A Final Response to Mitch Leblanc on the Argument from Horrific Suffering

I will provide a brief rebuttal to Mitch’s response and grant him the last word in this discussion, if he would like to have it. I’ll put them under different headings to attempt to clarify the issues somewhat, with a quote from Mitch and my response.

Foundationalism

Mitch: “I have noticed a general trend amongst presuppositionalists to not only assume a sort of foundationalist epistemology, but to even assume others are foundationalists! How can I have properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions if I think foundationalism is false? This isn’t an immediately relevant thought, but it’s interesting enough to flag.”

Moi: One can be an anti-foundationalist and still have properly basic beliefs. Mitch may want to familiarize himself with Reformed epistemology and foundherentism in this regard, at least. Both are anti-foundationalist and maintain properly basic beliefs. Maybe Mitch didn’t know this or he doesn’t think it’s pertinent since he doesn’t subscribe to either epistemology. Of course, he offered no alternative, so he’s fallen back on giving biographical information rather than philosophical argumentation. At the risk of seeming brusque, who cares that Mitch thinks foundationalism is false? Philosophers only care about why. I agree with Mitch that his thought is irrelevant in this case.

Question-Begging

Mitch: “If it’s the case that assuming that God does not exist in order to argue that he does is self-contradictory there is a real problem for argumentation in general, as assuming the negation of some proposition to prove that proposition is simply what is meant by “proof via contradiction” or reductio ad absurdum and it would be highly controversial for Zao to claim that instances of reductio are self-contradictory, yet that seems to be his suggestion.”

Moi: I apologize for my lack of clarity here. Assuming ~A in order to prove A is self-contradictory, excluding cases of proof by contradiction. I thought this would have gone without saying, but that appears to be a faulty assumption on my part. However, I don’t see its relevance to the larger discussion, unless Mitch wants to argue that only a proof by contradiction would be a valid way of responding to the Argument from HS. But he hasn’t argued for that and I won’t put words into his mouth.

Mitch: “Further, it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she (sic) does not in analyzing the argument. This seems to entail that nobody who is agnostic with regards to the existence of God could ever analyze the argument, or that agnostics are committed to the claim that God does not exist, which is false. He appears to cite the “Law of Excluded Middle” as justification for this claim, but this seems confused. It may be the case that “God exists” is either true or false but this does not entail that one has to regard it as so.”

Moi: This is a red herring. Unless Mitch would like to defend agnosticism I suggest he keep his comments relevant to the discussion at hand. Otherwise, what third truth category does Mitch propose with reference to the agnostic, since he asserts that one does not have to regard a truth claim as true or false? If he’s going to treat agnosticism as an assertion of ignorance, then this is just more biographical information in lieu of philosophical argumentation (taken from somebody else’s hypothetical biography no less, since Mitch is not an agnostic, last I checked).

Mitch has been given argumentation throughout his discussions with Choosing Hats fellas to the effect that the nature of the question of the existence of the Christian God is so comprehensive that one must epistemically presuppose His existence as true or false in every arena, regardless of one’s psychological status with reference to the question. (See Chris’ recent post on the non-neutrality principle.) He has so far not responded substantially to me in that regard (which is his right); however, until he does responses like “…it’s not clear why one need either assume that God exists or that she (sic) does not in analyzing the argument” will seem disingenuous at best, obfuscatory at worst.

Straw Man

Mitch: “Here, unfortunately, Zao misconstrues the argument. The finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are not people living life simpliciter. They are the people who believe they are in a mutually interactive relationship with God of the sort to which theists commonly attest. This is a stipulative definition and I could have perhaps made it clearer, but this is one example of why I dislike long discussions pertaining to a brief survey article of some argument, there are things which get left out or overlooked that aren’t so left out or overlooked in the primary source. But, moving on, Zao is also mistaken about what it means to “realize one’s deepest good.” If you note premise (1) it’s explicitly defining what it means to realize one’s deepest good, and it means to ever more fully experience the reality of God. The rest of Zao’s response in its current form can be overlooked since it’s simply not relevant. Zao has, perhaps unintentionally, strawmanned the argument from Horrific Suffering.”

Moi: As I admitted, I haven’t read the primary source document for the argument and I agree that Mitch’s stipulative definition might have been clearer (though, as I said before, I think it was a good start). Recognize that I’ve simply stipulated a clearer definition of my own. If Mitch doesn’t like my stipulative definition as much as he likes his stipulative definition, again, so what? He will need to argue for his definition over against mine. Recognize also that my definition is taken from the Bible; if Mitch’s definition doesn’t take this into account, then the Argument from Horrific Suffering was never intended to target the Christian God and I see no point in taking further issue with it if that is, in fact, the case.

As a brief further comment in this respect, Mitch has asserted that the argument proves that no “perfect being”-type God exists, but this assertion rests on a whole mountain of argumentation regarding what is and is not a perfect being which has not been discussed. Mitch would like to sidestep all of this by an appeal to his intuitions and inferences about what a perfect being would be. I would simply posit the questions: Do you really think that you, as an imperfect finite being, can accurately infer the nature of a perfect being? Based on what? Your imperfect, finite thoughts and feelings? Really?

I would posit that such knowledge is impossible apart from the self-revelation of a “perfect being.”

Antitheistic Argument from Horrific Suffering

Chris Bolt and Mitch Leblanc have been carrying on a discussion surrounding J. L. Schellenberg’s Antitheistic Argument from Horrors.  The full exchange (to date) is linked here.  As I’m occasionally wont, I’d like to throw my hat in the ring... now which hat will I choose…

The objective fact of suicide alone would appear to give some validity to Schellenberg’s subject-based definition of Horrific Suffering (HS):

“Horrific Suffering (def.) = that most awe-full form of suffering that gives the victim and/or the perpetrator a prima facie reason to think that his or her life is not worth living.”

Schellenberg’s argument:

(1) Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.

(2) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God.

(3) Necessarily, if God exists, the prevention of horrific suffering does not prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good. (from 1, 2)

(4) Necessarily, if God exists, there is horrific suffering only if its prevention would prevent there being finite persons who realize their deepest good.

(5) Necessarily, if God exists, there is no horrific suffering. (from 3, 4)

(6) There is horrific suffering.

(7) God does not exist (from 5, 6)

Notice the strong modal claims of the first five premises (i.e. “Necessarily, if God exists…).  Admittedly, I have not read Schellenberg’s chapter as of yet, but I would be interested in seeing his argumentation establishing the necessity of these premises.  At the very least it would give us a sketch of the sort of theology being targeted by the argument (while also giving us more than the mere assertion of necessity).  Also, if the necessity of any of the premises can be reasonably denied then the entire argument is overturned.  However, this is only a formal criticism and I’d rather respond more substantially.

It’s difficult to evaluate what is intended by the phrase taken from the first premise: “Finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.”  Mitch has offered his own interpretation for consideration:

“To experience the reality of God, in the context of this argument, is to be in a personal relationship with the creator of the cosmos. A relationship of the type theists mention often. It is a being as aware of the existence of God as a child is aware of his or her loving mother. That such an experience occurs in the ‘ever more fully’ sense is to simply point out that given the infinite complexity of God, there will always be more about God for some finite human person to know. That is, if God exists and is as awesome as theists often claim, it is difficult to see how any finite human person can exhaust the things there are to know about God, or exhaust the feelings there are to be had about God, or exhaust the myriad of forms a personal relationship with her (sic) might take. It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships.  Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals…  I am speaking here of, in many ways, an experience of God that unfolds throughout eternity and is such that, given God’s infinite resourcefulness and creativity, the fruits of which are inexhaustible by the finite human person.”

