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock, 73-78. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999.

Bock, Darrell L. "The Son of David and the Saints’ Task: The Hermeneutics of Initial Fulfillment." Bibliotheca Sacra 150, no. 600 (October 1993): 455.

Clouse, Robert G. “Introduction.” In The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, ed. Robert G. Clouse, 7. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977.

Einwechter, William O. "Psalm 110 and the Postmillennial Hope." In Thine Is the Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, 55-59. Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003.

Gaffin, Richard B., Jr. "Theonomy and Eschatology: Reflections on Postmillennialism." Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, ed. Will S. Barker, W. Robert Godfrey, 197-226. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990.

Gentry Jr., Kenneth L. "A Postmillennial Response to Craig L. Blaising." In Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr., 237. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999.

_________. "Agony, Irony, and the Postmillennialist." In Thine Is The Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr, 98-99. Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003.

_________. "A Postmillennial Response to Craig L. Blaising." In Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr., 237. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999.

Hiebert, D. Edmond. "Evidence from 1 Corinthians 15." In A Case for Premillennialism, ed. Donald K.

Campbell, Jeffrey L. Townsend, 230-231. Chicago: Moody Bible Institute, 1992.

Hoehner, Harold W. "Evidence from Revelation 20." In A Case for Premillenialism, ed. Donald K.

Campbell, Jeffrey L. Townsend, 245-250. Chicago: Moody Press, 1992.

Hoyt, Herman A. "Dispensational Premillennialism." In The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, ed. Robert G. Clouse. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977.

Ladd, George Eldon. "Historic Premillennialism." In The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, ed. Robert G. Clouse, 18-21. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977.

Mathison, Keith A. "A Summary Case for Postmillennialism." In Thine Is the Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, 1, 3. Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003.

Poythress, Vern S. "Currents within Amillennialism." Presbyterion 26, no. 1 (2000): 21-25.

_________. "2 Thessalonians 1 Supports Amillennialism." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37, no. 4 (1995): 534.

Strimple, Robert B. "Amillennialism." In Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock, 109-111. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999.

Wallis, Wilber B. "The Problem of an Intermediate Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 18, no. 4 (Fall 1975 ): 231.

Warfield, B. B. "The Millennium and The Apocalypse." Princeton Theological Review 2 (October 1904): 3.

_________. "Jesus Christ the Propitiation for the Whole World." The Expositor 21 (1921): 241-253.

White, R. Fowler. "Agony, Irony, and Victory in Inaugurated Eschatology: Reflections on the Current Amillennial-Postmillennial Debate." Westminster Theological Journal 62, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 161-176.

Bill Craig Curb Stomps Dick Dawkins...

2010-05-02T18:07:00.001-04:00

...philosophically speaking.

A Second Response to Mitch Leblanc

2010-03-19T00:04:00.006-04:00

Mitch Leblanc has responded to my criticisms of his post. I will respond first to what I perceive to be the three most central points of contention. I will then make several responses on other matters; those responses will be my last regarding those matters. If Mitch would like to respond to any of those points then I will grant him the last word on them. I expect any further responses I would make in those areas would be primarily iterative.

So, by way of response on salient points:

Source Citation

1.) One of my central points is that Mitch’s post is academically dishonest. He cites a book which he has not read as though he has read it. For those unfamiliar with academic citations, if you are quoting a primary source which is quoting a secondary source, your citation should read something like:

Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis. P & R Publishing, 1998. 277. As quoted in: Choi, Sean. “The Transcendental Argument.” Reasons for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith. Illustrated. Geisler, Norman L., and Chad V. Meister. Good News Publishers, 2007. 238-243.

Or something to the effect that you are quoting someone else’s quotation. Some might think this is no big deal, but this is one of the myriad ways in which people attempt to “beef up” the academic appearance of less-than-scholarly work. This sort of pseudo-scholarship slips by (particularly at the undergraduate level) all the time, but it doesn’t work when someone is familiar with the source material being cited. Mitch’s silence regarding my accusation in this regard is deafening.

Let me put it this way: if he’s read Bahnsen’s book, why did he choose to use this particular footnote as representative of TAG rather than some portion of the 30 or so pages of primary argumentation on the subject found in the same volume? If he hasn’t read the book (and is only borrowing Choi’s footnote quoting a footnote), why did he cite it as though he had? Either case involves a certain level of dishonesty, in the first case by avoiding the strongest presentation of the position he criticizes or in the second by padding his citations.

Conventionalism

Regarding my very brief rebuttal to his equally brief assertions regarding the validity of logical conventionalism Mitch replied, “This is a claim that is thrown around a lot, and it is a claim that is just simply false. There simply is no problem with logic being conventional, while having its principles be necessarily true. Zao is welcome to either read the literature cited in my paper, the brief treatment here or wait for an upcoming article I’m expecting authored by a logician.”

Mitch makes repeated assertions in this regard, but provides absolutely zero argumentation to demonstrate the soundness of his claims. Instead, he offers footnotes (and we’ve already seen problems with Mitch’s source citation). Since no argument has been presented for these assertions, again, no refutation is necessary... or even possible, really.

However, I would simply point out that the “brief treatment” Mitch links to at no point offers any support for his assertion that logic is both conventional and necessary; only that logic can be conventional and objective. Surely I don’t need to explain the difference between necessary and objective. The quoted author does this while embracing the arbitrariness of logical conventionalism as an epistemic axiom, and averring that epistemic justification reduces to linguistic definitions; the adoption of conventionalism is then a matter of pragmatics, of predisposition. As Mitch put it, “So put, conventionalism is the adoption of a system of justification. Other systems could have been chosen, but weren’t and no justification is required for the choice.” This statement of “conventionalist fideism” hardly substantiates Mitch’s claims for the coherence of logical conventionalism.

If Mitch wants to offer an argument in support of his assertions, I’d be glad to see it. Until then I will view all his assertions regarding the coherence of conventionalism as examples of ipse dixitism.

Circular reasoning and a Euthyphro dilemma analog
There are two problems here which I will attempt to untangle as briefly as possible, without reiterating/quoting the background material:
1.) Frame’s statement (C) is circular, but we have been discussing axiomatic presuppositions, which aren’t justified logically, they’re viewed as self-evident. The reason we’re arguing about them is because it is evident to my self but not to your self. To point out that Frame’s reasoning in justifying his most basic presupposition makes reference to his most basic presupposition hardly counts as criticism; it’s stating the obvious. What’s actually remarkable is that Mitch thinks this is an example of petitio principii, but that his argument-less assertion of the coherence of God-independent logic is not. Either we’re both guilty of begging the question or neither of us is. They’re equally ultimate but opposite presuppositions. Mitch believes logic is independent of God and all of his reasoning will assume this, even his argumentation for it; my position would be the opposite. Now, we can just accuse each other of question begging ad nauseam or we can recognize the nature of the discussion we’re in and attempt to elevate the conversation beyond that. I’ll leave it to Mitch to decide which will be the case.
2.) Mitch seems to think that the statement “God thinks logically” is “obvious(ly) incoherent.” He’s willing to bypass this issue in order to consider what it means to say that God thinks logically. He then conflates logical laws with the reasoning process, stating that thinking logically stands in contradiction to omniscience. Now, if Mitch can’t imagine what it means for God to think logically, he might be more well-served to just ask what it means (or to read some primary sources on Van Tillianism), rather than just speculating and pulling up the first contradiction which comes to mind.

Now, on to the second section of responses. As I said above, the following will be my final statements on the issues raised.

Hybrids

In response to my criticism regarding Mitch’s fictitious hybridization of a priori and conventionalist epistemic justifications for laws of logic he states, “I merely rely on the possibility of a system and that this possibility is enough to make the point I wanted to make.” This, of course, begs the question at hand, given that I have argued that no such hybridization is possible without being clearly reducible to one or the other of the two systems. Instead of offering a case for this hybridization, Mitch offers the classic “argument-from-analogy-minu-argument,” referring to hybrid cars. Unfortunately, it would seem that Mitch is not a Prius mechanic. He doesn’t seem to recognize that, at any given moment, a hybrid car is functioning on one of two distinct power sources: either an electric engine or an internal combustion engine, but never on a single “hybrid” engine. This analogy much better illustrates my point that Mitch’s proposed hybrid would likely be reducible to one of the two distinct systems of epistemic justification, just like a hybrid car’s two power sources.

As I said at the outset, Mitch will need to present even the barest sketch of this “hybrid” system before it’s possibility (much less plausibility) can even be entertained.

Presuppositional semantics

I pointed out that Mitch relies on a formulation of TAG which any contemporary Van Tillian worth his salt would reject as a straw man. By way of response Mitch states, “But what real difference does this make to our discussion? If I’m missing something then I wait to be informed, but it seems to me that even under this view the claim that “Both the truth of P or falisity (sic) of P presupposes Q” will reduce, in our discussion, to the claim that “logic presupposes the existence of God” since I am not denying the existence of logic. In other words, what difference does this make to any of my subsequent criticisms insofar as they pertain to the presuppositionalist ideas I mention?”

Since you are waiting and all, I’m willing to inform you of what you are missing, something which is plainly obvious to the Van Tillians who have taken the time to read your post: you know very little about Van Tillian presuppositionalism. You have read no primary source documents on the subject. You are unfamiliar with the role of presuppositional semantics in presuppositional apologetics. You have conflated implication with presupposition and when confronted about it, you wave your hands and say that it doesn’t make any difference. Well, maybe it doesn’t make any difference... unless, of course, part of the goal in your criticism was to accurately represent the position you have chosen to criticize. If that's not the case, please say so.

