Equal Rights

Sexual orientation presupposes a "sex" which one "orients." In other words, being a homosexual or a heterosexual is first predicated on whether a person is biologically male or female. This is as simple, straightforward and uncontroversial a fact as stating that eating requires a mouth and food.

However, this simple fact presents a massive problem to those who advocate for "homosexual marriage" rights on the basis of an "equal rights" platform. The fact is that a homosexual man and a heterosexual man have equal marriage rights: a homosexual man can marry any woman who will marry him, just like any other man (and vice versa with respect to homosexual women).

This wipes away any argument for "homosexual marriage" legislation based upon equality, and it removes any argument based upon analogy to women's suffrage or the abolition of slavery (since those issues stemmed from human rights being withheld from certain humans based upon biological sexuality or genetic ethnicity).

Now a case for "homosexual marriage" legislation could be based upon other suppositions, and ought to be weighed and considered on the merits of those arguments (though "equal rights" appears to be the most common argument currently). However, the prevailing equal rights assertions and analogies used by advocates of "homosexual marriage" are severely lacking, as demonstrated above. One cannot be a homosexual without first being a man or woman and all men and women in the western world have equal marriage rights.

The next time you hear someone offering an equal rights-based argument for "homosexual marriage," inform them that homosexuals do have equal marriage rights. Then ask them what they think the basis is for granting special "marriage" rights to homosexuals. This will at least give the opportunity for the conversation to advance a bit beyond the general sloganeering of the contemporary debate.

Doug Wilson on Christian Entitlement (aka Sloth)

Just One More Piglet

Part Deux

Good and Necessary Consequence

"The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture..." -1647 Westminster Confession of Faith 1:6

"The sum total of God's revelation concerning all things essential to His own glory, and to the salvation and faith and life of men, is either explicitly set down or implicitly contained in the Holy Scripture." -1689 2nd London Baptist Confession of Faith 1:6

There have been a few misologists along the way who have criticized the inclusion of the "implication" or "consequence" clauses in the WCF and 2LBCF (quoted above). An example could be found here, in a sermon by Don Fortner.

In his criticism of the quoted clauses Pastor Fortner states, "If I cannot show you where a thing is stated in Holy Scripture, I have no right to believe it, preach it, or compel you to believe it." Of course, this sentence is nowhere stated in Holy Scripture, but is something which Pastor Fortner deduced by implication (which I would assume he thought was of good, possibly even necessary, consequence) from the statements of Rev. 22:18-19, 2 Tim. 3:16, etc. The irony of the logical gyrations of those who are opposed to logic always makes for good entertainment.

These sorts of statements sound pious at first, because they propose a "high view of Scripture," especially in contrast to "extra-biblical statements," such as creeds, confessions, sermons... pretty much everything else. However, they belie a certain naivete about the actual process of the interpretation of Scripture, which then extends itself into a denial of "good and necessary" things. Like logic, a necessary part of interpretation.

The WCF speaks of deduction by good and necessary consequence from the expressions of Scripture and the 2LBCF speaks of the explicit and implicit statements of Scripture. (I'm going to stipulate that the various terminology used in the two confessions have the same concept at heart here.) What are we to make of these statements?

I think the authors may have meant by the phrase "good and necessary consequence" the simple distinction between the truth of the premises taken from Scripture ("good" interpretation) and the validity (or inductive strength) of the implication ("necessary" inference). However, I may be wrong on this point and would be glad to hear other perspectives on the matter.

If we have a conclusion of a valid argument deduced from true premises taken from the expressions of Scripture, then we can clearly say that this implication is true. Where we run into problems is with invalid (or inductively weak) argument forms or wrong interpretations giving untrue premises. Or the common practice of waving our magic "good and necessary consequence" wand to produce any doctrine which we like or which our favorite Puritan liked, apart from any explicit Scriptural premises or clear argumentation of any kind. In those cases we wind up with doctrines which certain people think are "good," but which are by no means demonstrably "necessary."

Deducing doctrines out of "good and necessary consequence" involves familiarity with valid logical forms (such as modus tollens, modus ponens, etc.) and with the principles of biblical exegesis, so that we can obtain true premises and make valid inferences. Also, a good external check on this process is to use the analogy of faith to determine if a conclusion contradicts a clear, explicit, multiply-attested doctrine of Scripture (i.e. a doctrine with a "strong analogy of faith.")

Some might then propose that deductions of "good and necessary consequence" ought to be placed on a different level than the explicit statements of Scripture with regards to reliability, since these deductions use fallible human logic. This objection suffers from the same naivete which I mentioned above regarding the role of logic in biblical interpretation. Rightly interpreted biblical expressions will entail by valid deduction necessary consequences which are no more and no less true than their premises. How can we posit two separate levels or orders of truth? Is a valid conclusion somehow less true than its true premises?

The problem, as I already alluded to, is not with the concept of "good and necessary consequence" as such, but with its common use (or perhaps I should say abuse) in justifying whatever pet doctrines one prefers without providing any cogent argumentation. Whenever certain traditionally cherished beliefs are called into question in light of a paucity of biblical data in favor of them, the phrase "good and necessary consequence" becomes the escape clause for maintaining one's traditions contra Scriptura.

Since we already have the WCF and 2LBCF in our purview, let's take an example from Covenant Theology. Covenant Theology proposes a framework of three extra-biblical covenants derived by "good and necessary consequence": the eternal, intra-Trinitarian Covenant of Redemption, the Covenant of Works, which is the context for the single Covenant of Grace with its multiple administrations throughout redemptive history (cf. WCF Ch. 7, 2LBCF Ch. 7).

While my familiarity with the literature on Covenant Theology is by no means exhaustive, I have never seen a valid formal argument with true premises presented for any of the three covenants mentioned above (or even an attempt at such argumentation). If anyone can point me to an example of such an argument I'd be grateful.