I like this attempt at definition.  I appreciate an atheist attempting to give a definition which reflects his reading of various theistic claims.  At several points I think it’s quite insightful.  I particularly like this part: “It is indeed doubtful that these things can be exhausted in the context of human-to-human relationships, let alone human-to-divine relationships.  Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons; perhaps we should even expect such a thing given God’s infinite resourcefulness, creativity, and the existence of unique individuals.”

I’ll be referring back to this section of Mitch’s definition shortly, when I attempt to present what I contend is a more biblically faithful way of responding to Schellenberg’s argument.  However, Mitch has already raised the objection that the use of Scripture in this regard is question-begging:

“(Schellenberg’s) argument, however, has as its conclusion that there is no God, so Chris must be careful not to beg the question against the argument by reasoning in a manner that assumes the conclusion false, to show the conclusion false.”

It seems appropriate, then, to respond to this objection before presenting my case.

Mitch contends that one must not assume that God exists (A) in order to disprove the above conclusion that God does not exist (~A).  This, he asserts, is question-begging.  However, for anyone wishing to criticize the conclusion, the alternative is to assume that God does not exist in order to argue that he does.  This is self-contradictory.  We must either assume God exists or God does not exist (A or ~A, Excluded Middle) in presenting our reasoning.  But assuming ~A to prove A is self-contradictory and assuming A to prove ~~A Mitch asserts is question-begging.  

What options remain for the Christian theist?  

1. We can grant that Schellenberg’s argument is completely unassailable; but this entails atheism.
2. We can reject the logical principle of the excluded middle; but this leaves us with many-valued, non-classical logics and the host of truth gap/glut issues surrounding that option.  
3. We can tie ourselves in philosophical knots attempting to assume ~A in order to prove A.  
4. We can reject Mitch’s assertion that assuming A in order to prove ~~A is question-begging in this instance.

I choose (4) for a number of reasons.  I’ve given Mitch one reason for this in the past (see point 1 under “Circular reasoning and a Euthyphro dilemma analog”), namely that there is an equal ultimacy to the criticism; given the comprehensive nature of the question of the Christian God’s existence, Schellenberg’s argument either assumes A or ~A in an effort at proving ~A.  But lest Mitch think this is merely a tu quoque response, I’m attempting to elevate the conversation by recognizing the epistemic role which properly basic beliefs or ultimate presuppositions (call them what you like) play in dealing with issues such as the problem of horrific suffering.  

As R. M. Chisholm recognized in his Theory of Knowledge the “problem of the criterion” (i.e. the relation of metaphysics and epistemology, “What do we know?” and “What are the criteria for knowing?”), as he put it, is the interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology.  The question of “what do we know” (e.g. Does God exist?) cannot be answered in isolation from the question “what are the criteria for knowing” (e.g. How do we know God exists?) and vice versa.  As Chisholm states in The Problem of Criterion, “What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question.  It seems to me that, if we do not recognize this fact, as we should, then it is unseemly for us to try to pretend that it isn’t so.” (p. 37)

So I “courageously” beg the question in favor of Christian theism and Mitch unadmittingly begs the question in favor of antitheism.  What’s to be done to bridge this gap?

Well, until Mitch recognizes this to be the nature of the case he will probably continue to beg ultimate questions while accusing various theists of begging the same questions; and we’ll occasionally remind him about it.  If Mitch does decide to elevate the discussion, we’ll be here waiting.  Until then, he’s begging the question. :)

Another alternative would be to present a transcendental argument of some kind, attempting to demonstrate that even a skeptic’s skepticism presupposes the existence of God or something to that effect.  For examples, email Chris Bolt. :)

With that issue set to one side, I’d like to briefly propose (like a “good Calvinist”) that the biblical doctrine of unconditional election presents an expansion of the definition given by Mitch above, which makes horrific suffering compatible with God’s existence.

(Note: I love little puns like “good Calvinist,” i.e. in order to be a Calvinist one must believe all people are totally depraved morally, so there are only “totally depraved Calvinists,” but if Chris is a consistent Calvinist then he might be described as “good” in that sense.  Good pun, Mitch.)

In Premise 1 we are told “Necessarily, if God exists, finite persons who ever more fully experience the reality of God realize their deepest good.”  Let’s break this down quickly for definitional purposes.  We’ll take “finite persons” to be, well, finite persons.  Finite persons who “ever more fully experience the reality of God” are people living life.  Every day every finite person existing ever more fully experiences the reality of God in various ways and to varying degrees, but every aspect of life is an experience of God in one way or another.  “Realizing their deepest good” means simply that they glorify God; and one may glorify God through either salvation or judgment.

So while Mitch’s definition is good, it is incomplete, as he stated: “…Indeed such an experience of God’s reality might manifest itself in different ways to different persons.”  Indeed, some people may realize their “deepest good” (glorifying God) through horrific suffering under the judgment of God for their sins.  So, given the above definitions, Premise 2 is false since certain persons glorify God most fully by suffering horrifically under judgment for their sins; and preventing that category of people from suffering would prevent them from “realizing their deepest good.”

In fact, it is through the horrific suffering of Jesus Christ that finite persons realize their deepest good by glorifying God through salvation rather than judgment.

A Case Study in Apostasy

I had planned to write a chapter-by-chapter critical review of prominent atheist John Loftus’ book, Why I Am an Atheist; however, upon reading the book I believed that such an analysis was overkill and unnecessary in refuting Loftus’ claims.  Providentially, shortly after I finished reading Loftus’ three books the fellas over at Triablogue released their collaboration, The Infidel Delusion, in response to Loftus, et al.  So I thought my little collection of posts might just be blogospheric white noise in the flurry of responses exchanged.

So I reworked the bit that I had written in response to Loftus as a brief case study in apostasy, viewed from an apologetic perspective.  I hope that some might find it useful in recognizing and avoiding some of the pitfalls which may lead to apostasy.  Some may object that doing a case study in apostasy is too critical or harsh.  They would prefer to speak merely in categories or generalities about such issues.  However, since he believes this chapter contains salient facts related to his cumulative case argument against Christianity, Loftus opens up his experience for critical analysis, which I will cautiously provide.  Ad hominem fallacies will be consciously avoided, since the truth value of Loftus' argumentation should be considered independently from his biographical data. 

They were sad chapters to read, in many ways and for many reasons.  It's always sad to read of the failures of others.  And these chapters were full of failures of many kinds.

Loftus begins the book with a challenge for Christians: "Anyway, Christian, for once in your life, you need to seriously examine your faith.  By virtue of the fact that your faith is something you prefer to be true, you should subject it to critical analysis at least once in your life.  If you laid aside the fact that you think Christianity is true and merely asked yourself if you prefer that it's true, you'll see quite plainly that you do.  How do you know you don't believe what you prefer to be true?" (12)

In the above quote, take out the words "Christian/ity" and replace it with "atheist/atheism."  It makes equal sense.  This is what's called a double-edged criticism.  There's no reason to grant presumptively that any given instance of atheism involves more examination than any given instance of Christianity; this is the author simply projecting his own experience onto his audience.  If the criticism that "beliefs are based on preference" applies to Christianity, it applies equally to atheism, polytheism and fern worship.  Either Loftus' criticism above is valid and he is an atheist because he prefers to believe atheism is true or he's guilty of granting atheism a special status that he doesn't grant to Christianity without providing any argumentation supporting that position.  This is tendentious from the outset; however, no apologist familiar with the non-neutrality principle of covenantal apologetics should be surprised by this (for those unfamiliar read this, particularly pp. 447-448).