Axioms

I stated that the nature of an axiomatic presupposition exerts influence in all other propositional beliefs in a given worldview. I think this is uncontroversial; however, Mitch has taken issue with the idea that a “non-Christian” worldview has “not Christianity” included in its axiomatic presupposition. He believes this to be a deduction from a given axiom, e.g. “Bob the Buddhist’s foundational axiom is ‘Buddhism is true.’” Mitch seems to have forgotten that definitions (especially systematic religious definitions) involve delineation. The statement “Buddhism is true” only implies “Christianity is false” if Buddhism is delineated from Christianity by definition, e.g. the definition of Buddhism includes that Buddhism is “not Christianity.” It’s definitional, not inferential. Far from “rendering the term axiom meaningless” (as Mitch claimed), I simply view the axiom as fully-invested with meaning.

Fristianity

I pointed out to Mitch that the Fristianity objection (created by Van Tillians) leaves only two viable worldviews up for debate as providing the necessary preconditions for intelligibility: Christianity and Fristianity. Mitch replied, “The Fristianity objection, if sound, merely shows that the central claim of presuppositionalism is false. That is, if the Fristianity objection holds then it is false that no non-Christian theistic methods can possibly justify X, Y, Z. This is all I was intending to show.”

The Fristianity objection emphatically does not “merely show that the central claim of presuppositionalism is false” no matter how much Mitch wishes that were the case. That may be “all (he) was intending to show,” but the argument proves too much for Mitch then. The objection leaves only two viable options: Fristianity or Christianity. Besides, if Mitch persists in clinging to conventionalism as the defeater for TAG, then why present the Fristianity objection in the first place? It seems rather superfluous at best in that case. I’d wager that he presented it because he didn’t fully understand its implications.

By way of conclusion, since I’ve repeatedly made reference to reading primary sources on Van Tillian presuppositionalism (which admittedly can make for dense reading at times), let me recommend (to anyone interested) starting with a good introductory work like Pushing the Antithesis by Gary Demar. Of more intermediate use would be Apologetics to the Glory of God by John Frame. And in the advanced camp, go read the man himself: Cornelius Van Til. (Some say that he demonstrates that the incomprehensibility of God is a communicable attribute; however, there’s still very much to be learned from him.)

A Considered Response to Mitchell Leblanc on The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God

2010-02-18T11:02:00.021-05:00

Below you will find a reprint of an article from philosophy student Mitchell Leblanc (of urbanphilosophy.net) making an effort at refuting the classical Van Tillian use of TAG (the Transcendental Argument for the existence of God), with my responses interspersed throughout in italics.

Introduction
Cornelius Van Til set the foundation of an argument for the existence of God that focuses on certain tenets. Van Til believed that (i) everyone has knowledge of God, some just suppress it (ii) Natural theological arguments are ineffective because they do not prove the Christian God uniquely over any other, (iii) we all have presuppositions which either assist or defeat our truth-seeking intentions (all non-Christian presuppositions defeat such intention), (iv) it can be shown that without Christian theism as an adopted worldview, the intelligibility of the world is lost, that one cannot make sense of logic, morality, or science. Van Til’s system became known as presuppositionalism and the modern scholars which have taken up a defence of his position include Greg Bahnsen and John M. Frame.
The most intriguing part of presuppositionalism is the assertion that there is, and only can be, one argument for the existence of the Christian God. With the exception of Frame, presuppositionalists largely reject traditional arguments for the existence of God claiming, as Van Til, that they offer only the mere probability of God’s existence and not the certainty that a Christian requires[2].
As such, Van Til proposed a transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments have origins which trace back to Immanuel Kant and generally take the form of modus tollens:
P
If not-Q then not-P
Therefore, Q
We can find an example of such an argument in Descartes’ Cogito:
I am thinking
If I do not exist, then I am not thinking
Therefore, I exist
The unique purpose of transcendental arguments is in many ways geared towards addressing the skeptic[3]. The arguments begin with a premise with which even the most hardened skeptic will agree and move to show that there is a precondition of that premise which cannot, thereby, be denied. In the above example of Descartes’ Cogito, existing is found to be the necessary precondition of thinking.
In the case of Christian theism, the transcendental argument employed is one which asserts that God is a precondition for the existence, and intelligibility of logic, morality, and science (amongst other things). For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the claim that the existence of the Christian God[4] is a necessary precondition of the existence of logical principles[5]. I will present a formulation of such an argument, but first I would like to clarify what the TAG is asserting.
Throughout presuppositionalist literature is this notion of needing to “account” for logical principles. To be sure to understand what is meant by this, it would be prudent to present an excerpt from presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein[6]:
What are the laws of logic, Dr. Stein, and how are they justified? We’ll still have to answer that question from a materialist standpoint[7]. From a Christian standpoint, we have an answer – obviously they reflect the thinking of God. They are, if you will, a reflection of the way God thinks and expects us to think.
With the argument presented informally, I now introduce a formal version.
The Transcendental Argument Stated:
Sean Choi, in his criticism, offers us the following formulation of the TAG[8]:
(1) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic
(2) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic
(3) Christian theism is true
In support of (2), Choi observes the justification as being:
(2a) It is necessary that: if there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify the laws of logic, then it will be either the a priori way or the a posteriori way or the conventionalist way
(2b) It is necessary that: neither the a priori way nor the a posteriori way nor the conventionalist way will justify the laws of logic
(2c) Therefore, it is necessary that: there is no non-Christian theistic way to justify the laws of logic
Initial Objections
There are a number of criticisms which Choi makes in his paper. He chooses to grant premises (1) and (2a) though with regard to (2a) while he does grant the premise for the sake of argument, he notes that it may be a false trillema. I am inclined to agree with Choi’s analysis. It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an a priori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.

Mitch starts off on the wrong foot immediately by proposing a hypothetical "hybridization" of two positions which is also "unique" to those other positions. So, is it a "hybrid" or is it "unique"?

If there is a non-contradictory way of producing such a system which is not ultimately reducible to one of the non-hybridized positions and provides the justification of logic then Mitch ought to present it, rather than giving some imaginary, contentless alternative as though it were an actual objection. Some arguments need only be repeated in order to be refuted.

Also, Mitch borrows from Sean Choi's understanding of TAG as reducible to modus tollens. However, advances have been made in presuppositionalism which have shown Choi's position to be mistaken. Don Collett has argued effectively (in Revelation and Reason edited by K. Scott Oliphint) that Van Til's conception of presuppositional semantics is identical to the Strawson/Van Fraasen semantics, which makes a clear distinction between "presupposition" and "implication." (Even John Frame has accepted Collett's argumentation in this respect.) If Mitch is unaware of these advances in presuppositional apologetics and its implications regarding TAG, he need only have asked Chris Bolt about them. I happen to know that he's a pleasant fellow, apt to teach, and would have gladly shared this information, helping prevent Mitch from misunderstanding TAG and criticizing his own misunderstandings.

Elsewhere in his presentation[9] Choi presents a criticism of (2b) by outlining the sheer impossibility of a TAG defender showing that every possible a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist way of justifying the laws of logic fail. Of course, the TAG defender may succeed if they show that all defences of either an a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification depend upon a particular claim that can be shown to be false.
Bahnsen seems to think that any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification of the laws of logic is incompatible with Christianity. That is to say, if one is justifying the principles of logic in any of these manners, they are employing tenets rejected by Christianity. In other words, Bahnsen believes that it follows from ‘Christianity is true’ that ‘the a priori way, a posteriori way and the conventionalist way fail to justify the laws of logic’ for if Christianity is true, the laws of logic can only be justified in the manner he presents[10]. By doing so, Bahnsen asserts that non-Christian justifications operate on the presupposition that Christianity is false. As such, in an attempt to avoid the arduous task of showing that all flavours of the aforementioned possible justifications are false (and thereby that any worldviews that employ them are false), he seeks only to show that they all depend upon a particular claim, that ‘Christianity is false’, and that this claim renders everything unintelligible. Clearly, Bahnsen has drawn a dichotomy wherein one either accepts Christianity, or wholly rejects it; no middle ground is possible. As Bahnsen states[11]:
It is absolutely crucial that transcendental argumentation begin by positing that Christian theism is either true or false…. Van Til’s defense of the faith does not require the apologist to be aware of and refute every single variation of unbelieving philosophy, but only the presupposition common to them all (namely, the rejection of Christian theism). Many apologists mistakenly imagine that there are really three options available: one may accept Christianity, reject it, or be “undecided.” But, as Van Til recognized, to be undecided about the claim that Christian theism is the presupposition necessary to make sense out of any reasoning whatsoever is to begin one’s reasoning on the operational assumption that this claim is false (and can be laid aside as one proceeds to research and develop one’s views). Since there are only two options at the most fundamental level – the truth or falsity of Christian theism as a presupposition – the refutation of the unbelieving one (in whatever illustrative variation it appears) is an indirect proof of the other.
But what might this mean for our discussion? If Bahnsen is permitted to carry on with his criteria, then if any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justifications of logic are shown to be false (and subsequently, the worldviews that house and depend on them) all other formulations which properly fall under those headings will also be false (worldviews included) since they employ the same proposition, namely, ‘Christianity is false’. Of course, this is not sound reasoning unless the shared proposition is what is causing the justification to be false. Bahnsen needs to show that ‘Christianity is false’ is the ‘false-making’ proposition of all non-Christian worldviews, and it doesn’t seem that this is possible by any means other than (i) showing that all possible non-Christian justifications will have ‘Christianity is false’ as the only proposition in common (for if there is even one other proposition shared by these worldviews, how might one disqualify that proposition as possibly being the ‘false-maker’?), and (ii) showing that Christianity is not false. The obvious problem is that if (ii) is shown, the TAG becomes superfluous as it is no longer needed; one has already arrived at the truth of Christian theism, and for (i) to be shown, one still has to have an awareness of “every single variation of unbelieving philosophy.”