Most of the literature which I've seen presupposes the doctrines as part of Covenant Theology's confessional framework and interprets Scripture in such a way as to show that it comports with those presuppositions. However, demonstrating that certain (even many) biblical statements can comport with a presupposition is not enough to establish a presupposition as biblical. It must be "explicitly set down or implicitly contained in the Holy Scripture."

And the fact is that when Scripture speaks of the various biblical covenants (plural), it speaks of them as separate covenants with different administrations, not a single, eternal covenant with multiple administrations (cf. Jer. 31, Heb. 8-9). This explicit language of Scripture carries a far stronger analogy of faith than the presupposition of an eternal Covenant of Grace, especially in absence of any demonstration of the doctrine's basis as a "good and necessary consequence."

(It is, in my humble opinion, a very unfortunate thing that an extra-biblical doctrine with dubious deductive validity (and which contradicts a doctrine with a strong, explicit analogy of faith) holds the position of one of the most basic presuppositions in Covenant Theology's theory of redemptive history. It is also unfortunate that the resultant theory of redemptive history then functions as a systematic hermeneutical framework as well, compressing the full-orbed unity and diversity of the biblical covenants into a single covenant. This results in some instances in an implicit Judaizing effect on Covenant Theologians' views of the sacraments, law, ethics and sanctification, emphasizing Moses to the detriment of Christ and creating a forced conception of equivalent, rather than typological, continuity between the covenants.)

Now calling this much-cherished, confessionally-Reformed tradition of the basic presuppositions of Covenant Theology into question will probably be as warmly received in certain circles as up-ending tables in the temple was by those whose livelihood depended on that income. I won't be responding in this post to all the conceivable objections and counter-arguments to what I've presented. I'll leave that to the comments, if anyone takes an interest in such a discussion.

Let me say briefly, however, that I am not advocating Dispensationalism as an alternative to Covenant Theology. With respect to a framework of redemptive history, I would much prefer a modified form of Covenant Theology, something largely akin to what has been called New Covenant Theology, or even the formulations of the 1646 1st London Baptist Confession of Faith, which does not adopt any doctrines of "unnecessary consequence" and appropriately emphasizes the New Covenant and the law of Christ, instead of the old covenant and the law of Moses. Also, the various covenants of Scripture all find points of unity and continuity in that they are all covenants initiated by a holy, gracious, eternal God, rather than being ectypes of an archetypal eternal covenant. Christ is the archetype and his New Covenant is the eternal covenant.

Finally, I do think it is advisable to keep our theories of redemptive history distinct from our hermeneutical systems in as much as this is possible, so that the text might inform our theory rather than the opposite. In this way we can truly affirm Semper Reformanda and solo Christo in the 21st century, in accordance with the eternal Scriptures.

Zen Calvinism

"So what is Zen-Calvinism? Like the Buddhist movement which shares the same name, Zen-Calvinism is a school of religious thought which allows its adherents to live at one with the world, untroubled in any ultimate sense by the slings and arrows which life throws their way. It is also counter-cultural and thus represents a deeply alternative lifestyle. Let me elaborate a little on this counter-cultural mentality.

At the heart of Zen-Calvinism is the belief that all human beings are morally flawed, unlike the worldviews projected by the celebrity-saturated commercial culture of the modern West...

Zen-Calvinists also accept that they are themselves no better than anyone else; and, understanding their own tendencies to treat everyone else in a less-than-perfect fashion, they will not be surprised when they are repaid in kind. Zen-Calvinists are at one with the depravity of the fallen universe; they expect to be treated as they know they have treated others...

The final element of Zen-Calvinism is perhaps the most important: the realization that all evil has been subverted for the greater good purposes of the God who loves hi church. If the supreme crime of human history – the judicial murder of the very Son of God – can be used for the greatest good, then any other crime, sin or moral failing can also be frustrated and turned to good account. And that applies not just to the loutish and corrupt behaviour of others; it applies supremely to that of the Zen-Calvinist who reflects upon these things..."

http://www.reformation21.org/counterpoints/post-44.php

Argument Against Classical Covenant Theology

Major Premise: 1. If Covenant Theology is true (A), then its doctrines will be expressed or implied in Scripture (B).

1a. CT contains a doctrine that baptism corresponds directly with circumcision (both being given to infants as signs of the covenant), albeit with minor administrative adjustments (baptizing infant males and females, whereas circumcision was limited to males, etc.).

1b. This doctrine rests heavily on the doctrine that the Abrahamic and the New Covenant are the same, single eternal Covenant of Grace in different administrations.

Minor Premise: 2. Even in the most conspicuous places (Acts 15, Col. 2) Scripture nowhere expresses or implies doctrines (1a) and (1b). (~B)

2a. Scripture presents a typological relationship between circumcision and baptism, where the emphasis on the material type (circumcision) is replaced by the emphasis on the spiritual substance (regeneration) (Col. 2), and baptism is linked to union with Christ (Rom. 6), which is by rebirth, not physical birth.

2b. The “one covenant – multiple administrations” supposition (1b) on which (1a) rests is also in contradiction with the plain teaching of Scripture regarding multiple covenants with multiple respective administrations (Jer. 31, Heb. 8-9), each a progressively-revealed, prophetically-typological shadow of the one, eternal covenant in Christ (the New Covenant).

Conclusion: 3. Therefore (~A) CT is false (or "not true," for the strict logicians out there) by modus tollens.

If A, then B.
Not B.
Therefore Not A.

Triablogue: The noseeum assumption

Some more interesting thoughts on The Problem of Evil from Steve Hays: Triablogue: The noseeum assumption This post particularly relates to the Inductive Problem of Evil.