The problem is not that Loftus is not neutral in his statements; it's that he thinks he is and he purports to be while he is not.  This is especially worth noting since many of his readers (regardless of their varied theistic commitments) will tend to grant that neutrality is possible, even desirable at times, and that many of Loftus' statements exemplify such neutrality.  But neutrality is impossible; if Christ is Lord of all, nothing is neutral.

"...I consider part 1, "The Basis for My Control Beliefs," to be the most significant part of my whole case...  But since my skeptical control beliefs don't tell me what to think about the specific evidence itself, I'll also examine the biblical evidence in part 2, and then conclude with what I believe today in part 3." (emphasis added, 12)

It seems like it should be too early in the book for the author to have made such a complete blunder.  Loftus asserts that his "skeptical control beliefs don't tell (him) what to think about the specific evidence itself," essentially stating that his control beliefs don't control his beliefs about evidence.  Either the beliefs control or they don't.  This is flagrantly self-contradictory and demonstrates a deep lack of epistemological self-consciousness.  This is further exemplified by simply citing the author's own definition of "control beliefs" given later in the book: "Control beliefs are those beliefs that control how we view the evidence...  Since how we each look at the evidence is controlled to a large degree by certain control beliefs of ours, I want to know how to justify those control beliefs themselves." (emphasis added, 59)

This error reflects the same problem of non-neutrality mentioned above.  Loftus wishes to present himself as objective and neutral regarding the biblical evidence he surveys in part 2 of the book, but this contradicts his stated recognition that control beliefs exert control over other beliefs.  Skeptical control beliefs control his view of the biblical evidence; to admit this is to admit that part 2 of the book is entirely question-begging (and little worth reading, therefore).  It's either dishonest or naive to recognize the role "control beliefs" or presuppositions play in examining evidence, then to declare the opposite when it is convenient for one's own position.

Loftus then gives us his bona fides as a Christian apologist, having (among other things) earned a Th.M. under William Lane Craig at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in '85.  "I was a Christian apologist with the equivalent of a PhD degree in the philosophy of religion, set for the express purpose of defending Christianity from intellectual attacks.  I was not afraid of any idea because I was convinced that Christianity was true and could withstand all attacks." (13)

The reader should recognize that Loftus failed in his "express purpose of defending Christianity from intellectual attacks," and is in this very significant respect nothing like "us."  He was "convinced that Christianity was true"... until he wasn't.  He proved that, in fact, he wasn't just like "us," and no Christian should be tricked by such attempts at short-circuiting our critical thinking with biographical narratives.

Loftus imports many biographical tidbits into his argumentation, attempting subversive persuasion based on his superficial once-Christian credentials.  How can I call a Th.M from TEDS a superficial mark of Christianity?  Well, quite easily, actually, since, the most significant Christian credential is persevering faith, which Loftus never had, and his Christian readers would do well to keep that in mind.  "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us. But they went out, that it might become plain that they all are not of us." (1 Jn 2:19)

Loftus was "a problem teenager" (20), who came to Christianity through a Pentecostal ministry in Ft. Wayne, IN, where his life was "radically changed" (20).  Shortly thereafter he was introduced to the evidentialism of Josh McDowell's Evidence That Demands a Verdict, Hal Lindsey's predictive dispensational premillennialism, the pragmatistic presuppositionalism of Francis Schaeffer, and the ubiquitous works of C.S. Lewis.  Sounds like a fairly standard 20th century evangelical experience.  Loftus is briefly critical of each author and footnotes various criticisms he believes conclusively demonstrate problems with each.  Apart from the varied merits (or lack of merits, as would apply) of each theologian mentioned, one could be critical of each and still remain a Christian.  In fact, I would recommend it.  Of those mentioned, I have benefited most from Schaeffer's work, though I do recognize the validity of Thomas V. Morris' criticisms (as cited by Loftus).  So much the worse for Schaeffer's particular methodology and so much the better for mine.

Loftus wants to look at some key initial questions: "...what bias or presumption is the correct one when approaching the Christian faith?  None of us sets out to study Christianity without some bias one way or another." (22)

This is a valid and important question for us all, and it appears to recognize the nature of the antithesis mentioned above.  Briefly, I will propose that there are only two options: one will approach Christianity either presuming its claims to be true or false.  This sounds a bit outlandish at first, doesn’t it?  Can’t someone approach Christianity as possibly true or false?  This is a very reasonable question.  

There is no third option as the result of the all-encompassing nature of the claims of Christianity.  The de jure question is not independent of the de facto question.  To assume that one is "objectively" judging the claims of Christianity is to assume an autonomy from Christ which contradicts Christianity; meaning that one is assuming that Christianity is false in order to conclude that it is false.

But, if this is the case, musn’t the Christian be guilty of fallacious circular reasoning in assuming the truth of Christianity?  For brevity’s sake, I’ll answer this question with an argument from the lesser to the greater by analogy.  Imagine you are called upon to prove the existence of space or time to someone who doubts or denies their existence.  How would you do it without assuming the existence of space or time?  The short answer is, you couldn't.  Even more so regarding arguing for the existence of the Creator of space and time.

Loftus mentions that a professor of his "drummed into his students the perfectly reasonable Christian idea that 'all truth is God's truth' - that all truth comes from God whether considered sacred or secular." (23)  I take note of this statement because the idea that "all truth is God's truth" is as common as it is misbegotten.  While it may have meant one thing when Augustine first said it (in book two of De Doctrina Christiana, "A person who is a good and a true Christian should realize that truth belongs to his Lord, wherever it is found, gathering and acknowledging it even in pagan literature."), it has come to be something of a wax nose today, used to justify any anti-Christian position which one desires to synthesize with biblical Christianity.  

We also see in Loftus' quoted statement above an example of inconsistent thinking which is wide-spread in contemporary evangelical worldviews.  If all truth really is God's truth then a distinction between sacred and secular makes no sense, since it would clearly follow that all truth is sacred truth.  Loftus' sacred-secular dualism was anti-biblical and a philosophical wedge in his thinking, waiting to be driven home, separating him from Christ.  Where has dualism crept into your worldview?

Loftus' stated deconversion story begins when he commits adultery with a woman, Linda, with whom he worked in ministry.  Immediately, Loftus shifts the blame to Linda, stating that "she had it in for preachers, and she took out her wrath on me...  There are mitigating factors here, even if I did do wrong.  And I did do wrong.  But until you experience something like this you will never understand." (25)  Even if he did do wrong?  Why must I commit adultery and take no responsibility for it in order to understand that adultery is a sin and the fallout from sin is horrendously undesirable?  It requires a hardened, irrational heart to admit guilt and provide self-justification in nearly the same breath.