This was a rather surprising error to me. I would have thought, given that Mitch cites Bahnsen's Van Til's Apologetic (which implies he has read it; see "Note" in paragraph below), that he would see that this objection is far wide of the mark. It is the axiomatic nature of the presupposition "Christianity is false" which puts it in the role of "false-maker" (as Mitch puts it) and this is clear from the quote which Mitch himself uses above. Mitch not-so-carefully diverts from Bahnsen's language of presupposition to that of mere proposition regarding the role of "Christianity is false" in a given worldview. One is left to wonder if this is the result of a superficial familiarity with the material being criticized, incompetence or dishonesty. (I have no good reason to doubt Mitch's competence or honesty.)

If the most basic presupposition of a non-Christian worldview is "not Christianity" (which appears to be definitional, given the above framework), then it is the basic nature of the presupposition which exerts a rational controlling influence on all other worldview content. It is not merely one proposition among many, floating loose and free in a certain worldview, but is rather foundational. To miss this is to miss the entire point of presuppositional semantics in Van Tillian apologetics, which is a rather large point to miss if one desires to criticize presuppositionalism as such.

Mitch rightly recognizes that rebutting one form of non-Christianity does not disprove all other forms of non-Christianity. However, he appears to severely overestimate the number of categories of non-Christian positions. It is finite, which means establishing the transcendental premise via Van Til's project of reductio ad absurdum is empirically possible. (In fact, this is a place where the classical apologetic work of someone like Norman Geisler may be of adaptable worth to the presuppositionalist.)

(Note: Mitch quoted above from Van Til's Apologetic p. 277 (Mitch's note #11). Interestingly, the quotation he cites is taken verbatim from footnote 28 of Sean Choi's chapter on the Transcendental Argument in Reasons for Faith edited by Norman Geisler and Chad V. Meister. In the following sections of his paper Mitch borrows exclusively from Sean's formulation of the "Fristianity" objection to TAG, as found in Reasons for Faith. I would posit that Mitch has not read VTA. Why? When I say that Mitch quoted verbatim from Sean's footnote, I mean he even includes the ellipsis where Sean does. The quote above is actually just a footnote on pg. 277 of VTA; the elided section states: "(see chap. 7 below)". Now what's the significance of this? Well, in the context of Sean's original footnote, he quotes the footnote because he thinks the statements are the closest thing to a defeater for the Fristianity objection which Bahnsen provided and chapter 7 of VTA has nothing to offer in that respect; so why shouldn't Sean leave it out? However, in the context of Mitch's quotation it is presented as a concise summary of Bahnsen's approach to TAG. But chapter 7 of VTA is all about apologetic arguments, including nearly 30 pages explicitly detailing Bahnsen's understanding of TAG. Why does Mitch quote a footnote from a footnote as representative of Bahnsen's presentation of TAG rather than interacting with the more detailed and extensive argumentation in chapter 7 of the same book? Given Mitch's heavy reliance on Sean's work for both his mistaken formulation of TAG as modus tollens and the Fristianity objection, his verbatim quotation from Sean's footnote, his demonstrated general lack of familiarity with presuppositional semantics and transcendental arguments, and his lack of interaction with Bahnsen's most explicit published work on TAG (ch. 7 of VTA), the simplest conclusion is that he hasn't read Bahnsen, he's only read Choi criticizing Bahnsen. Which doesn't count as scholarship. Anywhere.)

Further, Choi rightly points out that this criterion for distinguishing between the Christian worldview and all others is insufficient. He shows the absurdity of the criteria when applied to another worldview, namely, Fristianity[12]. Fristianity is a worldview adopted by Choi, which is identical to Christianity with the exception of the triune godhead, to make the point that the claim that “non-Christian” worldviews cannot account for X is false, since in whichever way Christianity accounted for X, Fristianity would do so in the same manner. The distinguishing feature of Fristianity is that its godhead is a quadrinity rather than a trinity, it is essentially a “Christianity + 1”. Michael Butler, a defender of TAG, has responded to the Fristianity objection by stating that there is no guarantee that Fristianity will be a coherent worldview after it is laid out and thus cannot be an objection to the TAG[13]. Choi’s reply is that this is simply besides the point as the TAG, if successful, should prove that Fristianity will be incoherent outright and that there is no burden on the Fristian to exemplify coherence. Further, in response to Bahnsen’s statement that there can only two worldviews, “the believing one and the unbelieving one”, Choi notes:
…on the same basis the hypothetical Fristian could argue as follows: ‘There are only two worldviews, Fristian theism and the unbelieving one’—which is to say, any worldview that has as its presupposition the rejection of Fristian theism. All the alleged worldviews (and here we would have to include Christian theism) are really just variations on a common presuppositional theme that Fristian theism is false
In other words, we may not simply claim that all worldviews which share a certain proposition are false because some worldviews which share a certain proposition are such. It needs to be shown that the worldviews are false because of the shared proposition. Under Bahnsen’s proposal, an atheist could show one theistic worldview to be incoherent, and reason from this that all theistic worldviews, including Christianity, are incoherent since they all share the same presuppositional theme, that atheism is false. Clearly, an exhaustive examination of possible worldviews is still required if one wants to make the strong claim made in (2b).

Being quite thoroughly familiar with various Fristianity objections, I had to chuckle at this one. I apologize for it, but I did. Let's be perfectly clear here: an atheist can get zero cash value out of the Fristianity objection in debate with a Christian. Are you planning on being baptized in the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit and "Fred" anytime soon, Mitch?

Fristianity doesn't refute the Christian TAG, it merely shows how closely a worldview needs to mirror Christianity in order to provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. If an atheist's positive epistemic resources are so depleted in responding to a Christian apologist that he must fall back onto the Fristianity objection in order to respond to TAG then the Christian need only ask whether or not the atheist would like to become a Fristian or a Christian. If he wishes to adopt neither (and maintain his status as a rational being) then the whole objection is superfluous to the debate. Let me emphasize this point: Fristianity doesn't overturn the TAG for Christianity, but leaves Christianity and Fristianity as the only epistemically viable worldviews, which would seem to be an undesirable argument for an atheist to present, given the extreme similarity between Fristianity and Christianity. While Fristianity does present some intramural issues for discussion regarding the strong modal TAG amongst presuppositionalists, it is of no value to the atheist interloper.

Let me humbly suggest that Mitch should study presuppositionalism qua presuppositionalism before criticizing, rather than merely assimilating various second-order criticisms of presuppositionalism.

The Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God
I would like to call attention to a statement made by Bahnsen in the excerpt taken from his debate regarding the Christian’s justification for logical principles: “From a Christian standpoint, we have an answer – obviously they reflect the thinking of God. They are, if you will, a reflection of the way God thinks and expects us to think.” [14] This is supposed to be the factor that separates Christian worldviews from non-Christian worldviews, but the claim seems rather vague. What does it mean to say that the justification for logical principles is the fact that they reflect the thinking of God?
Michael Martin asks a similar question and formulates a Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God (TANG) which he defended against criticisms from John Frame.[15]
Martin stated[16]:
How might TANG proceed? Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent on God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary–it is contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically necessary. Moreover, if principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them. Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd. How could God arrange matters so that New Zealand is south of China and that New Zealand is not south of it? So, one must conclude that logic is not dependent on God, and, insofar as the Christian world view assumes that logic so dependent, it is false.

Let me just briefly point out that Martin has not presented a "transcendental argument" for anything here. "Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true." This is neither transcendental nor an argument. The remaining section is a reductio ad absurdum, not a TA. Martin has simply used the common atheistic tactic of inverting a theistic argument and calling it something akin to that theistic argument, demonstrating the persistent parasitic nature of much atheistic argumentation. And, as Frame points out below, it is a straw man.

Frame’s response[17] stated that:
Logic is neither above God nor arbitrarily decreed by God. Its ultimate basis is in God’s eternal nature. God is a rational God and necessarily so. Therefore logic is necessary. Human logical systems don’t always reflect God’s logic perfectly. But insofar as they do, they are necessarily true.
Bahnsen and Frame’s defence of the TAG depend upon two claims:
(A) Logical principles (such as the Law of Noncontradiction) exist because God exists and the principles are reflections of his thinking[18]
(B) Logical principles cannot be changed by God as their ultimate basis is in God’s nature, and God is necessarily a rational God.
A Logical Euthyphro Application
In analyzing both (A) and (B) it seems that the famous Euthyphro dilemma can be applied to the TAG, substituting notions of ‘goodness’ for ‘logical principles’. The dilemma could perhaps be expressed as the following: does God think in a certain way because it is logical to do so, or is thinking in a certain way logical because God does it? If the first horn of the dilemma holds it seems clear that logical principles exist independently of God. If the second horn of the dilemma holds logical principles seem to be under the whim of God, meaning that God could change them. A TAG defender might respond by saying that this dilemma is a false one, and advocate similar to Frame that logical principles have their basis in God’s nature and are thus neither external, nor arbitrary. Firstly, this seems to add some confusion: are logical principles based on God’s thinking, or on his nature? Frame’s above statement in response to Michael Martin seems to indicate that both are true: logical principles reflect the thinking of God and the thinking of God has its basis in God’s nature.[19]
Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossible for the nature of God to change. But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:
(C) Based on God’s nature it is logically impossible for God’s nature to be different because God is necessarily a rational God
This does not seem to assist in any regard as what is rational is allegedly determined by God’s nature. So to argue that God’s nature must be the way it is because God is necessarily rational seems to only appeal to a standard of rationality that is separate from God, otherwise it is clearly circular.
In what manner would it be the case that God’s nature was not rational? It does not seem that a God who forms the basis of logical principles and thereby is the standard of rationality can ever be irrational (though he may certainly appear irrational when judged by a foreign standard). That is to say, if one wants to state that the Christian God forms the basis of rationality and the logical principles thereby in effect cannot be anything other than what they are, they must be appealing to a standard of logic that is separate from God’s nature as to appeal solely to God’s nature does not sufficiently answer the question; it is a non-answer.

The problem with Mitch's Euthyphro dilemma is that it is "clearly circular." The Christian's argument is that logical laws are a reflection of God's thought which is in accordance with God's nature, which are all necessary. The first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma then begs the question in asserting that there is a meaningful sense in which logic is independent of the thought of God. But no argument is presented for this non-theistic conception of logic; not even a definition is given. If the Christian is correct, then positing logical principles which exist independently of God is the real "non-answer." Mitch says that it is circular for a Christian to state that God's nature is the ultimate basis for rationality, while assuming that logic is independent of God in order to prove that logic is independent of God. I don't think Mitch has quite yet grasped the radical nature of presuppositional antithesis. But I hope he does.

God and the Abstract
In his TANG, Martin stated that if logical principles depend on God in any way, they lose their logical necessity and become contingent. Frame countered by making the claim that though dependent on God, the principles of logic have their basis in the nature of God and because the nature of God is necessary, so too are the logical principles.
An obvious defeater to Frame’s claim, and subsequently the TAG, would be to show that not only are logical principles not dependent on God, but they cannot be so dependent.
The dependence relationship between “God exists” and “logical principles exist” seems problematic. If God is the source of all things other than himself, and he depends on nothing for his existence, surely the relationship must be asymmetrical (with primacy granted to God), but it appears not to be. It can be shown, in fact, that God depends on logical principles for his existence.
Consider:
(4) Necessarily, x depends on y for its existence iff y were not to exist, neither would x[20]
Lewis’ counterfactual semantics tell us that ‘any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition’. Since “logical principles do not exist” is a necessarily false proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.[21] So it is also true that if logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.
The relationship between the existence of logical principles and the existence of God would be asymmetrical iff God depended on nothing for his being and logical principles depended wholly on him. In this regard, the relationship of dependence is one-way; logical principles depend on God but not vice versa. If dependence is asymmetrical, then logic cannot depend on God as it has been shown that God depends on logic.
The asymmetrical relationship can be depicted further: where P refers to logical principles and Q refers to God. If P depends on Q asymmetrically, then the worlds in which P is true must be a proper subset of the worlds in which Q is true. Since it is the case that the principles of logic hold in every world, and the set of all worlds is not a proper subset of any other set of worlds, the laws of logic cannot depend on anything, including God.
In order to overcome this problem, one could deny the necessary existence of logical principles. This seems antithetical to the presuppositionalist position which seeks to show that the only way to make sense out of logical necessity is through the existence of the Christian God. Indeed, the opposite becomes true; the only way that logical principles can be necessary is if “logical principles depend on God” is false. One could further deny the claim that “God depends on nothing else for his existence”, but this seems incompatible with Christian theism and perhaps even with a more general notion of God.

In this section the argumentation becomes rather muddled. Given the nature of the points under contention (the existence of God and the relationship between God and logic), to argue that "logical principles do not exist" counterfactually implies that God depends on logical principles for his existence is to beg the question in a rather bald and obvious sort of way. How about, "God does not exist" is a necessarily false statement? Given that TAG is intended to argue for the necessary existence of God, to assume the contingency of God's existence upon logic in order to prove God is contingent upon logic is, well, unpersuasive (to put it mildly). Any use of subjunctive conditionals in arguing about the necessity of God's existence will necessarily beg the question, given the nature of necessity. Necessarily. :)

Again, Mitch has simply assumed that logic is independent of God in order to prove the same.

Another possible solution is twofold. One must first accept that abstract objects are the thoughts of God. This is not problematic for the TAG proponent as they have already explicitly stated that this is the case. One must then further embrace the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) and accept that God is identical with each of his attributes and thoughts. Under this view, the statements “God exists” and “Logical principles exist” express the same proposition. This eliminates the problem because any proposition is counterfactually dependent on itself. But it is not clear that DDS is a coherent option[22]. Indeed it is not clear that the principles of logic can be thought to be attributes of God, in any capacity. This problem seems even more severe for the Christian. If the proponent of the TAG attempts to establish the conclusion that the Christian God exists, but has to accept the DDS to do so (as per the above objection) it is unclear as to how they would reconcile the fact that God is identical with his attributes and the belief that he is internally distinct as a Trinity. Indeed, if DDS is coherent, how can there be any distinction whatsoever between God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Spirit? The DDS seems wholly incoherent with Christian theism.

As such, in order to avoid the consequence of conceding that God is not entirely sovereign, one must either (i) deny that logical principles are necessary (ii) deny Christian theism. Both are unacceptable consequences for the proponent of the TAG.

We're then treated to a rather brief, cursory series of assertions regarding the incompatibility of divine simplicity with Trinitarianism and the existence of logic. Frankly, since no argument is presented, no refutation is necessary. All that is demonstrated here is a thorough-going unfamiliarity with the standard works on Trinitarianism and divine simplicity.

The Mind of God
There is yet another respect in which the TAG is vague. It states that the Christian worldview can account for the laws of logic because they have their basis as reflections of God’s thought. Presumably, this means that the reason why the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is the way it is depends on the fact that God cannot avoid thinking in accordance with it due to his nature as logical. Even temporarily disregarding the previous objections, this claim seems dubious. This justification or grounding of the principles of logic does not seem to necessitate any transcendental reference. Consider Bob the Conventionalist[23]; he is a normal human being. Even as a conventionalist, Bob cannot help but think in accordance with the LNC, for how could Bob visualize the effects of a proposition that is both true and false simultaneously? If, as per Bahnsen’s statement, logical principles are reflections of the way God thinks and further if it is true that the LNC exists and holds because God cannot think that p and not-p, surely Bob’s own inability to think that P and not-P fulfills the same justification requirement.
One foreseeable objection is that Bob’s self-grounding does not explain the seeming universality of the LNC. However, it is impossible to think of anyone in existence who could visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC[24] and in this regard the LNC is universally self-grounded.
In the aforementioned debate, Bahnsen criticized conventionalism for being arbitrary and potentially giving way to people with contradictory logical systems. Though it is hard to imagine someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent mechanism. Such a system would be as trivial as a magic eight-ball that answers “yes” to every question[25]. It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions. On pragmatic grounds, it is entirely useless.
One may make the case that Bahnsen has misunderstood conventionalism[26], and one might further make the more interesting point of asking how God accounts for the laws of logic. If it is even possible that God justifies his use of logic in either an a priori, or conventionalist manner[27] premise (2b) of the TAG can be further rejected.
What might it mean to say that God justifies logic in an a priori manner? Bahnsen’s criticisms of an a priori justification can be found in his debate with Stein:
But if you don’t take that approach and want to justify the laws of logic in some a priori fashion, that is apart from experience, something that [Stein] suggests when he says these things are self-verified. Then we can ask why the laws of logic are universal, unchanging, and invariant truths – why they, in fact, apply repeatedly in the realm of contingent experience.
He argues that an a priori justification of the laws of logic does nothing to explain their universality. But, the fact that the laws of logic would be known a priori to be logically necessary does seem to explain the universality in a ‘self-verifying’ manner; they are necessarily true. One might further press to ask why it is the case that they are necessarily true rather than not and one possibility is that they are justifiable in some Platonic manner, existing as brute, primitive facts. In essence, this is presumably how God would view his a priori justification. For God, these logical principles are “just there” even if necessarily “just there”.
It may also be possible that God justifies logical principles conventionally, assuming them for a purpose. One possible objection is that if this is the case, God could have done otherwise (chosen a different convention). It seems that if there are multiple sufficient conventionalist justifications of logical principles, God certainly would possess the capability to select the best possible and employ it on pragmatic grounds.
If these justifications are even possible, then (2b) in its current form becomes demonstrably false. Of course, it may be reworded to state:
(2b*) It is necessary that: no human forms of either a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification will justify the laws of logic
It would be the duty of the TAG proponent to develop an explanation as to why it is either impossible that God justify logical principles in the aforementioned two manners or why a human version of the same justification must necessarily fail.
One might object to (2b*) stating that a divine form of a priori justification or conventionalism would not differ sufficiently from a human form but space does not permit a treatment of this claim here.

Finally, we have a section where logic is said to be both conventional while necessary and universal. This is rather fun. It's like something from Alice in Wonderland. "Sentence first - verdict afterwards!"

Conclusion
Given (i) the initial objections, (ii) the vague and troubled explanations of what it means for God’s nature to be logical, (iii) the lack of asymmetry in the relationship between logical principles and God’s existence, and (iv) the possibility that God accounts for logic with the same justifications criticized by the TAG, it is my proposal that, pending further defence, the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God be considered unsound and unsuccessful in its goal of establishing the existence of the Christian God[28].

My conclusion, in brief: the paper appears to be a scatter-gun reiteration of information found via cursory internet research rather than a responsible familiarity with the standard works on the subject under consideration. While I'm happy to see a bright young philosopher taking an interest in Van Tillian apologetics (even if it is a critical interest), I would recommend doing a far more thorough study of the subject. I might start here. And I might read to understand the matter for myself before attempting to criticize, not vice versa.

Far Away by Lecrae

2010-02-14T16:23:00.002-05:00

Purchase this song on Itunes to donate to Haiti relief.

A Prayer for Muslims

2010-02-13T22:31:00.001-05:00

"Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, who hast made of one blood all nations and hast promised that many shall come from the East and sit down with Abraham in thy kingdom: We pray for thy prodigal children in Muslim lands who are still afar off, that they may be brought nigh by the blood of Christ. Look upon them in pity, because they are ignorant of thy truth.