Loftus even blames God for his sin: "The biggest question of all was why God tested me by allowing her to come into my life when she did if he knew in advance I would fail the test?"(26)  Loftus portrays himself as a cosmic victim.  However, an even bigger question might be, since  Loftus was a highly-educated Christian minister, why hadn't he thought about such matters (God's sovereignty over sin) before this, maybe when he had committed other (albeit less consequentially painful) sins?  Finding a biblical answer to questions of this nature is one major step toward apostasy-proofing one's self.  Fleeing adultery would be another aid.  "Can a man carry fire next to his chest and his clothes not be burned? Or can one walk on hot coals and his feet not be scorched? So is he who goes in to his neighbor's wife; none who touches her will go unpunished." (Pr 6:27-29)

It appears that after the adultery, at a time when resolving marital issues might have wisely been a top priority, Loftus chose rather to investigate the theological implications of the age of the universe, engaging in a correspondence debate with his biochemist cousin.  It's hard to imagine a subject which has less to do with repenting from adultery and restoring a gutted marriage than academically investigating the age of the universe for the first time.  A word for theologians and students: repentance must always precede research.  You cannot move directly from bickering with your spouse or slandering an associate to unrepentantly studying God’s word without consequences on your heart and mind.

Loftus recognized that the biblical pattern for creation "doesn't square with astronomy," (26) as its been most recently formulated and adopts the position that the early chapters of Genesis are myth.  He then projects onto the sky various intuitions about what he would do if he created the universe, and "nearly two years later, (he) came to deny the Christian faith."  He states that "it required too much intellectual gerrymandering to believe." (27)

For those interested in the age of the universe controversy, see Harvard PhD geologist Kurt Wise's article here.  It's a "gerrymandering"-free article, which presents the consistent antithesis between Christianity and unbelief.

It appears that Loftus remained in the pulpit of his church and various other ministries during this period; this was an utter failure of church discipline, which is ultimately a failure of love.  It's sad to read a story of such thorough faithlessness on so many levels, involving so many people.  He outlines various "he said - she said" situations of small church and broader denominational politics which led to him eventually leaving the church altogether.  "I often ask myself why Christians don't seem to act any better than others when they alone claim to have the power, wisdom, and guidance of God right there within them." (30)  Intellectually, that sinners (even redeemed ones) still act like sinners is not problematic, but it can produce some of the greatest suffering in life; and sin and suffering combine well to short-circuit reason.

Loftus' story presents a "sincere and honest" picture of apostasy.  It shows clearly the irrationality of sin and the inextricable link between moral and theological failure.  It is a cautionary tale for all Christians, and the Bible is not silent on matters such as these either.  1 Timothy 1 closes with these words, "This charge I entrust to you, Timothy, my child, in accordance with the prophecies previously made about you, that by them you may wage the good warfare, holding faith and a good conscience. By rejecting this, some have made shipwreck of their faith, among whom are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have handed over to Satan that they may learn not to blaspheme."

By rejecting faith and a good conscience some have made shipwreck of their faith.  A characteristic of Christian ministry is waging good warfare, "fighting the good fight."  It is a struggle, a battle, a way of life; and the weapons of this good warfare are holding faith and a good conscience.  Faith is never an end in itself, it doesn't mean anything by itself.  When the NT refers to "faith" it is referring to more than mere belief, because belief in itself is nothing.  It is inseparable from its object: Christ.  Paul is telling Timothy to hold onto Christ.  A "good conscience" is not merely finding peace with one's self by appealing to universal guilt or the specific guilt of others (as Loftus does), but results from a careful, sensitive application of the Gospel to our lives, to our sins.  Christ bears our guilt and produces in us a good conscience, so that we can have hope and begin to act like what we are in Him.

Paul goes on and shows the opposite of this good warfare, those who have not kept faith and a good conscience.  The rejection, the shipwreck of the faith begins with a certain carelessness or indifference in Christian living and in applying the Gospel to ourselves.  It begins with a careless conscience and it ends with a "seared conscience" (1 Tim 4:2).  The result of stifling one's conscience produces a moral derailment which more and more eats away at our sensitivity to truth.  Violating one's conscience in one way or another undermines our ability to discern true from false, right from wrong, through a process of self-justification (e.g. Loftus' blame-shifting or his sudden desire to investigate the age of the universe, etc.), rather than seeking justification in Christ.  

This violation persists until it is as if the conscience were seared with a hot iron, so that one can blaspheme openly and unabashedly in a good conscience (e.g. Loftus' entire book).

Moral and theological decline go together.  We need to recognize there is no such thing as a purely theological controversy.  And we must not underestimate the centrality of the Gospel in all of life, including our philosophy and apologetics.  Moral decay breeds rational decline.  “Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling.” (Ps. 2:11)

Limited Atonement?

An insightful post by Ed Ross over at Christ My Covenant blog.

A Baptist Defends Postmillennialism

Introduction

Every locus of systematic theology raises questions which can only be answered by an understanding of biblical eschatology, for “eschatology is the crown and capstone of dogmatic theology.”(1)  The entire trajectory of biblical revelation and human history is resolved in eschatological conclusions. The Church lives in the time of Christ’s already inaugurated but not yet fully consummated Kingdom. Expectations regarding the nature and timeline of the Kingdom must be biblical, so that the Church may have a correct understanding of her purpose and direction as vicegerents in his Kingdom and members of his Body.

A central point of disagreement among evangelicals respecting the broader realm of eschatology is the “millennial debate” over the timing of Christ’s prophesied second advent. The debate is complex by nature, involving every loci of theology, hermeneutical prioritizing, higher criticism, diachronic and synchronic biblical theology, exegesis of prophetic and apocalyptic literature, theories of progressive revelation, and a philosophy of history. The discussion can be further complicated by the use of somewhat inadequate traditional terminology to delineate the different positions: dispensational premillennialism, historic premillennialism, amillennialism, and postmillennialism.(2)

Survey of Various Positions

In order to obediently fulfill the Great Commission of Christ the King it is necessary to understand the chronology and nature of his Kingdom; these two issues are also of use in distinguishing millennial views from each other.(3)  Briefly, the question of chronology has to do with the relationship between the timing of Christ’s second coming and the establishment of his Millennial Kingdom. Premillennialism holds that the second coming precedes the Millennium; post- and amillennialists believe the second coming succeeds the Millennium. The question of the nature of the Kingdom has to do with its historical character. If the Kingdom is expected to be characterized by radically pervasive righteousness then the position is either premillennial or postmillennial; if it is characterized by the nearly parallel growth of good and evil, it is amillennial.(4)

Dispensational Premillennialism

Premillenarians… insist that one general rule of interpretation should be applied to all areas of theology and that prophecy does not require spiritualization any more than other aspects of truth… History is history, not allegory. Facts are facts. Prophesied future events are just what they are prophesied.(5)

At the heart of classical dispensationalism is a hermeneutic of literal interpretation. Applying this hermeneutic to biblical prophecy leads invariably to the complex premillennial eschatological conclusions of the dispensational system. The cataclysmic culmination of history leads into a “Great Tribulation” period of seven years, which believers will narrowly escape when Christ returns part way to earth and raptures the Church.(6)  Christ then physically returns after the Tribulation with the saints to establish his millennial kingdom of righteousness, peace and prosperity on earth.(7)  This millennial period occupies the time between the two resurrections of Revelation 20, between the second coming of Christ and the final Day of Judgment.