Take away pride of intellect and blindness of heart, and reveal to them the surpassing beauty and power of thy Son Jesus Christ. Convince them of their sin in rejecting the atonement of the only Savior. Give moral courage to those who love thee, that they may boldly confess thy name.

Hasten the day of religious freedom in Turkey, Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa. Send forth reapers where the harvest is ripe, and faithful plowmen to break furrows in lands still neglected. May the tribes of Africa and Malaysia not fall prey to Islam but be won for Christ. Bless the ministry of healing in every hospital, and the ministry of love at every church and mission. May all Muslim children in mission schools be led to Christ and accept him as their personal Savior.

Strengthen converts, restore backsliders, and give all those who labor among Muslims the tenderness of Christ, so that bruised reeds may become pillars of his church, and smoking flaxwicks burning and shining lights. Make bare thine arm, O God, and show thy power. All our expectation is from thee.

Father, the hour has come; glorify thy Son in the Muslim world, and fulfill through him the prayer of Abraham thy friend, "O, that Ishmael might live before thee." For Jesus’ sake. Amen." -Samuel Zwemer, "Apostle to Islam"

Three Horizons of Matthew 5:17-20

2010-02-06T16:36:00.007-05:00

Matt 5:17 Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. 18 For truly, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law until all is accomplished. 19 Therefore whoever relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever does them and teaches them will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. 20 For I tell you, unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven. (1)

“The theological and canonical ramifications of one’s exegetical conclusions on this pericope are so numerous that discussion becomes freighted with the intricacies of biblical theology. At stake are the relation between the testaments, the place of law in the context of the gospel, and the relation of this pericope to other NT passages that unambiguously affirm that certain parts of the law have been abrogated as obsolete.” (2)

In the opening chapters of Matthew’s gospel (1:1-4:16), the reader is barraged with a flood of Old Testament quotations and allusions which serve to establish Jesus as the Jewish Messiah, the righteous Redeemer of his people. (3) Jesus’ messianic message explicitly echoes the prophetic message of John the Baptist: “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matt 4:17). With Christ’s disciples as the primary audience, Matthew begins his account of Jesus’ ministry with the famous Sermon on the Mount (5:1-7:28), giving the messianic exposition of the nature of the kingdom of heaven and the character of its inhabitants. (4)

The Sermon opens with the “Beatitude” inclusio (set apart in context by the repetition of the phrase “for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” in verses 3 and 10, respectively), declaring the attitudes of those in the kingdom of heaven, which are in stark contrast with the natural expectations and attitudes of sinners. The Beatitudes allude to the blessings pronounced for Mosaic covenant-keepers, (5) the wisdom literature of the Psalms and Proverbs, (6) as well as the prophetic promises of God as the redeemer of His oppressed people. (7) We see here the inauguration of an eschatological kingdom which promises future, eternal blessings as well as present, temporal suffering. These beatitudes prophetically foreshadow the absolute righteousness of Christ’s life (which led to his being persecuted to death), even as they masterfully reveal the progression of righteousness in the life of his disciples, from spiritual bankruptcy (vs. 3) to rejoicing, not merely in spite of, but because of persecution for righteousness’ sake (vs. 12).

It is important to take note of the shift in language from verse 10 to 11. The disciples are first told generally, “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake”; this teaching is then amplified and personalized when Jesus tells them directly, “Blessed are you when others… persecute you… on my account.” This parallel subtly identifies “Christ” and “righteousness,” for persecution because of righteousness is persecution because of Christ. (8) This equation sets the stage for Christ’s amazing declaration in verse 17.

After implicitly identifying himself with righteousness, the Messiah announces his own position in the progress of divine revelation: he came to fulfill, not abolish, all the Law and the Prophets. With these words, Matthew opens another inclusio regarding the relationship of Christ to the Law and Prophets (which does not conclude until chapter 7:12). At the heart of this pericope is righteousness: the righteousness necessary within the kingdom of heaven.

It is important to recognize the canonical location of this teaching, because it is not always easy to discern whether Christ’s teaching is intended primarily for his immediate audience (as they live under the old covenant) or if his statements are intended to have a broader application to the New Covenant era which he was inaugurating. (9) It would seem that these verses play a significant role in the transitional period of revelation in moving from prophetic promise to messianic fulfillment.

The direct contrast in verse 17 is between the two verbs: “abolish” and “fulfill,” with the emphasis being placed on the positive aspect of fulfillment. (10) An unhelpful dualism has crept into many interpretations of this verse, reading “fulfill” as though it has two different senses, one concerning the Law and another regarding the Prophets. Christ is said to fulfill the Law by obeying its commands and to fulfill the Prophets by fulfilling their predictions. (11) However, there are two problems with this interpretation: to “obey” the Law does not contrast with “abolish,” and there is no indication here that Christ is equivocating in his use of the term “fulfill.” It is far more natural to recognize that the whole Old Testament has a prophetic element to it; even the commandments of the Law point forward to the coming Messiah’s ethical reign. Christ doesn’t merely obey the Law; he is the righteous archetype which the holy and good Law foreshadowed. This even implies that without Jesus the Law would, in some sense, be unfulfilled. (12)

Jesus then emphasizes the abiding nature of the Law in verses 18-19, saying that it will not pass away until heaven and earth pass away, that is, until the new heaven and earth are consummated at Christ’s second coming. (13) These verses have produced much controversy regarding the role of the Mosaic Law in the Christian life. One of the most time-honored traditional ways of interpreting this statement of Christ is to adopt the tripartite distinction of moral, civil and ceremonial laws in the Old Testament, arguing that Christ is referring here to the abiding force of the moral law alone, summarized in the Ten Commandments. (14) However, this distinction is not only illogical (for all laws are moral laws by definition), it also contradicts Christ’s statement affirming “not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law,” which would rather obviously include civil and ceremonial iotas and dots.

This statement of Christ is finely attuned to have direct application to both his contemporary Jewish audience and the still-being-inaugurated body of Christian disciples. By identifying himself as righteousness and emphasizing his own role as the one who fulfills the Old Testament, Christ is introducing the fact that he is “the end of the law for righteousness to all who believe” (Rom 10:4). (15) It is not merely that his teaching “intensifies” the commands of the Law while his life fulfills the prophecies of the Prophets, but it is his entire person which fulfills the entire Old Testament. He “fulfills all righteousness” (Matt 3:15). He points to himself through the Law, so that his contemporaries have no warrant for disobeying the Law, while also introducing the authoritative ethical fulfillment found in the kingdom of heaven.

As the King of the kingdom of heaven, he is the Law. Everything he does is inherently good and loving, while everything he says is incomparably prophetic and wise. His every statement and action simultaneously obeys and surpasses the law in righteousness, filling it full to overflowing.

As Priest he puts an end to sacrifices, not by abrogation through divine fiat, but by permanently fulfilling the sacrificial system in his own substitutionary death. Its principles abide still, though the practice has ceased by being gloriously surpassed.

As Prophet he is the pinnacle of revelation. General revelation and special revelation are conjoined in the person and work of Jesus Christ, such that our understanding of all of Scripture and the universe must be filtered through Christ or we will misapply it, to our own detriment. Our understanding of how Christ fulfills the law must be right if we are to be “great,” and not “least,” in the kingdom of heaven (vv. 18-19).

This righteousness is alluded to in the next statement: “Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.” This indicative righteousness comes into greater focus in the imperative of verse 48, “You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.” Between these two statements outlining the absolute, perfect righteousness of the kingdom of heaven are the six “antitheses.” These antitheses (“You have heard it said…, but I tell you…”) are often represented as an “intensification” of the Mosaic Law or rabbinic traditions.

Yet this interpretation misunderstands the preceding statement of Christ regarding his personal fulfillment of the Old Testament while also misrepresenting the nature of the Mosaic Law. The requirements of perfect righteousness and godliness are not something which Christ introduced in the Sermon; they were present in the old covenant as well (Deut 6:5; Lev 19:1-2, 18).

A detailed analysis of the numerous implications of Christ’s personal fulfillment of the Old Testament would go beyond the scope of this paper. However, one fulfillment theme needs to be expounded clearly if we are to properly understand the antitheses, and, more broadly, the ethical relationship between the two testaments of Scripture.

Christ’s fulfillment of the Old Testament introduces a motif of what I will call emphasis inversion between the testaments (a specific aspect of the general “lesser-to-greater” theme in the progress of biblical revelation), whereby the teaching of Christ emphasizes something which was present, but often overshadowed, in the Law. Christ’s fulfillment inverts the emphasis without abolishing the Law.

By way of example, the Law of Moses consisted of six hundred thirteen imperatives written on stone tablets, while the New Covenant Law of Christ is written on hearts of flesh by the Holy Spirit (Jer 31:33; Ezek 36:26; Heb 8). The old covenant emphasized the physical progeny of Abraham, ethnic Israel, as God’s chosen people (Deut 7:6), while the New Covenant emphasizes the spiritual seed of Abraham by faith as those who are truly God’s elect (Gal 3:7). Physical, national, historically-elect Israel typologically foreshadowed the New Covenant reality of spiritual, global, eternally-elect Israel; (16) and it is Christ who fulfills both, “For all the promises of God find their Yes in him” (2 Cor 1:20).

Often in Scripture, physical types of the Old Testament are fulfilled in spiritual antitypes in the New. The spiritual realities were present in the OT, but the emphasis is inverted in the NT, placing the physical elements in the background and bringing what is spiritual to the foreground (Heb 9:23-24). Ethically, the inversion of emphasis from the Old Testament Law to its fulfillment in Christ is a movement from imperative-based to indicative-driven ethics. The Sermon on the Mount contains fifty imperatives in one hundred sentences, but still maintains a thoroughly descriptive tone throughout, using three hundred twenty non-command verbs. (17)

Those who interpret the Sermon on the Mount as simply the moral teaching of “a new kind of rabbi” miss the fact that no one can attain the perfect righteousness required for admission to Christ’s kingdom (Rom 3:10-18). However, to interpret the Sermon as merely the intensification of Old Testament morality equally misses the point. The Sermon is not merely given to display humanity’s sinful inability to obey God’s laws; it does that, but it also simultaneously reveals the redemptive solution to this fallen condition in the perfect righteousness of Christ.

It is his absolute righteousness, as declared on this mount, which leads him inexorably to another mountain, Calvary, where the same perfect righteousness is fully and permanently displayed. It is this perfect righteousness which is imputed to all believers and Christ’s cross is the example of righteousness for all believers. In this way, the indicative of Christ’s righteous love surpasses even the imperative commands to love God and neighbor, not in the sense that the imperative is not binding (it is), but that its fulfillment displays a love greater than the letter of the command could ever convey. The indicative of Christ’s forensic justification of believers provides the necessary condition for imperative exhortations to ethical sanctification, which are often summarized in the statement “Be who you are in Christ.” Put more simply, the basis for ethical behavior is union with Christ. The Sermon reveals humanity’s complete moral inability, displays Christ’s perfect moral righteousness and implies the resolution for the chasm between the two: the Gospel, whereby we become the righteousness of God (2 Cor 5:21).

It is within this larger epochal/canonical context of fulfilled righteousness and prophetic emphasis inversion that the antitheses must be understood. The antitheses do not simply dispel an old law and create a new one; they are a call to see the world as Christ does, to live and love as he does. (18) Even the imperatival statements of the antitheses function within the larger flow of the Sermon as exhortations to righteous living rather than specific, literal commands. If read without consideration to the broader canonical themes surrounding the Sermon, it is easy to understand why so many view the antitheses as merely newer, more intense commandments. While much could be said regarding each antithesis, I will attempt to show that the motif of emphasis inversion aids in gaining a clear understanding of the way in which the antitheses introduce Christ’s fulfillment, and not abolition, of the Law. (19)

The first antithesis shows an inversion of ethical emphasis, in that the solemn act of making sacrifice for sin ought to be interrupted for the sake of immediate reconciliation with an offended brother, alluding to the fact that mercy should be desired over sacrifice (Matt 9:13; 12:7). The hyperbole of the second antithesis regarding eye-plucking and hand-cutting no less shockingly displays the inversion of emphasis from physical adultery to adultery of the heart, moving from the emphasis on external conformity to a focus on internal conviction. It is better to be maimed physically than to suffer forever spiritually. Rather than explicitly forbidding divorce in the third antithesis, Christ explains the heinous character of such an action, while also showing that what is permissible is not always righteous (1 Cor 10:23). He also authoritatively expands the Mosaic divorce laws by declaring remarriage after improper divorce to be adultery. The fourth antithesis emphasizes the absoluteness of the Creator, such that to swear by anything is to implicitly swear by God, making all oaths irreverent oaths and forthrightness the only acceptable pattern of speech. The fifth antithesis brings into view the complex, paradoxical relationship of mercy to justice in the righteousness of the kingdom of heaven (which also finds its ultimate resolution at the Cross), by exhorting disciples not to resist those who are evil and to give liberally to all whom ask. The final antithesis emphasizes the Law of Love, showing that the righteousness of the kingdom of heaven is most clearly viewed in the righteous love of the King, who even shows grace and love toward his enemies. This emphasis displays the counterintuitive nature of supernatural righteousness. Out of this love flows all good things, from sunshine to eternal life, and we are able to obediently join in that love through union with Christ.

The antitheses do not explicitly abrogate any OT commandment, and neither do they merely exposit or intensify them. “What is the dominant note, hinted at in the emphatic, ‘I say to you,’ testified to by the crowds at the conclusion of the Sermon and observed in all the antitheses, is the independent, authoritative teaching of Jesus, which is neither derived from nor explicitly related to the OT.” (20)

Our interpretation of all of Scripture must be performed with an eye to Christ the Final Prophet who fulfills the Prophets and declares the Way, Christ the Righteous King who fulfills the Law and declares the Truth, and Christ the Resurrected High Priest who brings abundant Life out of death. All of our understanding of hermeneutics and its ethical implications are refracted through the crèche, the cross and the crown of Christ who fulfills all revelation and righteousness.

1 The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Wheaton: Good News Publishers, 2002), 810.

2 D.A. Carson, The Expositor's Bible Commentary: Matthew Chapters 1 Through 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995), 141.

3 G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson, Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 1-20.

4 D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones, Studies in the Sermon on the Mount (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976), 18-20.

5 William Hendriksen, Matthew (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1973), 261.

6 Ben Witherington III, Matthew (Macon: Smyth & Helwys Publishing, Inc, 2006), 118.

7 G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson, Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 20.

8 In each case the blessed ones will be persecuted e[neken ("because of") “righteousness” or “me” (Christ).

9 Douglas J. Moo, "The Law of Christ as the Fulfillment of the Law of Moses: A Modified Lutheran View," in Five Views on Law and Gospel, ed. Stanley N. Gundry (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996), 323.

10 R.T. France, Matthew (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985), 114.

11 John Walvoord and Roy B. Zuck, The Bible Knowledge Commentary: New Testament (Colorado Springs: David C. Cook, 1983), 30.

12 William Hendriksen, Matthew (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1973), 288. Douglas J. Moo, The Best in Theology, Volume One, ed. J.I. Packer (Carol Stream: Christianity Today, Inc, 1987), 106.

13 D.A. Carson, The Expositor's Bible Commentary: Matthew Chapters 1 Through 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995), 144. Contrast this with the statement of Christ in Mt 24:35, “Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away.”

14 John Calvin, Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2005), 279-280.

15 Compare the parallel passage in Luke 16, particularly verse 16, “The Law and the Prophets were until John; since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached, and everyone forces his way into it.”

16 John Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing Company, 2002), 317-330.

17 Daniel M. Doriani, The Sermon on the Mount (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing Company, 2006), 8.

18 Daniel M. Doriani, The Sermon on the Mount (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing Company, 2006), 9.

19 For brevity's sake, I will forego any discussion regarding whether the antitheses refer to the Mosaic Law or rabbinic traditions (or both). In any case, if my interpretation of verse seventeen is correct then there is no threat of contradiction even if Christ is referring at any point to the Mosaic Law proper.

20 Douglas J. Moo, The Best in Theology, Volume One, ed. J.I. Packer (Carol Stream: Christianity Today, Inc, 1987), 113.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beale, G. K. and D.A. Carson. Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007.

Calvin, John. Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2005.

Carson, D.A. The Expositor's Bible Commentary: Matthew Chapters 1 Through 12. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995.

Doriani, Daniel M. The Sermon on the Mount. Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing Company, 2006.

Frame, John. The Doctrine of God. Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing Company, 2002.

France, R.T. Matthew. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985.

Hendriksen, William. Matthew. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1973.

Lloyd-Jones, D. Martyn. Studies in the Sermon on the Mount. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976.

Moo, Douglas J. "The Law of Christ as the Fulfillment of the Law of Moses: A Modified Lutheran View." In Five Views on Law and Gospel, ed. Stanley N. Gundry. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996

Moo, Douglas J. The Best in Theology, Volume One. Edited by J.I. Packer. Carol Stream: Christianity Today, Inc, 1987.

The Holy Bible, English Standard Version. Wheaton: Good News Publishers, 2002.

Walvoord, John and Roy B. Zuck. The Bible Knowledge Commentary: New Testament. Colorado Springs: David C. Cook, 1983.

Witherington, Ben, III. Matthew. Macon: Smyth & Helwys Publishing, Inc, 2006.

Empty Selves

2010-02-02T10:23:00.005-05:00

"Finally, it is not just scholars and ministers who will benefit from training in philosophy, but also laypeople who need to be intellectually engaged if our culture is to be effectively reformed. Our churches are unfortunately overly-populated with people whose minds, as Christians, are going to waste. As Malik observed, they may be spiritually regenerate, but their minds have not been converted; they still think like nonbelievers. Despite their Christian commitment, they remain largely empty selves. What is an empty self? An empty self is a person who is passive, sensate, busy and hurried, incapable of developing an interior life. Such a person is inordinately individualistic, infantile and narcissistic.

"Imagine now a church filled with such people. What will be the theological understanding, the evangelistic courage, the cultural penetration of such a church? If the interior life does not really matter all that much, why should one spend the time trying to develop an intellectual, spiritually mature life? If someone is basically passive, he will just not make the effort to read, preferring instead to be entertained. If a person is sensate in orientation, then music, magazines filled with pictures, and visual media in general will be more important than mere words on a page or abstract thoughts. If one is hurried and distracted, one will have little patience for theoretical knowledge and too short an attention span to stay with an idea while it is being carefully developed. And if someone is overly individualistic, infantile and narcissistic, what will that person read, if he reads at all? Books about Christian celebrities, Christian romance novels imitating the worst that the world has to offer, Christian self-help books filled with slogans, simplistic moralizing, lots of stories and pictures, and in adequate diagnoses of the problems facing the reader. What will not be read are books that equip people to develop a well-reasoned, theological understanding of the Christian faith and to assume their role in the broader work of the kingdom of God. Such a church will become impotent to stand against the powerful forces of secularism that threaten to wash away Christian ideas in a flood of thoughtless pluralism and misguided scientism. Such a church will be tempted to measure her success largely in terms of numbers - numbers achieved by cultural accommodation to empty selves. In this way, the church will become her own grave digger; for her means of short-term "success" will turn out in the long run to be the very thing that buries her."