Consistent literalism maintains that God’s two “projects” in history (Israel and the Church) remain entirely separate, Israel inheriting the OT promises of earthly, material blessing and the Church inheriting heavenly, spiritual blessing. The present age of the Church is a parenthesis in redemptive history. The coming of God’s Kingdom has been postponed due to its rejection by rebellious Israel; Gentiles have been allowed to receive God’s blessings, while awaiting the fulfillment of all promises to Israel and the Church in the millennium.(8)

Historic Premillennialism

The literalistic hermeneutic of classical dispensationalism has been challenged and attenuated by so-called “progressive dispensationalists” who have adopted an eschatological view more akin to historic premillennialism.(9)  Adherents of the historic position have often sought to distinguish themselves from dispensationalists,(10) adhering to a more holistic view of biblical revelation, while still maintaining a literal reading of Revelation 20 with the millennium intervening between two resurrections. The two premillennial positions actually hold little in common theologically; in fact,

…the only positive features that unify premillennial views ancient and modern are those that dispensational premillennialism affirms as well – a millennial kingdom in which Satan is bound, instituted after the visible coming of Christ, and a partial resurrection of the dead but prior to the Final Judgment.(11)

Historic premillennialists also maintain that the second coming of Christ will be preceded by a period of Great Tribulation on the earth, though without the controversial rapture debates of the dispensationalist framework.

Amillennialism

Amillennialism has been characterized as the “simplest”(12) of the millennial positions. Amillennialists maintain that the millennium of Revelation 20 is symbolic of the present Church Age and that all eschatological events not yet fulfilled will occur contemporaneously with Christ’s return at the end of this age. The millennium is characterized throughout by the parallel growth and struggle between good and evil, the kingdom of darkness and the kingdom of light. This struggle is expected to intensify in a period of persecution just prior to Christ’s Parousia.

Robert Reymond puts it succinctly:

The concept of a millennial reign per se is found only in Revelation 20, a book with extensive symbolism. It is most likely that this Johannine “millennium” should be construed symbolically either of the present spiritual reign of Christians with Christ… or of the present reign of the martyred saints in the intermediate state… or perhaps even both together, rather than be construed literally as an aspect of the Eschaton…(13)

Postmillennialism

Postmillennialism agrees with premillennialism regarding the nature of the millennial kingdom as a time of unprecedented historical glory and righteousness under the reign of King Jesus.(14)  Postmillennialism also agrees with amillennialism regarding the chronology of the millennium; the “thousand years” of Revelation 20 precedes the second coming of Christ.(15)

According to postmillennialism, the millennium is characterized by the gradual fulfillment of the Great Commission with the Holy Spirit drawing unprecedented multitudes to Christ through the faithful preaching of the gospel, transforming global society through discipleship; among those converted are the ethnic Israelites who have thus far rejected the Messiah.(16)  At the end of the present age there is a brief period of rebellion, after which Christ will return to consummate his Kingdom, there will be a general resurrection, and the final judgment of the just and the unjust will take place. Postmillennialism maintains a gospel-centered, missiologically-driven realistic optimism regarding the future of the present age under the reign of the ascended Christ.

Support for Position

It could be argued that a diachronic view of the corpus of Scripture provides a strong case for postmillennialism, from the protoevangelium (Gen 3:15) through the promises of the Abrahamic covenant (Gen 12, 15, 17) and the Messianic psalms (Ps 2, 22, 110), to the predictions of the Prophets (especially Is 9:6-7; Dan 2:31-35, 44; 7:13-27), as well as Christ’s Kingdom Parables (Matt 13:31-33), the Great Commission (Matt 28:18-20, with its allusion to Dan 7:13-14(17)), the role of ethnic Israel (Rom 9-11), and finally the perpetually controversial millennial passage in Revelation 20. Unfortunately, such an extensive undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper.(18)

Instead, this paper will present an exegetical defense of postmillennialism from 1 Corinthians 15:22-26. If the interpretation here is correct it should be sufficient to establish that only postmillennialism properly apprehends both the biblical chronology and nature of the eschatological millennial kingdom.

For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive.  But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who belong to Christ.  Then comes the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power.  For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet.  The last enemy to be destroyed is death (1 Cor 15:22-26).(19)

The context of 1 Corinthians 15 is Paul’s response to the question of the validity of bodily resurrection (15:12). Paul provides an eschatological answer, moving from Christ’s resurrection to the telos (“end”).(20)  Resurrection is invariably intertwined with Christ’s kingdom reign, since death is an enemy (15:26). The origin of death was sin (“as in Adam all die”) and the deliverance from death is in the Messiah (“in Christ shall all be made alive”). He then gives the eschatological sequence (tagmati) of this deliverance: “each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who belong to Christ.”  Christ was resurrected,(21) “then” (epeita) the resurrection “at his coming” of “those who belong to (him),” “then the end” (eita to telos). It is clear from the adverb usage (epeita, eita) that Paul is presenting a chronological sequence of eschatological events.(22)

Paul expands on the meaning of eita to telos by teaching that the “end” (telos) is “when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power.”(23)  The “end” is when the kingdom is consummated, not initiated, and Christ reigns from his resurrection “until he has put all his enemies under his feet.” This demonstrates that the kingdom is a reality before it is delivered to God the Father (contradicting the premillennial view of millennial chronology), but it is also delivered after Christ’s reign has brought about the destruction of every rule, authority and power (contradicting the amillennial view of the equal progression of good and evil throughout the interadvental period).

When the connection between 15:24 and 15:25 is analyzed in relation to the remainder of the pericope, the postmillennial interpretation is established. The gar (“for”) of 15:25 “introduces an explanation,” namely, indicating that the kingdom actions of 15:24 are the result of Christ’s “current but ongoing rule.”(24)  The chronological key, then, is that Christ’s established reign persists “until he has put all his enemies under his feet” and “the last enemy… is death,” which is “swallowed up in victory” (15:54) at his “coming” (15:23).(25)  Christ’s reign is interadvental, because the last enemy defeated before “the end” is death; and his reign is characterized by progressively putting all his enemies under his feet through the fulfillment of the Great Commission, until he has destroyed every rule, authority and power, since this occurs before the kingdom is delivered to God the Father.(26)

The premillennialist will interject that the adverb usage of 15:23-24 allows for the possibility of an intervening period between the “coming” (parousia) of Christ and “the end” (to telos).(27)  The semantic range of the terms and grammatical possibility of the interpretation are admitted by all sides.(28)  However, Paul’s usage of the term telos precludes such a conclusion, recognizing that telos is never used to refer to an “end period.”(29)  Theological presuppositions appear to drive this interpretation, rather than syntactical analyses, since there is no positive exegetical evidence in the passage referring to an intervening period between the present interadvental age and the age to come.(30)

The premillennialist rightly recognizes the nature of the millennial kingdom, that Christ reigns in a kingdom of righteousness, but abstracts this “end period” from the present interadvental age in contradiction to the teaching of Paul in this passage of 1 Corinthians.

The amillennialist agrees with the postmillennial assessment of the premillennial interpretation above. In fact, “optimistic amillennialists”(31) aren’t presented with any difficulty by the above exegesis. Problems arise when some amillennialists insist that the destruction of Christ’s enemies is contemporaneous with the second coming.(32)  This clearly contradicts the proper sequential translation of the second o[tan clause in 15:24 and its explanatory link to 15:25, as discussed above. The amillennialist correctly apprehends the biblical chronology regarding the millennial kingdom, but not the biblical testimony regarding its nature.(33)

Objections to Position

Without exaggeration postmillennialism is the most often caricatured eschatological position within professing evangelical circles. From the numerous premature reports of its death, to grossly distorted definitions, the postmillennialism that one reads about in popular works of theology is hardly recognizable by those who consider themselves postmillennialists… Postmillennialism is not liberalism, the social gospel, universalism, perfectionism, or some form of nationalism. Biblical postmillennialism teaches that the kingdom of Christ has been inaugurated and is redemptive, that its supernatural growth is progressive and will lead to worldwide conversion, and, finally, that it will be perfectly consummated only at the Second Coming of Christ.(34)

Apart from the numerous straw men erected in the place of postmillennialism (referred to in the quote above) one of the most common objections to postmillennialism is the imputation of guilt by its historical associations with modern theological liberalism.(35)  Guilt-by-association and slippery slope arguments are fallacious and, as such, are unworthy of Christian discourse. It is no less fallacious to point out that premillennialism is invariably the eschatology of anti-Christian cults such as Islam, Mormonism, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, while amillennialism is the doctrine of Roman Catholicism and Neo-Orthodoxy. Such observations only muddy already turbid waters, rather than providing biblical clarity.

Having very briefly pointed out the mistaken or fallacious nature of the most common objections to postmillennialism,(36) we will look at two of the most substantial objections presented to the postmillennial position, one from each respective alternative position.

The majority of premillennial objections to the postmillennial thesis center on the proper interpretation of New Testament prophecies, particularly the parallel passages of the Olivet Discourse and Revelation 20.  If the catastrophic events depicted in these passages characterize the circumstances in the intervening period before Christ’s return, then it would appear to rule out the postmillennialist’s optimism regarding the progress of the gospel until the end of human history.(37)

More specifically, Revelation 20 depicts the binding of Satan for one thousand years (to prevent him from continuing to deceive the nations), during which the saints are resurrected and reign with Christ (20:1-6). Satan is then released from his prison and he deceives the nations into going to war with Christ and the saints, where the devil is defeated and cast into eternal torment (20:7-10). These events precede the Final Judgment (20:11-15). This all takes place subsequent to a period of great tribulation (12:1-19:5) and Christ’s intervention in history (19:6-21).

Using a literal, chronologically sequential reading of Revelation the premillennialist draws the conclusion that Christ’s return in Revelation 19 precedes his millennial reign in Revelation 20; hence, pre-millennial.(38)  Of particular significance in establishing a literal interpretation of Revelation 20:1-6 is the use of the term anastasis (“resurrection”), which is used to refer to “the elimination of the condition of physical death through bodily resurrection” in every instance of its use in the New Testament (with the single exception of Lk 2:34).(39)  Given that the only explicit discussion in Scripture regarding the Millennium is this passage, it would seem that the appropriate interpretation here should carry the most force in the millennial debate, establishing the premillennial position. If the premillennial interpretation of Revelation 20 is correct then postmillennialism is refuted.

As mentioned above, amillennial objections have shifted in recent history from arguments based on specific exegetical matters to general soteriological arguments.(40)  The general thrust of the argument is that the Church will suffer persecution on earth throughout her existence as an essential facet of her union with Christ in his sufferings. In effect, “inaugurated eschatology comes across as ‘victory now for the One (Christ) and not yet for the many (the church).’”(41)  The nature of the church age is that “over the interadvental period in its entirety, from beginning to end, a fundamental aspect of the church’s existence is ‘suffering with Christ’; nothing, the NT teaches, is more basic to its identity than that.”(42)

Arguments in favor of this view of Christ’s interadvental millennial reign generally appeal to two biblical themes for support: redemptive/retributive irony and perseverance as spiritual victory. From the protoevangelium (Gen 3:15), White presents the case for gospel irony (ultimate victory through apparent defeat) as the paradigm for understanding biblical eschatology:

…the eschatologically significant moral principles by which his enemies would defeat him would end up being the very means by which he defeats them; in addition, the actual results effected by God are the opposite or a greater degree of the results intended by his enemies.(43)

Redemptive irony then entails defining the church’s victory in terms of perseverance through suffering, demonstrating that the church is characterized throughout by persecution, since perseverance through suffering is inherent in victory. As stated above, the church (ironically) overcomes through enduring persecution, just as Christ overcame sin through death. If the amillennialist is correct regarding the nature of the general soteriological principles at work during the kingdom reign of Christ then postmillennialism is refuted.

Defense of Position

B.B. Warfield once remarked (in reference to Revelation 20),

Nothing, indeed, seems to have been more common in all ages of the Church than to frame an eschatological scheme from this passage, imperfectly understood, and then to impose this scheme on the rest of Scripture vi et armis.(44)

The one point of agreement among scholars regarding the interpretation of Revelation appears to be the extreme difficulty of the task. Revelation is arguably the most figurative book in all of Scripture and it is the only place in all of Scripture which associates a “millennium” with the reign of Christ. Premillennialism rests its entire case regarding the chronology of the millennium on a literal interpretation of the most symbolic book in the New Testament.(45)

Significantly, Revelation contains clearly non-symbolic statements regarding the fulfillment of its own prophecies shortly after they have been given.(46)  This, when combined with other internal evidence, suggests the plausibility of a partial preterist understanding of Revelation, as well as a pre-70 A.D. date of authorship.(47)  The premillennialist’s futurism leaves these pressing time-frame indicator statements unfulfilled for centuries upon centuries. Also, as Luke 2:34 demonstrates, the semantic range of the term anastasij (“resurrection”) allows for its use in reference beyond “physical resurrection” alone.

The entire edifice of premillennialism appears to rest on an unjustified assertion of the necessity of a literal interpretation of an apocalyptically symbolic book. At the very least, the analogy of faith requires that the more complicated passage in Revelation 20 be understood in light of the much clearer statements of passages such as 1 Corinthians 15:22-26, so that a harmony may be found within Scripture. The premillennial eschatology is irreconcilable with Paul’s end time chronology in 1 Corinthians 15, though neither a partial preterist nor a recapitulatory interpretation of Revelation 20 presents any obstacle to finding a unity of New Testament interpretation.

The amillennialist has objected that union with Christ entails the essential, perpetual suffering of the Church. However, the amillennial position in this regard suffers from a subtle equivocation regarding the terms persecution and suffering; for not all suffering is reducible to persecution, and it is only the perpetuity of persecution which contradicts the postmillennial position. The postmillennialist agrees that suffering is central to the identity of the Church, but denies that persecutional suffering must necessarily persist until Christ’s second advent. If persecutional suffering is essential to the identity of the Church, then there has been no Church in North America for many years.

Postmillennialism affirms that any time the Church is persecuted she must persevere and that suffering is central to her identity; it simply denies that persecution is a necessary condition for spiritual victory, especially considering that there will be no persecution in heaven, the place of ultimate spiritual victory. Suffering may be the perpetual result of sin without being persecutional.