-J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview p. 5

Typography

2010-01-26T19:58:00.000-05:00

Typography from Ronnie Bruce on Vimeo.

Some Thoughts on TAG

2009-12-17T22:36:00.006-05:00

...also known as the Transcendental Argument for the existence of God (TAG). For those unfamiliar, a brief overview of TAs (Transcendental Arguments) by John Frame can be found here. With respect to TAG in particular, quoting Frame:

Traditional apologists have often argued that causality (for example) implies God. A transcendental argument makes a stronger claim: that causality presupposes God. The difference between “implies” and “presupposes,” according to Peter Strawson and Bas Van Fraasen, is that in the latter case God’s existence is implied either by the assertion or the denial of causality. That is, not only does the existence of causality imply the existence of God, but even to deny (intelligibly, if it were possible) the existence of causality would be to invoke a framework of meaning that presupposes God’s existence. Don Collett argues that the Strawson-Van Fraasen kind of presupposition is identical with Van Til’s. So if creation presupposes God, even the denial of creation presupposes him, and the atheist is like the little girl slapping her father while sitting on his lap.

Transcendental arguments are most at home in application against some form of skepticism (though they have other potential applications as well). Essentially, TAG argues that God is the necessary precondition for certain realities to which even the skeptic must grant legitimacy, such as predication (Van Til), the uniformity of nature or absolute laws of logic (Bahnsen), knowledge (James Anderson), morality (Frame), etc. Doug Jones has even presented an informal TA for buying milk, and I've offered one elsewhere based on arithmetic.

TAG presents analogs to the classical deductive modus ponens and modus tollens argument forms, the analog being found in the differences between implication and presupposition, as such (cf. Don Collett "Van Til and Transcendental Arguments" in Revelation and Reason by K. Scott Oliphint). It is one thing to argue that "P implies Q" and an altogether different thing to argue that "P presupposes Q," though the argument form will appear very similar. This similarity has at times led to confusion on the part of skeptics and critics in responding to the TAG.

And criticism for TAG abounds. For a succinct reiteration of Sean Choi's "Fristianity" criticism of Bahnsen's formulation of TAG in the Bahsen-Stein debate, see Mitch Leblanc's article here. Leblanc also reprises Michael Martin's TANG (Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God), which, in my humble opinion, has about as much philosophical value as the corresponding orange-flavored drink has nutritional value (i.e. little-to-none). For further commentary, see the on-going discussions between Leblanc and Chris Bolt of choosinghats.com.

Richard Dawkins' website appears to confuse the presuppositionalists' TAG with Alvin Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" (EAAN). This is understandable, given that the EAAN is a kind of TA, and Richard Dawkins is obviously too "busy" to understand the difference between the two positions, given that he's too busy to debate the world's foremost Christian debater, William Lane Craig. (If the comments section of Dawkins' website is any sort of indicator of contemporary atheistic and skeptical thought then we can expect the TAG and EAAN to continue to be thoroughly misunderstood and misrepresented. It's like asking penguins to study quantum mechanics.)

Christian apologist John Warwick Montgomery argues that TAG is only capable of proving a robust monotheism, but that it is insufficient to prove Christian theism in particular. The Fristianity objection mentioned above questions whether or not a hypothetical "Quadrinity" might be equally as sufficient as the Christian Trinity in providing the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Others have argued that TAG is really a traditional deductive theistic argument, akin to Thomas Aquinas' "Five Ways" or Anselm's Ontological Argument, and subject to similar criticisms (of the kind where presuppositionalists have tended to agree with skeptics).

I see an immense amount of epistemic and apologetic value in the TAG and have gained a great deal of insight from Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, et al. I also think the prevalent criticisms (such as TANG) are pathetic (though the Fristianity objection may require a slight attenuation of the strong modal TAG claims). However, I see one glaring issue with TAs in general and with the TAG in particular. I'm raising this issue in the hopes of progressing and elevating the intramural discussions amongst presuppositionalists regarding TAG, though I recognize that my point (if sound) may provide some amount of apologetic ammunition to the skeptic. (The fact that the issue I'm about to raise hasn't been brought up by anyone on the skeptical side of the discussion is rather telling regarding the superficiality of interaction there, in my opinion.) If my criticism misses the mark, I'd be very glad for someone to point it out clearly to me. In any event, I hope I can contribute in some small way to the "evolution" of presuppositionalism, even if it might only be as cannon fodder.

That being said, it appears to me that the greatest problem with the TAG is that it claims more than it proves. The TAG argues that the metaphysical existence of the Christian God is the necessary precondition for intelligibility, predication, induction, logic, etc. However, even once TAG is granted as valid, this doesn't establish the necessity of the existence of God; it only establishes the necessity of belief in God in order to be consistently rational, scientific, moral, etc. It is enough to make predication, induction, morality, knowledge, etc. possible if we believe that God exists, or even if it looks for all the world as if God exists, but that doesn't mean God actually exists.

There is an often overlooked gap here between belief and reality. In order to bridge the gap, it is necessary then to argue that to coherently believe in the existence of God we must be able to establish whether or not God exists, establishing a knowledge claim regarding the proposition. But this is just a kind of verificationism, by which something is only intelligible if we are able to confirm or disconfirm it. This makes the TAG (and TAs in general) seem rather weak in arguing against skepticism, since it must rest on a kind of verificationism (which could quite very well stand on its own apart from a TA), making it redundant to assert both a verificationist argument and a transcendental argument.

I can rephrase the criticism as a dilemma: if we dispense with the TA's verificationist assumptions then we fall short of refuting skepticism, but if we accept the necessity of verifying God's existence (which is the point of TAG) then the TA is redundant.

I can see a few potential responses to the criticism, but none of them seem too promising with respect to the Van Tillian "transcendental project" as we've known it. I imagine a similar criticism has been raised at some point somewhere, though I haven't seen it yet. (Though I recognize that David Hoover raises some criticisms which dovetail with my own.)

Maybe I'm missing something? Let me know what you think.

Vampires and Werewolves and... Mormons? Oh My!

2009-12-10T18:44:00.003-05:00

Here is a rather astute synopsis and examination of the popular Twilight book/film series, which clearly explicates the Mormon worldview woven throughout the story. Very interesting...

Cheaters, and Tigers, and Idiots; Oh My!

2009-12-04T17:06:00.000-05:00

Cheaters, and Tigers, and Idiots; Oh My! A solid analysis from David Bahnsen on the whole Tiger Woods' Affair affair.

Learning from Matt Chandler

2009-12-02T22:41:00.001-05:00

"What I Am Already Learning From the Situation With Matt Chandler"

Posting Hiatus

2009-09-14T22:05:00.003-04:00

Just to let folks know, I'm currently a full-time husband, full-time father, full-time seminarian and full-time pharmacy technician, which means (for awhile, at least) I will be a zero-time blogger. Lord willing, I'll throw some more thoughts on here around December.

Blessings!
ZT

Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics

2009-08-07T21:06:00.003-04:00

I am currently reading Gospel Centered Hermeneutics by Graeme Goldsworthy for my Biblical Hermeneutics course in seminary (reading ahead when you first get the syllabus is not cheating). :)

Do you have any idea how much Vos and Van Til I had to slog through to reach the sorts of conclusions which Goldsworthy concisely places into the first 90 or so pages of this book? It’s just not fair. Anyone who receives and reads a copy of this book early on in their Christian life should have to read it with one black eye just so those of us who didn’t have it available to us won’t feel quite as disadvantaged. Just kidding.

But seriously, read this book or you deserve a black eye. Chapters 16-18 are individually worth the price of the book. With their powers combined, you will be unstoppable.

If I had to pick, here's my favorite quote:
"To those who say that we need the law first - that is, we need to perceive our problem before we will flee to God for grace, we must reply that such an assertion assumes the ability without grace to understand the law as natural law. The gospel is the clearest explication of the law, both in its perfect fulfillment and in the effects of its being broken." -p.226

Equal Rights

2009-07-26T12:36:00.003-04:00

Sexual orientation presupposes a "sex" which one "orients." In other words, being a homosexual or a heterosexual is first predicated on whether a person is biologically male or female. This is as simple, straightforward and uncontroversial a fact as stating that eating requires a mouth and food.

However, this simple fact presents a massive problem to those who advocate for "homosexual marriage" rights on the basis of an "equal rights" platform. The fact is that a homosexual man and a heterosexual man have equal marriage rights: a homosexual man can marry any woman who will marry him, just like any other man (and vice versa with respect to homosexual women).

This wipes away any argument for "homosexual marriage" legislation based upon equality, and it removes any argument based upon analogy to women's suffrage or the abolition of slavery (since those issues stemmed from human rights being withheld from certain humans based upon biological sexuality or genetic ethnicity).

Now a case for "homosexual marriage" legislation could be based upon other suppositions, and ought to be weighed and considered on the merits of those arguments (though "equal rights" appears to be the most common argument currently). However, the prevailing equal rights assertions and analogies used by advocates of "homosexual marriage" are severely lacking, as demonstrated above. One cannot be a homosexual without first being a man or woman and all men and women in the western world have equal marriage rights.

The next time you hear someone offering an equal rights-based argument for "homosexual marriage," inform them that homosexuals do have equal marriage rights. Then ask them what they think the basis is for granting special "marriage" rights to homosexuals. This will at least give the opportunity for the conversation to advance a bit beyond the general sloganeering of the contemporary debate.

Doug Wilson on Christian Entitlement (aka Sloth)

2009-07-23T08:18:00.001-04:00

Just One More Piglet

Part Deux

Good and Necessary Consequence

2009-07-17T23:40:00.005-04:00

"The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture..." -1647 Westminster Confession of Faith 1:6

"The sum total of God's revelation concerning all things essential to His own glory, and to the salvation and faith and life of men, is either explicitly set down or implicitly contained in the Holy Scripture." -1689 2nd London Baptist Confession of Faith 1:6

There have been a few misologists along the way who have criticized the inclusion of the "implication" or "consequence" clauses in the WCF and 2LBCF (quoted above). An example could be found here, in a sermon by Don Fortner.

In his criticism of the quoted clauses Pastor Fortner states, "If I cannot show you where a thing is stated in Holy Scripture, I have no right to believe it, preach it, or compel you to believe it." Of course, this sentence is nowhere stated in Holy Scripture, but is something which Pastor Fortner deduced by implication (which I would assume he thought was of good, possibly even necessary, consequence) from the statements of Rev. 22:18-19, 2 Tim. 3:16, etc. The irony of the logical gyrations of those who are opposed to logic always makes for good entertainment.

These sorts of statements sound pious at first, because they propose a "high view of Scripture," especially in contrast to "extra-biblical statements," such as creeds, confessions, sermons... pretty much everything else. However, they belie a certain naivete about the actual process of the interpretation of Scripture, which then extends itself into a denial of "good and necessary" things. Like logic, a necessary part of interpretation.

The WCF speaks of deduction by good and necessary consequence from the expressions of Scripture and the 2LBCF speaks of the explicit and implicit statements of Scripture. (I'm going to stipulate that the various terminology used in the two confessions have the same concept at heart here.) What are we to make of these statements?

I think the authors may have meant by the phrase "good and necessary consequence" the simple distinction between the truth of the premises taken from Scripture ("good" interpretation) and the validity (or inductive strength) of the implication ("necessary" inference). However, I may be wrong on this point and would be glad to hear other perspectives on the matter.

If we have a conclusion of a valid argument deduced from true premises taken from the expressions of Scripture, then we can clearly say that this implication is true. Where we run into problems is with invalid (or inductively weak) argument forms or wrong interpretations giving untrue premises. Or the common practice of waving our magic "good and necessary consequence" wand to produce any doctrine which we like or which our favorite Puritan liked, apart from any explicit Scriptural premises or clear argumentation of any kind. In those cases we wind up with doctrines which certain people think are "good," but which are by no means demonstrably "necessary."

Deducing doctrines out of "good and necessary consequence" involves familiarity with valid logical forms (such as modus tollens, modus ponens, etc.) and with the principles of biblical exegesis, so that we can obtain true premises and make valid inferences. Also, a good external check on this process is to use the analogy of faith to determine if a conclusion contradicts a clear, explicit, multiply-attested doctrine of Scripture (i.e. a doctrine with a "strong analogy of faith.")

Some might then propose that deductions of "good and necessary consequence" ought to be placed on a different level than the explicit statements of Scripture with regards to reliability, since these deductions use fallible human logic. This objection suffers from the same naivete which I mentioned above regarding the role of logic in biblical interpretation. Rightly interpreted biblical expressions will entail by valid deduction necessary consequences which are no more and no less true than their premises. How can we posit two separate levels or orders of truth? Is a valid conclusion somehow less true than its true premises?

The problem, as I already alluded to, is not with the concept of "good and necessary consequence" as such, but with its common use (or perhaps I should say abuse) in justifying whatever pet doctrines one prefers without providing any cogent argumentation. Whenever certain traditionally cherished beliefs are called into question in light of a paucity of biblical data in favor of them, the phrase "good and necessary consequence" becomes the escape clause for maintaining one's traditions contra Scriptura.

Since we already have the WCF and 2LBCF in our purview, let's take an example from Covenant Theology. Covenant Theology proposes a framework of three extra-biblical covenants derived by "good and necessary consequence": the eternal, intra-Trinitarian Covenant of Redemption, the Covenant of Works, which is the context for the single Covenant of Grace with its multiple administrations throughout redemptive history (cf. WCF Ch. 7, 2LBCF Ch. 7).

While my familiarity with the literature on Covenant Theology is by no means exhaustive, I have never seen a valid formal argument with true premises presented for any of the three covenants mentioned above (or even an attempt at such argumentation). If anyone can point me to an example of such an argument I'd be grateful.

Most of the literature which I've seen presupposes the doctrines as part of Covenant Theology's confessional framework and interprets Scripture in such a way as to show that it comports with those presuppositions. However, demonstrating that certain (even many) biblical statements can comport with a presupposition is not enough to establish a presupposition as biblical. It must be "explicitly set down or implicitly contained in the Holy Scripture."

And the fact is that when Scripture speaks of the various biblical covenants (plural), it speaks of them as separate covenants with different administrations, not a single, eternal covenant with multiple administrations (cf. Jer. 31, Heb. 8-9). This explicit language of Scripture carries a far stronger analogy of faith than the presupposition of an eternal Covenant of Grace, especially in absence of any demonstration of the doctrine's basis as a "good and necessary consequence."

(It is, in my humble opinion, a very unfortunate thing that an extra-biblical doctrine with dubious deductive validity (and which contradicts a doctrine with a strong, explicit analogy of faith) holds the position of one of the most basic presuppositions in Covenant Theology's theory of redemptive history. It is also unfortunate that the resultant theory of redemptive history then functions as a systematic hermeneutical framework as well, compressing the full-orbed unity and diversity of the biblical covenants into a single covenant. This results in some instances in an implicit Judaizing effect on Covenant Theologians' views of the sacraments, law, ethics and sanctification, emphasizing Moses to the detriment of Christ and creating a forced conception of equivalent, rather than typological, continuity between the covenants.)

Now calling this much-cherished, confessionally-Reformed tradition of the basic presuppositions of Covenant Theology into question will probably be as warmly received in certain circles as up-ending tables in the temple was by those whose livelihood depended on that income. I won't be responding in this post to all the conceivable objections and counter-arguments to what I've presented. I'll leave that to the comments, if anyone takes an interest in such a discussion.

Let me say briefly, however, that I am not advocating Dispensationalism as an alternative to Covenant Theology. With respect to a framework of redemptive history, I would much prefer a modified form of Covenant Theology, something largely akin to what has been called New Covenant Theology, or even the formulations of the 1646 1st London Baptist Confession of Faith, which does not adopt any doctrines of "unnecessary consequence" and appropriately emphasizes the New Covenant and the law of Christ, instead of the old covenant and the law of Moses. Also, the various covenants of Scripture all find points of unity and continuity in that they are all covenants initiated by a holy, gracious, eternal God, rather than being ectypes of an archetypal eternal covenant. Christ is the archetype and his New Covenant is the eternal covenant.

Finally, I do think it is advisable to keep our theories of redemptive history distinct from our hermeneutical systems in as much as this is possible, so that the text might inform our theory rather than the opposite. In this way we can truly affirm Semper Reformanda and solo Christo in the 21st century, in accordance with the eternal Scriptures.

Zen Calvinism

2009-07-17T19:52:00.000-04:00

"So what is Zen-Calvinism? Like the Buddhist movement which shares the same name, Zen-Calvinism is a school of religious thought which allows its adherents to live at one with the world, untroubled in any ultimate sense by the slings and arrows which life throws their way. It is also counter-cultural and thus represents a deeply alternative lifestyle. Let me elaborate a little on this counter-cultural mentality.

At the heart of Zen-Calvinism is the belief that all human beings are morally flawed, unlike the worldviews projected by the celebrity-saturated commercial culture of the modern West...

Zen-Calvinists also accept that they are themselves no better than anyone else; and, understanding their own tendencies to treat everyone else in a less-than-perfect fashion, they will not be surprised when they are repaid in kind. Zen-Calvinists are at one with the depravity of the fallen universe; they expect to be treated as they know they have treated others...

The final element of Zen-Calvinism is perhaps the most important: the realization that all evil has been subverted for the greater good purposes of the God who loves hi church. If the supreme crime of human history – the judicial murder of the very Son of God – can be used for the greatest good, then any other crime, sin or moral failing can also be frustrated and turned to good account. And that applies not just to the loutish and corrupt behaviour of others; it applies supremely to that of the Zen-Calvinist who reflects upon these things..."

http://www.reformation21.org/counterpoints/post-44.php

Argument Against Classical Covenant Theology

2009-07-15T09:52:00.004-04:00

Major Premise: 1. If Covenant Theology is true (A), then its doctrines will be expressed or implied in Scripture (B).

1a. CT contains a doctrine that baptism corresponds directly with circumcision (both being given to infants as signs of the covenant), albeit with minor administrative adjustments (baptizing infant males and females, whereas circumcision was limited to males, etc.).

1b. This doctrine rests heavily on the doctrine that the Abrahamic and the New Covenant are the same, single eternal Covenant of Grace in different administrations.

Minor Premise: 2. Even in the most conspicuous places (Acts 15, Col. 2) Scripture nowhere expresses or implies doctrines (1a) and (1b). (~B)

2a. Scripture presents a typological relationship between circumcision and baptism, where the emphasis on the material type (circumcision) is replaced by the emphasis on the spiritual substance (regeneration) (Col. 2), and baptism is linked to union with Christ (Rom. 6), which is by rebirth, not physical birth.

2b. The “one covenant – multiple administrations” supposition (1b) on which (1a) rests is also in contradiction with the plain teaching of Scripture regarding multiple covenants with multiple respective administrations (Jer. 31, Heb. 8-9), each a progressively-revealed, prophetically-typological shadow of the one, eternal covenant in Christ (the New Covenant).

Conclusion: 3. Therefore (~A) CT is false (or "not true," for the strict logicians out there) by modus tollens.

If A, then B.
Not B.
Therefore Not A.

Triablogue: The noseeum assumption

2009-07-06T10:03:00.000-04:00

Some more interesting thoughts on The Problem of Evil from Steve Hays: Triablogue: The noseeum assumption This post particularly relates to the Inductive Problem of Evil.