Also, the amillennialists cited above appear to use the redemptive irony theme in a selective manner, omitting important facets of gospel irony which can be seen to bolster the postmillennial thesis. The ironic victory of the gospel is also historical and gradually pervasive. Discussing these aspects of gospel irony, Gentry comments:

…the serpent sought to be like the most high, but was brought low – in history. The craftiest creature became the accursed creature – in history. The woman desired to rule her husband, but was ruled by him – in history. Man from the dust wanted to be like God, but was brought back to the dust – in history. The serpent sought the woman as his ally, but she became the mother of the righteous conqueror – in history. The serpent subdued the man, but the man’s son, the Son of Man, subdued the serpent – in history.(48)

However, given the amillennial view of the nature of history it appears that the serpent attempts to destroy the greater part of the human race – and succeeds(!) since God only saves “a remnant” of mankind. This hardly appears to be the irony which God has in mind.(49)

The amillennial conclusions here are based on a rejection of the principle of the gradual pervasiveness of the gospel in history. One more point of gospel irony is that the tiny, severely persecuted Church of the first century will be the tool by which Christ will destroy every rule and authority and power, reigning until he has put all his enemies under his feet (Matt 28:18-20; 1 Cor 15:24-25).

In fact, Matthew organizes the revelation of the kingdom in a surprising and ironic context: In Matthew 12:28 Christ proclaimed the presence of the kingdom (the kingdom is present); in 13:53-58 Matthew records Christ’s rejection (the kingdom appears to fail). Yet between these two kingdom data, the kingdom parables explain the irony of the kingdom’s method: it grows from a small seed to a great plant (13:31-32); it acts like a little yeast leavening the whole (13:33).(50)

The amillennial objections to postmillennialism rest on an equivocation regarding the role of suffering and persecution in the life of the Church and a selective understanding of redemptive irony. While the postmillennialist agrees with the amillennial assessment of the importance of perseverance through suffering in the life of the Church, the postmillennialist sees no warrant for the amillennial view of the nature of the interadvental reign of Christ.

Before concluding, it may be of use to bring into focus a point which appears to have been “lost in the shuffle” of postmillennial polemics, but which may help advance the cause for an evangelical consensus regarding the millennial debate.

Specifically, postmillennialists believe there will be a Satan-led rebellion subsequent to the pervasive reign of Christ on earth (the millennium), but prior to Christ’s return (in accordance with Rev 20:7-8).(51)  In this respect, the “judgment coming” of Christ in destroying the Jerusalem temple in A. D. 70 may be viewed as a part of the continuing typological foreshadowing of the final, terrible Day of the Lord, which will only be completely fulfilled at Christ’s second coming. This creates a potential point of agreement on all sides regarding the “already-not yet” character of the interpretation of Revelation and the Olivet Discourse.

Postmillennialism agrees with premillennialism regarding the nature of the millennial kingdom of Christ and agrees with amillennialism regarding the chronology of Christ’s return. Some points of disagreement have been discussed and a case has been presented for viewing postmillennialism as the most biblical view in the millennial debate, combining tempered optimism regarding the future of world history, and an absolute optimism regarding the return of Christ and consummation of his Kingdom.

Notes:

¹ Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1996), 665.

² "These categories, although helpful and widely accepted, are in certain respects unfortunate as the distinctions involve a great deal more than the time of Christ's return." Robert G. Clouse. “Introduction.” In The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views, ed. Robert G. Clouse (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 7.

³ This “eschatological sorting device” was adapted from: Jay E. Adams, The Time Is At Hand (Stanley: Timeless Texts, 2004), 8-11.

⁴ Anthony A. Hoekema, The Bible and The Future (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 174.

⁵ John F. Walvoord, The Millennial Kingdom (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1973), 129-130.

⁶ There is an intramural debate among dispensationalists regarding the timing of the rapture, whether it will be pre-tribulational, mid-tribulational or post-tribulational.  See Gleason L. Archer, Jr. et al., Three Views on the Rapture (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996).  More recently some have also argued in favor of a “pre-wrath” rapture, occurring sometime between the middle and end of the Tribulation.  See Marvin J. Rosenthal, The Pre-Wrath Rapture of the Church (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990).  Historically, most dispensationalists have favored a pre-tribulational perspective.

⁷ Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 1112-1114.

⁸ Herman A. Hoyt, "Dispensational Premillennialism," in The Meaning of the Millennium, ed. Robert G. Clouse (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977).

⁹ Russell D. Moore, The Kingdom of Christ: The New Evangelical Perspective (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 25-80.

¹⁰ George Eldon Ladd, "Historic Premillennialism," in The Meaning of the Millennium, ed. Robert G. Clouse (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 18-21.

¹¹ Craig A. Blaising, "Premillennialism," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 187.

¹² Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 1109.

¹³ Robert L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 1033.

¹⁴ "The 'reign' that Christ promises to His believers, furthermore, is not a 'spiritual' reign through the church.  It is instead a coercive rule over the cosmos (Rev. 5:10)...  It would seem therefore that a temporal millennial reign of Christ in the flow of this age's history is part of the messianic hope of Scripture." Russell D. Moore, The Kingdom of Christ: The New Evangelical Perspective (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004), 64-65.

¹⁵ Some postmillennialists maintain that the "thousand years" refers to a long period of global prosperity in the present age preceding Christ's return; others agree with amillennialists that it refers to the entire era between the two advents.

¹⁶ Keith A. Mathison, Postmillennialism: An Eschatology of Hope (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1999), 10.

¹⁷ Craig L. Blomberg, Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, ed. D.A. Carson, G.K. Beale (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 100.

¹⁸ For a more extensive treatment of relevant passages from a postmillennial perspective see Roderick Campbell, Israel and the New Covenant (Philadephia: P&R Publishing, 1954); Kenneth L. Gentry, He Shall Have Dominion (Tyler: Institute for Christian Economics, 1992).

¹⁹ The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Wheaton: Good News Publishers, 2002), 961.

²⁰ Paul, the archetypal apologist, argues his case evangelistically (15:1-2), scripturally (15:3-4), evidentially (15:5–7), experientially (15:8-11), logically (15:12-19), soteriologically (15:20-22), eschatologically (15:23-27, 51-54), via reductio ad absurdum (29-34), somatologically (15:35-49), and practically (15:58)!

²¹ It is possible that "firstfruits" refers to Christ or (given the nominative case of aparche) a group raised at the time of Christ’s resurrection (Mt 27:52-53).  Either interpretation comports with the argument presented in this paper.

²² Walter Bauer, W.F. Arndt, F.W. Gingrich, F.W. Danker, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed, ed. Frederick William Danker (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 295, 361.

²³Note that in the ESV the second hotan of 15:24 with the subjunctive aorist (katargese) is correctly rendered “after,” in accord with BAGD p. 731 (“with the aorist subjunctive, when the action of the subordinate clause precedes that of the main clause”).

²⁴ Darrell L. Bock, "The Son of David and the Saints’ Task: The Hermeneutics of Initial Fulfillment," Bibliotheca Sacra 150, no. 600 (October 1993): 455.

²⁵ Paul's clear allusion to Ps 110 in 15:25 is important, but space limitations prevent a further investigation into the matter.  Suffice it to say that, given the pervasive use of Ps 110 by NT authors, a biblical view of the Messianic Kingdom cannot in any instance utterly divorce Ps 110's usage in the NT from Paul's eschatological usage here in 1 Corinthians 15.  If this interpretation is correct then the allusion to Ps 110 gives greater support prima facie to the earlier assertion regarding diachronic biblical support for postmillennialism.

²⁶ This view of Pauline eschatology coheres well with the NT eschatological teachings of Jesus and John.  See Keith A. Mathison, Postmillennialism: An Eschatology of Hope (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1999), 178-179.

²⁷ "Like the preceding epeita (v. 23), the temporal adverb eita most likely implies an interval of time between the coming of Christ and the end...  If epeita, a closely related word can mark an interval of 1900 years in the previous verse, may not eita allow for a 1,000-year interval in verse 24?...  Therefore, by "the end" Paul means an end period, which includes Christ's conquest of enemy powers followed by the handing over of the kingdom to the Father...  Thus the most probable meaning of eita and to telos in verse 24 lends evidence to a time gap between the coming of Christ and the end, which allows for a millennial reign of Christ, the very kingdom (ten basileian) mentioned in verse 24." D. Edmond Hiebert, "Evidence from 1 Corinthians 15," in A Case for Premillennialism, ed. Donald K. Campbell, Jeffrey L. Townsend (Chicago: Moody Bible Institute, 1992), 230-231.

²⁸ Geerhardus Vos, The Pauline Eschatology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930), 243.

²⁹ Paul uses telos 12 other times, never to indicate an “end period” (Rom 6:21, 22; 10:4; 13:7; 1 Cor 1:8; 10:11; 2 Cor 1:13; 3:13; 11:15; Phil 3:19; 1Th 2:16; 1Tim 1:5).

³⁰ Wallis’ statement can be taken as representative, “Therefore, since there is a sequence clearly marked, the telos cannot be simultaneous with the Parousia.  Because the telos is preceded by the destruction of enemies, and the destruction of enemies cannot be put before the Parousia, the telos must stand beyond the Parousia and judgment.” Wilber B. Wallis, "The Problem of an Intermediate Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 18, no. 4 (Fall 1975 ): 231.

The postmillennialist simply asks why the destruction of enemies cannot be put before the Parousia?  In context, Wallis gives no argument in support of his assertion. Yet this contradicts what seems to be the most straightforward reading of the passage.  In part, Wallis’ interpretation is due to a prior commitment to a pessimistic view of interadvental history which precludes following 1 Corinthians 15:22-26 to its clearest conclusion, while also permitting a particular interpretation of Revelation 20 to be the exegetical boundary marker on this passage, leading to the interjection of an extra millennial period which is entirely alien to the text under discussion.  Issues surrounding Revelation 20 will be discussed in the next two sections of this paper.

³¹ Or “nonquantitative postmillennialists.” See Vern S. Poythress, "Currents within Amillennialism," Presbyterion 26, no. 1 (2000): 21-25; "2 Thessalonians 1 Supports Amillennialism," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37, no. 4 (1995): 534.

³² Robert B. Strimple, "Amillennialism," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 109-111; Simon J. Kistemaker, Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1993), 552-553.

³³ In the literature surveyed in researching this paper, it appeared that contemporary amillennialists believed there were sufficient general soteriological reasons for rejecting postmillennialism, without sufficient consideration of the exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15:22-26.  Those “general soteriological reasons” will be discussed in the next two sections of this paper; suffice it to say, however, if the interpretation above is correct, no general soteriological reasons will be sufficient to overturn Paul’s teaching in this regard.

³⁴ Keith A. Mathison, "A Summary Case for Postmillennialism," in Thine Is the Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry (Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003), 1, 3.

³⁵ There can be no such thing as a "liberal postmillennialist," by definition.  Postmillennialism is the doctrine that Christ will return after the Millennium.  No liberal theologian believes in the bodily return of Christ at the close of human history.

³⁶ For a fuller response to common misrepresentations see Greg L. Bahnsen, "The Prima Facie Acceptability of Postmillennialism," The Journal of Christian Reconstruction 3, no. 2 (Winter 1976-77).

³⁷ Craig A. Blaising, "A Premillennial Response to Kenneth L. Gentry Jr," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 73-78.

³⁸ Harold W. Hoehner, "Evidence from Revelation 20," in A Case for Premillenialism, ed. Donald K. Campbell, Jeffrey L. Townsend (Chicago: Moody Press, 1992), 245-250.

³⁹ Craig A. Blaising, "Premillennialism," in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Darrell L. Bock (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 223-224.

⁴⁰ Richard B. Gaffin, Jr, "Theonomy and Eschatology: Reflections on Postmillennialism," in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, ed. Will S. Barker, W. Robert Godfrey (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), 197-226; R. Fowler White, "Agony, Irony, and Victory in Inaugurated Eschatology: Reflections on the Current Amillennial-Postmillennial Debate," Westminster Theological Journal 62, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 161-176.

⁴¹ White, ibid., p. 167.

⁴² Gaffin, ibid., p. 211.

⁴³ White, ibid., p. 170.

⁴⁴ B. B. Warfield, "The Millennium and The Apocalypse," Princeton Theological Review 2 (October 1904): 3.

⁴⁵ John repeatedly interjects explanations for the meanings of various symbols throughout the book, severely undercutting literalistic interpretations, e.g. lampstands represent churches (1:20), eyes represent the Spirit (5:6), incense represents prayers (5:8), a serpent represents Satan (12:9), heads represent mountains (17:9), horns represent kings (17:12), waters represent people (17:15), etc.

⁴⁶ Rev 1:1, 3; 3:10; 22:6, 10.  Similar statements were made by Christ during the parallel passages in the Olivet Discourse, cf. Mt 24:34, Lk 21:32, Mk 13:30.

⁴⁷ Gentry, Jr., Kenneth L, Before Jerusalem Fell: Dating the Book of Revelation (San Francisco: Christian Universities Press, 1997).  While the scope of this paper precludes further discussion of preterism and higher criticism regarding Revelation’s date of authorship, it is worth noting that a preterist, like the premillennialist, maintains a sequentialist interpretation of Rev 19-20; however, a recapitulatory reading of Rev 19-20 with a post-70 A.D. date of authorship (often held to by amillennialists) does not necessarily preclude the postmillennial view, especially when one considers the parallels between Ps 110 and Rev 19 in light of Ps 110’s use throughout the NT.  See: William O. Einwechter, "Psalm 110 and the Postmillennial Hope," in Thine Is the Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry (Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003), 55-59.

⁴⁸ Kenneth L. Gentry Jr., "Agony, Irony, and the Postmillennialist," in Thine Is The Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr (Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003), 98-99.

⁴⁹ The belief that only a remnant of mankind will ultimately be saved explicitly contradicts the definition of "redemptive irony" given by White, as quoted above; namely, "the actual results effected by God are the opposite or a greater degree of the results intended by his enemies."  If this is the case then "a greater degree" of mankind must be saved than lost.  The postmillennialist recognizes that the discipleship - in history - of the greater degree of mankind carries historical implications for society and culture.  See B. B. Warfield, "Jesus Christ the Propitiation for the Whole World," The Expositor 21 (1921): 241-253.

⁵⁰ Gentry, ibid., p. 98.

⁵¹ Kenneth L. Gentry Jr., "A Postmillennial Response to Craig L. Blaising" in Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 237.

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_________. "Agony, Irony, and the Postmillennialist." In Thine Is The Kingdom: Studies in the Postmillennial Hope, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr, 98-99. Vallecito: Chalcedon Foundation, 2003.

_________. "A Postmillennial Response to Craig L. Blaising." In Three Views on the Millennium and Beyond, ed. Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr., 237. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999.

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Wallis, Wilber B. "The Problem of an Intermediate Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 18, no. 4 (Fall 1975 ): 231.

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White, R. Fowler. "Agony, Irony, and Victory in Inaugurated Eschatology: Reflections on the Current Amillennial-Postmillennial Debate." Westminster Theological Journal 62, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 161-176.